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note were signed) or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. This
exercise would require an exhaustive review of the books of original entry and ledgers
along with performing a detailed valuation of the assets and liabilities to be disposed of in
AlA's discontinuation of its insurance underwriting operations. The valuation provided
by Mr. Hooper is cursory in nature based upon an estimated mathematical allocation and
not supported by actual documents. Mr. Hooper also does not address the significant
"write ups" in asset values that I discussed above that accounted for over $9,000,000 in
profits in 1996 and 1997. At this time, I have not determined the financial status as of
July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years as we have never
been provided full and complete access to the necessary documents. Such a review is not
possible based upon the documents produced to date and would require an exhaustive
review of the AlA's books of original entry and ledgers, all of which have not been done
by Mr. Hooper.
17.

As discussed above, the magnitude of the 1995 write-off, closely followed

by substantial write-ups in 1996 and 1997 totaling $9,720,505, demonstrate the arbitrary
nature of estimating the net impact of discontinued operations and invalidates the net
deficit amount calculated on a pro rata basis by Mr. Hooper as of July 22, 1995. Based
upon our retrospective look at the impact of discontinued operations on AlA's financial
statements, it is apparent that they significantly overestimated the impact of discontinued
operations in 1995, thereby resulting in an inflated deficit amount as of December 1995.
18.

Practically, it is very difficult to determine the net impact of discontinued

operations and its effect on the net deficit amount in 1995. This is further complicated by
the fact that after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, new management was
responsible for making operational and financial decisions. The net impact of these
AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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decisions may have further negatively impacted the resultant end-of-year net deficit
amounts.
19.

Even if a business entity's overall book value is negative, this may not be

indicative of the entity's ability to maintain normal operations into the future or indicate
that the entity has no significant net value. Additional factors include its ability to obtain
credit and/or produce future positive operating results and cash flow. Likewise, an entity
can have asset book values that are sizably less than fair market values, which, upon
liquidation, can reduce or eliminate equity deficits.
20.

Mr. Hooper also notes that the 1995 Auditor's Report raised doubt as to

AlA's ability to continue as a Going Concern. The Going Concern issue was removed
prior to issuance of the Auditor's Report for AlA's 1997 audited financials. This fact
further undermines any insolvency argument attributable to the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares.
21.

In the Affidavit of Drew E. Voth, CPA, CFE, CVA, ClRA in Support of

Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration of
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Voth comes to
many of the same conclusions as Mr. Hooper. Namely, that AlA was insolvent as of July
22, 1995, and had insufficient earned surplus. For the same reasons that apply to Mr.
Hooper's opinions, Mr. V oth' s opinions are not supported by the review and
investigation of all the required documents necessary to form his opinion.
22.

It appears that neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper address capital surplus in

their opinions as to the financial ability of AlA to redeem Reed Taylor'S shares in 1995
or 1996.

Neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper addressed any consideration and due
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diligence considered by the Board of Directors of AlA when determining the financial
condition of AlA in 1995 or the fair market value of its assets.
23.

With the passage of 13 Yz years since the date of the 1995 Agreement, one

is now afforded the opportunity to take a more practical and realistic approach as to the
question of solvency. As noted above, for the II-year period from 1996 through 2006,
AlA generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of $3,867,584 and Net Income of
$10,194,714. These financial results, including the ability to continue to operate for no
less than an additional eleven (11) years, should resolve any issue regarding whether or
not AlA was solvent in 1995 as a result of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I note
that AlA started paying Reed Taylor reduced amounts contemporaneously with the
formation and operation of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. (flkla AlA Crop Insurance,
Inc.).
24.

Mr. Voth notes as evidence of AlA's inability to pay its debts the failure

of the AlA to pay the $1.5 million down payment at closing or within 90 days. In fact, it
was not paid until 2001. Mr. Voth fails to note that as part of the restructuring plan in the
1995 Private Placement Memorandum, AlA was to sell 150,000 shares of Series C
Preferred Stock and receive $1,500,000 from a group of investors. This $1.5 million was
to be used as the down payment on Reed Taylor's $7.5 million stock repurchase deal.
AlA received this money, but never paid the agreed upon down payment amount of
$1,500,000 to Reed Taylor.
25.

Mr. Voth has not attempted to perform a valuation or determined the

financial status, either on an asset valuation model or calculating earned surplus of AlA
as of July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. He simply
states "there was not sufficient Earned Surplus in order to fund such an obligation based
AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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upon how that term is used in Idaho Code 30-1-6 and 30-1-46." As stated above, such a
valuation and opinion would require an exhaustive review of AlA's books of original
entry and ledgers, which Mr. Voth and Mr. Hooper have not done.

In addition, to

properly opine on the amount of AlA's earned surplus in 1995 or 1996, one would need
to review all financial statements, journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents,
auditor and accountant workpapers, and the other documents listed below.
26.

Mr. Voth also notes AlA's failure to payoff the $6.0 million note as

evidence of AlA's inability to "pay its debts as they became due in the usual course of its
business." As noted in my previous Affidavit, dated September 8, 2008, our review of
AlA accounting and financial records disclosed a number of questionable and/or
inappropriate related party transactions. These transactions began started with the arrival
of new leadership at AlA in 1995 and have continued through December 2006, the end
date of records that we have thus far reviewed. Generally, these transactions have had
the effect of increasing AlA's general and administrative costs and decreasing net income
and available cash to pay Reed Taylor. A summary of transactions follow:
a

AlA and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") engaged in a
number of transactions to the detriment of AlA creditors and
shareholders:

•

AlA Crop Insurance Inc. is incorporated on November 18, 1999. It
appears that this is a subsidiary of AlA. Articles of Amendment filed
November 13, 2000 changed the name to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. CropUSA apparently became an independent company
at some point in time, although I have been unable to conclusively
make an opinion as to when that event transpired. Mr. John Taylor's

involvement in CropUSA is questionable especially given the nonAMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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compete provisions in the Executive Officer's Agreement with AlA
signed August 1, 1995.
III

AlA subsidized expenses related to CropUSA from 1999 and on by
providing general and administrative support and either undercharging
CropUSA for this support, or not charging them at all. For example,
for years

1999 through 2004, none of John Taylor's total

compensation, which ranged from $196,536 to $250,000, was
allocated to CropUSA. Due to the types of accounting records that
were maintained in 1999 and 2000 when CropUSA was an AlA
subsidiary, and based upon the records that have been produced to
date, it is impossible to determine the amount of dollars that should
have rightfully been allocated to CropUSA without an exhaustive
review of the financial records of both entities. Based upon what has
been provided though, costs appear to have been allocated on a very
subjective basis with no documentation to support the allocation logic.
It appears other costs or expenses paid by AlA for CropUSA may

never be known. With respect to the labor allocations, no substantive
documentation was provided to support the arbitrary allocation of time
between AlA and CropUSA. According to 2001 and 2002 financial
records as represented in the known accounting entries, the unallocated
cost total was approximately $500,000.

This amount was never

allocated to CropUSA.
III

In 2004, AlA Insurance, a subsidiary of AlA, purchased CropUSA's

ownership shares of AlA Services for approximately $1.5 million in
AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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cash. According to CropUSA's financial records, these shares had a
book value of $21,850. This appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to
capitalize CropUSA while depleting the financial resources of AlA. I
also note that AlA Insurance was responsible for the income taxes on
the $1.5 million transferred to CropUSA.
II

AlA Insurance became the guarantor on a loan with AGM, LLC for
$15,000,000. AlA received no consideration for this loan guarantee
and it further demonstrates that the Defendants were utilizing AlA for
the benefit of CropUSA without any compensation or return benefit to
AlA.

II

According to a letter to shareholders dated August 18, 2008, certain
CropUSA assets were to be sold to Hudson Insurance Company
("Hudson"). The representation disclosed in the letter indicates "the
sale of the current block will result in a gain in excess of $10 million."
There is a legal question as to whether Reed Taylor should have been
entitled to a security interest in the assets that were sold to Hudson
based upon our identification of significant amounts of money that
were transferred to CropUSA by AlA and the fact that this entity was
initially operated as a subsidiary of AlA.

b

AlA engaged in a number of transactions where stock was redeemed and
payments were made to ESOP for put contracts:
II

Based upon my understanding, AlA is specifically prohibited from
engagmg m paying any dividend to the Series C Preferred
Shareholders or redeeming any other shares m AlA Services

AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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Corporation until it has satisfied the outstanding obligations of Reed
Taylor and redeemed all of the Preferred A Shares in ALA Services
Corporation. Based upon the limited records reviewed, below is a
listing of the transactions:
..

Payments made to employees for stock redemptions:

..
II

..

2003-2006 - $14,963

Payments made to the ESOP for put contracts:

..

1999 - $49,626.90

..

2000 - $37,531.88

..

2001 - $42,487.81

II

2002 - $31,914.18

II

2003 - $58,114.89

II

2004 - $16,671.68

..
III

c

1997-2002 - $405,658

2005 - $8,901.13
2006 - $2,945.98

AlA paid dividends to Preferred C Stock shareholders from 1995 through
1998:

..

ALA's payment of dividends is hardly the action of an insolvent
corporation.

These payments are made despite the fact that the

obligations of Reed Taylor and the Preferred A Shareholder had not
been satisfied. Based upon the limited records reviewed, amounts paid
in dividends by year total:
..

1995 - $67,123

AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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II

1996 - $249,888

III

1997 - $289,702

II

1998-$74,375

AlA engaged in a number of transactions with Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation ("PERC"). PERC was at one time a related party with AlA:
II

From December 1997 through December 2001 AlA engaged in a
series of transactions where 219,044 shares of PERC common stock
were purchased. The total book value of stock held was $411,844. In
December 2001 and the third quarter of 2004, AlA transferred all of its
ownership shares of PERC to John Taylor at a transfer price that may
or may not have been at fair market value.

III

A receivable in the amount of $95,000 owed by PERC to AlA was
transferred to Crop USA on December 31, 2006.

II

Transactional activity reflects an ongoing back and forth transfer of
cash between AlA and PERC, even though AlA was no longer an
owner of PERC stock after the third quarter of 2004.

II

Emails and other documents produced by AlA also show that AlA
personnel were providing services for

Pacific Empire Radio

Corporation and related entities.
e

John Taylor received total compensation ranging between $196,536 and
$250,000 per year from 1995 through 2006:

One can question the validity of the reasonableness of both the amount of John
Taylor's total compensation and as to why AlA was required to absorb these costs, as his
salary was not allocated to CropUSA until 2006 (his total compensation appears to have
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been allocated after John Taylor testified on March 1, 2007, that his salary was not
allocated to CropUSA and that he spent half of his time working for CorpUSA).
f

John Taylor is charging AlA an excessive amount for the rental of a
parking lot:

•

Prior to John Taylor's purchase of a parking lot in 2001, AlA was
being charged $5,000 per year in rent for the lot.

Amounts paid in

2004,2005 and 2006 were $15,750, 15,000 and $30,000 respectively.
The $30,000 amount paid in 2006 includes $15,000 of "prepaid
parking lot rent for 2007."
g

AlA purchased vehicles on behalf of John Taylor:
II

In January 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's BMW for $41,450.

II

In September 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's Ford Excursion for
$18,770.

27.

Currently our investigation is incomplete because documents requested

during the discovery process have not yet been produced.

The above examples of

questionable transaction are not exhaustive and our investigation in this regard remains
ongoing and incomplete. Upon production of the necessary documents and answers to
questions from various past and present accounting personnel in and outside of AlA, we
will need additional time to review the records of AlA and related parties to scrutinize
investments, transfers and other transactions from 1995 through the present time to
confirm that AlA actually produced sufficient cash flow to pay Reed Taylor. Without
gaining full and unencumbered access to additional financial records and accounting
information, it is impossible to measure the full extent of funds that have been drawn out
of AlA for the benefit of others.

With the added complexities of locating historical

AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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financial records and other documents from over 13 Yz years ago, we may never be able
to measure the full amount of the financial impact or to fully rebuild the financial status
of AlA on certain dates in 1995 or 1996.
28.

The previously noted financial transactions identified to date represent

deliberate instances of self-dealing and questionable business transactions involving the
use of AlA as a financial platform to fund other umelated or competing opportunities.
Without doubt, these transactions were detrimental to AlA and are subsumed in the
balance sheet and operating results for the respective periods in which they occurred;
although as previously mentioned, for the period from 1996 through 2006, AlA generated
positive Operating Income after Interest Expense of $3.8 million. The cumulative effect
of these transactions impacted AlA's ability to meet its existing debt obligations to Reed
Taylor, including amounts owed as a result of the 1995 and 1996 Agreements. Based
upon my understanding of the priority of the various shareholders and creditors of AlA,
the $l.5 million transferred/paid to CropUSA for the Series C Preferred Shares in AlA
Services should have been paid to Reed Taylor or the Preferred A Shareholder before
being transferred/paid to CropUSA.
29.

Based upon our review of the documents that have been produced to date

in this matter, my findings are summarized as follows:
a

Neither of the financial consultants in this matter (Mr. Hooper and Mr. Voth)
has provided a thorough and accurate financial status of AlA as of July 22,
1995 or August 1, 1995.

b

AlA was not rendered insolvent in 1995 or 1996 as a result of the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares as evidenced by the following:
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III

Positive cumulative operating results from 1996 through 2006, and no
evidence that any creditors besides Reed Taylor had not been paid.

iii

With the exception of Reed Taylor, no creditors have been impaired by
AlA through non-payment or failure to fulfill financial obligations.

c

From 1995 through present, the management of AlA has engaged in a series
of questionable and prohibited transactions with the net effect of diminishing
the value of AlA and Reed Taylor's asserted security interest therein.

d

Given the magnitude of AlA's pattern of questionable and prohibited
transactions and transfers of capital that have occurred over a 13 Y2 year
period, it is conceivable that the remaining obligation owed to Reed Taylor for
surrendering his AlA stock presumably could have been satisfied in
accordance with its tenns.

30.

As indicated above substantial amounts of financial documents have not

been produced or made available in this action. In order to detennine and render a full
and complete opinion on the amount of earned surplus available at AlA in 1995, the
following documents for AlA need to be produced
(a)

All journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents, income
statements, check registers, tax returns, financial statements,
accounting notebooks (monthly, quarterly and year-end),
workpapers, and account analysis for AlA and all Subsidiaries
from the date of incorporation through the end of 1996;

(b)

All workpapers and notes from all internal and outside
accountants/auditors for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of
incorporation through the end of 1996;

(c)

All record for all dividends, distributions, redemptions and other
corporate transactions for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of
incorporation through the end of 1996; and
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(d)

All due diligence information relied upon by the Board of
Directors of AlA and all Subsidiaries for all material transactions
(including the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares) from the date
of incorporation through the end of 1996.

This information is required to reconstruct and ddcrmine the amount of
adjusted earned surplus for AlA in 1995 or 1996. This efrort will require sufficient
time onee the documentation has been provided. along \vith an allowance oftil1le for
tollow up with any other information and/or supporting documents which may have
been omitted and/or may be required to fully reconstruct an adiusted earned surplus
for AlA in 1995 and 1996.

DATED this 9th day of April 200 .

SUBSCRIBED and SWORt\' to on this 9th day' of April 2009. before me. a
Notary Public for the State of Montana. by Paul E. Pederson. known to me to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the \vithin instrument and ackncnvlcdged that he
executed the same.

M0 ntan a. res i din gat ~--"'-"""'~~'r"''--''::''-'"'7''-''-''''-..:r.JIV
My Com miss ion Ex pires: ......L.-='<A."'f.?-~:...=:..:'--"7~
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Exhibit A

Paul E. Pederson
Paul E. Pederson is the President of Pederson Associates, Inc., establishing the firm in 1995. His
past experience includes approximately ten years with "big five" accounting firms and another
five years with a national consulting firm.
As part of his experience, Mr. Pederson has performed financial analysis work for bankruptcy
and breach of contract matters in industries such as construction, real estate development, forest
products, agriculture, fishing, retailing, restaurant, and agency relationships, addressing such
issues as increased costs, wrongful termination, lost profits, diversion of funds and business
devastation. He has periodically been asked and has provided valuations of closely held
businesses in the construction, restaurant and sign industries. He has also extensively reviewed
partnership records in real estate matters involving both commercial and mixed-use projects and
reviewed response action costs in environmental matters.
Throughout the course of his career, he has reviewed financial agreements, stipulations or
consideration sections contained within numerous contracts and the financial records of hundreds
of companies involved in contract issues. In conjunction with these efforts, he has often been
asked to evaluate and testifY to the meaning and interpretation of the financial agreements,
stipulations or consideration in contracts, the potential direct financial impact of contractual
relationships and any potential associated consequential financial impacts to the parties of the
contracts such as lost profits and business devastation/destruction. As part of these efforts, he
has been asked to offer opinions in a variety of industries on the value of a particular contractual
relationship and the value of a business based upon anticipated future income. Mr. Pederson has
also been engaged in matters involving the valuation of trademarks, impacts due to trademark
and trade dress infringement and copyright infringement.
He has provided testimony as an expert in a variety of matters through affidavit, deposition and
oral testimony in cases before State and Federal courts and arbitrators.
In addition to claims analysis, Mr. Pederson has performed organizational management reviews
for both public and private organizations. This work included addressing such items as contract
formation, contract language, contract administration policies and procedures, project
organization, project reporting and identification of key areas of risk in the contracting process.
Mr. Pederson's previous experience also includes six years in the construction industry working
for a concrete construction company.
Mr. Pederson earned his Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration, Accounting, from the
University of Puget Sound. He holds a certificate as a Certified Public Accountant, is a member
of the Washington Society of Certified Public Accountants and a past member of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
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Exhibit B

Pederson Associates, Inc .
Representative Client List
Law Firms:

Law Firms (COni.):

Abbott, Davis, Rothwell, Mullin & Earle
Ahlers & Cressman, PLLC
Allen, Yazbeck, O'Halloran & Hanson
(Portland, OR.)
Arnold, Gallagher, Saydeck, Percell
Roberts & Potter (Eugene, OR)
Ater Wynne, LLP
Betts Patterson & Mines
Blankenship Law Firm
Bogle & Gates
Barokas, Martin, Ahlers & Tomlinson
Brown Lewis Janhunen & Spencer
(Aberdeen, WA.)
Bush Strout & Kornfeld
Cairncross & Hemplemann, P.S.
Camp vonKallenbach O'Sullivan
Carney Badley Smith & Spellman
Carley & Rabon, PLLC (Charlotte, NC)
Christensen, O'Connor, Johnson & Kindness
Chism, Thiel, McCafferty & Campbell
Connor & Chung, PLLC
Cushman Law Firm (Olympia, WA.)
Dann & Meacham
Davis Wright Tremaine
Edwards Frickle Anner-Hughes & Culver
(Billings, MT)
Farella Braun + Martell, LLP (San Francisco)
Ferring Nelson LLP
Field Jerger LLP (Portland)
Foianini & Sears (Ephrata, WA.)
Foreman Arch Dodge & Zimmerman PS
(Wenatchee, WA.)
Foster Pepper & Shefelman
Gibbons & Whyte, PLLC
Graham & Dunn
Groff Murphy PLLC
Hacker & Willig, Inc., P.S.
Hale Lane Peek Dennison and Howard (Reno, NV)
Hanemann, Bateman & Jones (Olympia, WA)
Hanson Baker Ludlow Drumheller P.S.
Harold A. Thoreen, P.S., Inc.
Hattery Schwartzenburg, LLC
Hedeen & Caditz
Hight Green & Yalowitz
Heller Ehrman White & McAuliffe
Hoffman Hart Wagner (Portland, OR)
Inslee Best Doezie & Ryder
Jameson Babbitt Stites & Lombard

Jeffers, Danielson, Sonn & Aylward
(Wenatchee, W A.)
Keller Rohrback LLP
Lane Powell PC
Lee Anav Chung, LLP
Linville Ursich, PLLC
Logan & Giles LLP (Walnut Creek, CA)
McDonough Holland & Allen PC (Sacramento, CA)
Miller Nash, LLP (Seattle, WA. Portland, OR)
Mills Meyer Swart ling
Montgomery Purdue Blankinship & Austin
Nadler Law Group
Ogden Murphy Wallace PLLC
Oles Morrison Rinker & Baker
Ordal, Kaseberg & Mitchell, PLLC
O'Shea Barnard Martin (Bellevue, WA.)
Perkins Coie
Preston Gates & Ellis
Resick Hansen & Follis (Bellingham, WA.)
Robert Crick Law Firm, PLLC (Spokane, WA)
Rock Creek Legal Services (Missoula, MT)
Short Cressman & Burgess
Sirianni Youtz Meier & Spoonemore
Smith,Cannon & Bond, PLLC (Lewiston, ID)
Stanislaw Ashbaugh LLP
Stewart Sokol & Gray, LLC (Portland)
Stoel Rives
Vandeberg Johnson & Gandara
(Tacoma, WA.)
Yi Tuan & Brunstein (New York, NY.)
Young deNormamdie
Williams Kastner & Gibbs PLLC
Winston & Cashatt (Spokane, WA.)

Public Agencies:
Attorney General of Washington
City of Bellingham
City of Brier
City of Kirkland
City of Edmonds
City of Everett
City of Federal Way
City of Issaquah
City of Kent
City of Lake Forest Park
City of Lynnwood
City of Puyallup
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Public Agencies (cont.):

Business Enterprises:

City of Seattle
East Side Union High School District,
San Jose, California
Eastern Washington University
PUD No. I of Chelan County
PUD No.2 of Grant County
King County
LOTT Wastewater Alliance
(Lacey, Olympia, Tumwater, Washington and
Thurston Co.)
Magadan Science and Research Institute (Russia)
Manson School District
Mercer Island School District
Montana Department of Transportation
Olympus Terrace Sewer District
Oregon State Department of Environmental
Quality
Oregon State Department of Justice
Oregon State Lottery
Pierce County
Port of Port Angeles
Port of Everett
Seattle Housing Authority
Sherwood School District (Oregon)
Skagit County
Snohomish County
Tacoma School District
The Evergreen State College
Thurston County Dept. of Water and Waste
Management
U.S. Department of Energy
Washington State Convention and
Trade Center
Washington State Department of
Corrections
Washington State Department of Ecology
Washington State Department of
Transportation
Washington State Ferry System
Washington State Penitentiary
Washington State University
Whatcom County Water District #10
Yakima Air Terminal

360networks USA
Abbey Land LLC (California)
Advanced Technology Construction
Aldergrove LLC
Aleutian Spray Fisheries
Armada West Campus, Inc.
ANCOICAICO's JV
Artic Slope Regional Corporation
ASRC Energy Services (Alaska)
Aztec Electric of Spokane
Bank of America Corporation
BaughiSkanska, Inc.
Belarde Company
BergerlABAM
Berschauer Phillips Construction Company
BIE Aerospace
Bridgewood Joint Venture
Bruce Dees & Associates
Bechtel Hanford, Inc.
Cadman, Inc.
CaicoslAnco JV
California Track & Engineering
Canron Construction, Inc.
Cascadia Restaurant
Casne Engineering
Chase Electric
Chemco Corporation
City Transfer, Inc.
CLEANPAK Systems Co.
Clear Brook Construction
CNA Insurance
Colliers International
Construction Enterprises & Contractors, Inc.
Copperwood Properties, LLC (Montana)
Cortex Medical Management Systems, Inc.
Creekwood Lots, LLC (Montana)
Cupertino Electric (California)
David Evans Associates
DPIC Insurance Companies
E. Kent Halvorson, Inc.
Easters & Kittle
Eastwood Environmental, Inc.
Edgewood Properties, LLC (Montana)
Elcon Corporation
Emerald Outdoor Advertising
ENRON Corporation
Evergreen International Aviation, Inc.
Falcon West Helicopters, Inc
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Business Enterprises (coni.):

F. E. Ward Constructors
Filtration Development Company, LLC (California)
First Pacific Development Ltd.
Fishing Company of Alaska
Fletcher General Construction
Frank L. Veninga, Architect, PC.
F. W. Spencer Mechanical (California)
George E. Masker Painting (California)
G. F. Atkinson General Construction
General Electric (Real Estate and Construction)
George Gill Construction, Inc.
Giles Engineering
Glacier Construction Partners, LLC (Montana)
Hanson Pipe & Products, NW
Harnell Green & Abrahamson, Inc.
Harrington Construction & Development, LLC
HDR Engineering, Inc.
HDRITurner JV
HealthCare Systems, Inc.
Holaday-Parks-Fabricators, Inc.
Holiday ReSales Group
Horton Dennis & Associates
Howard S. Wright Construction Company
Hunt Family Properties, LLC
Huntwood Industries
Humphrey Industries, Ltd.
Hyundai Telecom, Inc.
Hyundai Wood Industries Co., Ltd.
ICF Kaiser Hanford
I/O Concepts, Inc.
Insurance Company of the West
Industrial Properties, Inc.
1. Harper Contractors, Inc.
Jacobs Engineering Group
Janssen Contracting Company, Inc. (Alaska)
J. E. McAmis, Inc. (California)
Jones Quarry
J.M. RAFN Company
Kegel & Associates
Kiewit Construction Group
Kitsap Community Federal Credit Union
Klukwan, Inc. (Alaska)
KMD Architects
KPFF Engineers
Laser Underground Utilities
Lease Crutcher Lewis
Ledcor Industries, Inc.
Lehigh Portland Cement Company

Leo A. Daly
Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon
Liberty Capital, LLC
Linder Construction, Inc. (Alaska)
Lloyd's of London
Lowe Development Corporation
LS W Architects, PC
Lunde Construction
Lydig Construction (Spokane)
Magnum Drywall (California)
Marco Two Union Square
Matheus Lumber Company
Mead Gilman & Associates
MEECO Manufacturing Company, Inc.
Medical Asset Management, Incorporated
Merritt + Pardini
Metromedia Fiber Network
Mithun Architects
Millers Mutual Fire Insurance Company
Mills, John & Rigdon
Mosier Creek LLC (Oregon)
Multi Concepts of America, Inc.
Neir & Associates
New Lines Construction
Noble House Hotels, LLC
North Coast Enterprises, Inc.
Northern Cheyenne Indian Tribe
Northwest Cascade, Inc.
Oasis Events
Olympic Blvd. Partners
Olympic Coast Investment Inc.
Olympic Western Company
Olson Bros. Excavating, Inc.
Osborne Construction Company, Inc.
PACCAR
PACE Systems Company
Pacific Coast Coal Company
Pacific Pluming Supply Co. LLC
PAPE Group
Parametrix, Inc.
Paul Bros., Inc. (Oregon)
PCL Construction Services
PCY Corporation, Inc.
Pinnacle Realty Management Company
Powell Homes
ProteoTech, Inc.
Rakoz Electric, Inc.
Questech
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Business Enterprises (cont.):

R. C. Hedreen
Reliance National Insurance Companies
Riverside Properties, LLC (Montana)
Roll Manufacturing, Inc. I Franklin Mint
S. A. Gonzales Construction, Inc. (Spokane)
Safeco Property and Casualty Insurance
Companies
Santana Trucking
Seafirst
Seattle Gourmet Foods, Inc.
Scott Wall Construction
S.D. Deacon Corporation
Shea Construction, Inc. (Spokane)
Shelton Presbyterian Church
Singleton Associates
Signal Electric
S. 1. Amoroso Construction (California)
Smith-Kern Ellensburg, Inc.
Specialty Restaurant Group, Inc.
Sound Design Engineering, Inc.
South Central Concrete, Inc,
South Coast, Inc.
St. Paul Insurance Companies
Standard Steel RDfRA PRP Group
Star Track Systems (Wisconsin)
Starfire Sports Complex
State Farm Mutual Insurance Group
Stewart Foods
Strand Hunt Construction
Streeter & Associates
Sverdrup Corporation
T-Mobile
Tacoma Mall Townhouses, LLC
Takisaki Inc. Contractors
Target Corporation
Tesoro Petroleum Company
Texaco Marketing and Refming
The Hotsy Corporation of Denver
The Scott Company (California)
Thermion, Inc.
Timberland Construction LLC (Montana)
Timberland Properties, LLC (Montana)
Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America
TyDiCo Construction, Inc.
United of Omaha Life Insurance Company
Universal Land Construction Company
US WEST, Inc.
Valley Electric ofMt. Vernon

Vision One LLC
VW & R Corporation
W. A. Botting Company, Inc.
XL Specialty Insurance Company (Surety)
Yates, Wood & MacDonald
Zurich American Insurance Company
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Exhibit C

Document Listing
•

AlA Services Corporation and Subsidiaries Consolidated Financial Statements for
Years Ended:
o December 31, 1994 and 1995 [AIA0028658 - AIA002870 1]
o

December 31, 1995 and 1996 [AIA0025034 - AIA0025076]

o December 31, 1996 and 1997 [AIA0025181 - AIA0025223]
o December 31, 1998 and 1999 [AIA000080 - AIAOOOI10]
o December 31, 2000 and 2001 [AIA000049 - AIA00007 4]
o December 31, 2001 and 2002 [AIA000021 - AIA000048]
o December 31, 2003 [AIAOOOO 16 - AIA000020]
o December 31, 2004 [AIAOOOO 11 - AIAOOOO 15]
o
•

December 31, 2005 [AIA000006 - AIAOOOO 10]

CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. Financial Statements for Years Ended:
o

December 31, 2002 and 2003 [AIA000450 - AIA000462]

o December 31, 2003 and 2004 [AIA0004 37 - AIA000449]
•

AlA Insurance Workpapers for Years:
o

2001 [AIA0021853 -AIA0022083]

o

2002 [AIA0022225 - AIA0022427]

o

2003 [AIA0022925 - AIA0023184]

o

2004 [AIA0022552 -AIA0022872]

o 2005 [AIA0023087 - AIA0023517]
o
(I

2006 [AIA0023656 - AIA0023795]

AlA Services Workpapers for Years:
o

1999 [AIA0024165 - AIA0024237]

o

2000 [AIA0024086 - AIA0024165]

o

2001 [AIA0023956 - AIA0024068]

o

2002 [AIA0023874 - AIA0023955]

o

2003 [AIA0024631 - AIA0024 737]

o

2004 [AIA0024738 - AIA0024822]

o

2005 [AIA0023543 - AIA0023655]

o

2006 [AIA0024823 - AIA0024875]
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Document Listing
e

AlA Insurance Accounts Payable Account #2460-00-0 dated December 31, 2005
[AIAOOO 1460]

I)

AlA Insurance, Inc. Due To/From John Taylor Account dated December 31,2006
[AIA0001563 -AIAOOOI564]

I)

AlA Insurance, Inc. General Ledger Detail Listing dated December 20, 2004
[AIA0012844]

I)

Letter from Richard A. Riley of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen to

w. Frank Taylor of Cairncross &

Hempelmann regarding AlA Services

Corporation dated July 1, 1996 [AIA0029010 -AIA0029014]
\II

AlA Services Corporation Confidential Private Placement Memorandum dated
June 1, 1995 [AIA00280 15 - AIA0028059]

..

Articles ofIncorporation of AlA Crop Insurance, Inc. [AIAOOI121 - AIA001123]

•

Articles of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation of AlA Crop Insurance,
Inc. dated November 13,2000 [AIAOOI124 - AIA001125]

I)

Executive Officer's Agreement for R. John Taylor dated August 1,1995 [9 pages]

I)

AlA Inc. Trust Mark 3Q2004 Journal Entries dated 9/30/04 [AIA0001415 AIAOOOI418]

I)

Loan and Security Agreement between CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. and
AGM, LLC dated October 27,2006 [AIAOOI157 - AIA001239]

•

Letter to Shareholders from CropUSA dated August 18,2008 [AIA0027471]
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Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor submits this Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie
Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Bryan Freeman, JoLt:e
Duclos, ALA Services Corporation ("AlA Services"), ALA Insurance, Inc. ("AlA Insurance"),
R. John Taylor ("John Taylor"), and ALA Services Corporation 401(k) Plan's ("Plan") Joinders
and in Support of Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Reed Taylor: l

I.

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the Defendants and Plan's assertions, ALA Services had sufficient capital
surplus to redeem Reed Taylor's shares in 1995 and the redemption did not render ALA Services
insolvent in violation of I.C. § 30-1-6, as evidenced by the significant appraisals conducted for
ALA Services and the millions of dollars in commissions and related receivables. ALA

Service~'

only insolvency arose years later in or around 2001, after the redemption agreements were
executed, by the Defendants' corporate malfeasance and mismanagement-facts which are not
denied by the Defendants. The Defendants created the insolvency in 2001 when they elected to
not pay Reed Taylor and instead to steal the money?

ALA Services' later insolvency has

effected only one known creditor-Reed Taylor.
Assuming ALA Services was insolvent or had insufficient capital surplus as a result of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, the redemption agreements were not illegal. Contracts to
I For convenience of the Court, Reed Taylor submitted his Statement of Facts as a separate pleading, however, Reed
Taylor incorporates by reference his Statements of Facts dated April 9, 2009, into each and every section below.
The Statement of Facts and Memorandum of Law dated April 9, 2009, supersede and replace Reed Taylor's
Response dated February 26,2009.
2 Reed Taylor has alleged and maintains that AlA Services has been insolvent since 2001, but such insolvency was
not caused by the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, but instead by the Defendants' malfeasance and
mismanagement.
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redeem shares in a corporation are not illegal. Contracts promising to pay a creditor over time
for the redemption of shares are not illegal. Contracts granting a creditor a security interests in
collateral as terms of a stock redemption agreement are not illegal. Contracts promising to allow
a creditor to vote the shares of a corporation as security for redeeming the creditor's shares are
not illegal.

Moreover, the Idaho Legislature did mandate that any agreements that violate I.e.

30-1-6 are void or voidable and did not even mention a violation as being "unlawful."
Instead, the Defendants are attempting to draw the Court away from the undisputed
corporate malfeasance, the facts and appraisals, and the applicable case law cited by Reed
Taylor. Indeed, I.C. § 30-1-6 does not violate a criminal code nor does not contain the operative
"buzz" words of "illegal" or "unlawful" or "prohibited" acts, which are found in Farrell v.
Whitman, WL 198516 (Idaho 2009) (the Defendants' key case dealing with an unlicensed
architect violating Idaho Code stating that it is "unlawful" to not be licensed and the companion
code section making such violation a criminal misdemeanor).
Irrespective of the legal nature of stock redemptions, AlA Services' assets exceeded all of
its liabilities (including the debt owed to Reed Taylor) by over $2.5 Million on December 31,
1995 (based upon a reduced "minority interest" valuation), which was after the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares and after AlA Services' businesses had declined as asserted by the
Defendants. As of December 31, 1996, the "minority interest" valuation of AlA Services (after
all obligations, including the debt owed to Reed Taylor) increased to over $4.2 Million. In other
words, regardless of whether the Court utilizes "surplus" or "insolvency" as the basis for the
redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares as provided under I.C. § 30-1-6, sufficient surplus existed
and AlA Services was not rendered insolvent by the redemption in 1995 or 1996.
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Assuming AlA Services was rendered insolvent or had insufficient surplus to redeem
Reed Taylor's shares, Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
should be denied for many reasons, without the need of even addressing the factual issue of the
financial status of AlA Services in 1995 or 1996. The same holds true for the Joinders filed by
the other parties in this action. The Defendants and the Plan are not intended beneficiaries of
I.e. § 30-1-6. The Defendants and the Plan are not innocent creditors or innocent shareholders.

In fact, there are no innocent creditors or innocent shareholders. The Defendants and the Plan
lack standing to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and are time barred from
attacking the redemption.

Moreover, the Defendants and the Plan have acquiesced in the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares for over 13 years. The Court should deny the Defendants
and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Joinders, and grant partial summary judgment in
favor of Reed Taylor.
II.
A.

LEGAL AUTHORITY AND ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment Standard.
1. The Summary Judgment Standard for an Affirmative Defense.

When a party moves for summary judgment based upon an affirmative defense, the party
asserting the defense bears "the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact
material to ... [the] defense." Mason v. Tucker and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 437, 871 P.2d 846
(Ct. App. 1994).
The party seeking summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense must
conclusively prove all elements of the defense. Franklin v. JD. Jackson, 847 S.W.2d 306, 308
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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Here, the burden is on the Defendants to prove all elements of any affirmative defenses
and that there is no genuine issue of fact. The Defendants have failed to meet their burden.
2. The Summary Judgment Standard For the Moving Party
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the
moving party. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy, Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713 (2005).
The court must liberally construe all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 P.3d 743 (2007).
Summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPhheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 394,
64 P.3d 317 (2003).
On summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving parting, including questions of credibility and the weight to be accorded particulflr
evidence. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991) (quoting Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986».
3. The Summary Judgment Standard for the Nonmoving Party
The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party
has not filed its own motion with the court. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d
612 (2001). Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
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file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c).
B.

I.C. § 30-1-6 Governed the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares In 1995 and
1996 and the Redemption Agreements and Promissory Notes Were Not Illegal.

On February 26, 2009, the Defendants for the first time asserted that I.C. § 30-1-46 is
inapplicable and that I.C. § 30-1-6 was the appropriate code section. 3 See I.C. § 30-1-6; I.C. §
301-46 (both sections remained the same in 1995 and 1996).
Idaho Code has a savings provision that requires the provision in place as of the date of
the transaction to govern transactions occurring prior to the repeal of the Idaho Business
Corporations Act:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the repeal of a statute by this
chapter does not affect:

***

(c) Any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred
because of the violation, before its repeal.

I.C. § 30-1-1703 (emphasis added).
Thus, I.C. § 30-1-6 applies to any violations in 1995 and 1996. I.C. § 30-1-46 has no
application. Moreover, only payment terms were modified in 1996-Reed Taylor'S shares were
already redeemed and he became a secured creditor on July 22, 1995, pursuant to the terms of
the redemption agreements. 4

III
Although inapplicable, I.C. § 30-1-46 illustrates the illegality of over $600,000 in unlawful dividends paid to the
Preferred C Shareholders by the Defendants when the payments should have gone to Reed Taylor and Donna
Taylor. Reed Taylor objects to hearing the Defendants Motions and Joinders because they asserted I.C § 30-1-6 as
authority for the first time on February 26, 2009. They have thwarted Reed Taylor's discovery and prejudiced him
by not complying with numerous discovery requests in this action.
4 See Hearing, Ex. A, Z, AA-AD.
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C.

AlA Services Had Sufficient Capital and Earned Surplus to Redeem Reed
Taylor's Shares.
1. AlA Services Had Sufficient Surplus to Redeem Reed Taylor.

The parties agree that I.C. § 30-1-6 is the applicable code section to the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares for any violations in 1995 and 1996. The pertinent parts of I.e. § 30-1-6
(1995) state:
30-1-6 Right of a corporation to acquire and dispose of its own shares.

A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, hold,
own, pledge, transfer or otherwise dispose of its own shares, but purchases of its own
shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the extent of unreserved and
unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and, if the articles of incorporation so
permit or with the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares entitled to
vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available
therefor.
To the extent that earned surplus OR capital surplus is used as the measure of the
corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such surplus shall be restricted so long as
such shares are held as treasury shares, and upon the disposition or cancellation of any
such shares the restriction shall be removed pro tanto .
.. .No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made at a time when the
corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent.
I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995). Thus, when ascertaining the financial condition of a corporation to redeem
its own shares, a corporation may rely upon one or more of the following: (1) Earned Surplus;
(2) Earned Surplus and Capital Surplus; or (3) Capital Surplus. See I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995)
(emphasis added); see also LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 125, 369 P.2d 45

(196~)

(the fair market value of a corporation's assets over its debts is applicable to a stock redemption).
When determining the application of I.C. § 30-1-6, interpretation must be based upon the
definitions set forth in I.C. § 30-1-2 (1995).
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"CAPITAL SURPLUS" is defined as "the entire SURPLUS of a corporation other than
its earned surplus." See I.C. § 30-1-2(m) (emphasis added).
"SURPLUS" is defined as "the excess of the NET ASSETS of a corporation over its
stated capital." See I.e. § 30-1-2(k) (emphasis added).
"NET ASSETS" is defined as "the amount by which the TOTAL ASSETS of a corporation

exceed the TOTAL DEBTS ofthe corporation."

See I.C. § 30-1-2(i) (emphasis added).

Thus, after applying the definitions set forth in I.C. § 30-1-2 to the references to "Capital
Surplus" in I.C. § 30-1-6, the test for determining a corporation's ability to purchase its own
shares, when "Earned Surplus" is not used, is the net value of all of the corporation's assets.
The Idaho Legislature's departure from the strict reliance of only "earned surplus" and
using other valuation methods has been adopted by the American Jurisprudence and other
treatises:
Directors have reasonable latitude to depart from the balance sheet to calculate surplus,
for the purpose of determining whether the corporation can redeem shares, so long as
they evaluate assets and liabilities in good faith, on the basis of acceptable data, by
methods that they reasonably believe reflect present values ...

See 18B Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1777 (2008) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); 19
C.J.S. Corporations § 664 (2008).
Balance sheets are not conclusive indicators of surplus or the lack thereof, for the purpose
of determining compliance with the requirement that a corporation may redeem its shares
only out of surplus or as expressly authorized by statute. This is because unrealized
appreciation and depreciation can render book numbers inaccurate; regardless of what a
balance sheet that has not been updated may show, and though unrealized, appreciation
reflects real economic value that the corporation may borrow against or that creditors
may claim or levy upon. Accordingly, corporate directors have reasonable latitude to
depart from the balance sheet to calculate surplus ... so long as they evaluate assets and
liabilities in good faith ...
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19 C.J.S. Corporations § 664 (2008) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added) .
... the existence or nonexistence of an adequate surplus that the corporation has to apply
to the purchase of its own shares is not determined solely on the corporation's financial
statement, but rather the authorities have suggested that actual values, not book values,
are determinative of the existence of surplus.
A statutory restriction that if the purchase was for cash or property made only to the
extent of unreserved or unrestricted earned surplus did not prohibit a corporation from
purchasing its own shares on credit ... 5
The relevant time to evaluate whether a corporation's capital has been impaired is the
time when the challenged obligation was entered into ...
... the board of directors may base a determination that a distribution is not so prohibited
either on financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices and principals
that are reasonable in the circumstances, or on a fair valuation or other method that is
reasonable in the circumstances.
6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2849 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Significantly, however, in 1997 (1 Yz years after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares),
the Idaho Legislature clarified Idaho law even further by removing the confusing "Earned
Surplus" and "Capital Surplus" standards when it adopted I.C. § 30-1-640. This is significant
and cannot be underemphasized.
Therefore, contrary to the assertions made by the Defendants and the Plan, they must
produce all appraisals, valuations or other means of providing an analysis of the fair value of
AlA Services assets are at issue and subject to discovery in this action. Indeed, the value of AlA
Services assets strikes at the heart of the Defendants and Plan's alleged "illegality" arguments
The appraisals of assets, shares and businesses of AlA Services and/or its subsidiaries directly
pertains to the pending motions filed by the Defendants and Plan and impacts Reed Taylor's
This provides yet another independent basis to deny all of the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
without reaching the issue of surplUS.

5
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ability to respond. These documents and information are all discoverable and should be ordered
produced.
In fact, although previously requested over one year ago, on March 5, 2009, AIA
Services and AlA Insurance finally produced appraisals conducted in 1995 and 1996 to value a
minority interest in AlA Services (after considering the over $7 Million owed to Reed Taylor) at
over $2 Million6 and $4 Million,7 respectively (meaning that after Reed Taylor's redemption,'a
majority ownership interest was even more valuable). Moreover, on March 11,2009, additional
appraisals were finally produced valuing AlA Services' commons shares at over $8 Million for a
minority interest at year-end 1994 (in other words, Reed Taylor'S majority interest was worth
significantly more)8 and an appraisal valuing the entire company at over $19 Million on October
14, 1994. 9 Finally, Reed Taylor valued the commissions and contractual relationships owned by
AlA Services at over $24 Million in 1995. 10
2. AlA Services' Directors Obviously Relied Upon Projections for Future
Business When Electing to Redeem Reed Taylor's Shares.

When determining the solvency or insolvency of a corporation, the directors of a
corporation may rely upon projections for future business:

See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12,2009, Ex. A (valuing the common shares at a discounted
minority interest value resulted in them being worth over$2 Million after considering the company's obligations to.
Reed Taylor).
7 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12, 2009, Ex. B (valuing the common shares at a discounted
minority interest value resulted in them being worth over $4 Million after considering the company's obligations to
Reed Taylor).
8 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12, 2009, Ex. C. This valuation report was received issued to AlA
Services on October 24, 1995-approximately three months after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and relied
upon the June 1, 1995 Private Placement Memorandum attached to the Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008,
and other documents attached to this affidavit. This report, like the others, fell squarely within the information
requested for over 1 Yz years from AlA Services and only produced within the past seven days.
9 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated March 12,2009, Ex. D; Statement of Facts, ~~ QQ-RR.
10 See Affidavit of Reed Taylor, ~~ 5-6.

6
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In addition, in determining whether the equity insolvency test has been met, certain
judgments or assumptions as to the future course of the corporation's business are
customarily justified, absent clear evidence to the contrary. When directors are making
judgments or assumptions about the future course of a corporation's business, they may
utilize a cash flow analysis based on a business forecast and budget for a sufficient period
of time in order to determine whether the corporation can reasonably expect to satisfy
known obligations as they mature over that period.
See 15A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 7363 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

3. A Corporation Need Not Consider A Corporation's Surplus When
Payments Are Made Over Time.
When a corporation acquires shares from a shareholder on credit, the amount of surplus
that a corporation has available is not relevant:
A statutory restriction that if the purchase was for cash or property made only to the
extent of unreserved or unrestricted earned surplus did not prohibit a corporation from
· ·Its own shares on cre d'It ... 11
purc hasmg
6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2849 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, AlA Services acquired Reed Taylor's shares on for $7.5 Million in credit in 1995. 12
Accordingly, the amount of surplus available at AlA Services in 1995 is irrelevant and that
extensive factual issue need not be determined.
4. Even if AlA Services Utilized the Earned Surplus Standard, A Question
of Fact Exists As To the Amount of AlA Services' Earned Surplus on
July 22,1995.
Significantly, AlA Services' shareholders specifically voted to approve the redemption of
500,000 of Reed Taylor's shares for $7.5 Million (includes the $1.5 Million down payment and

11 This provides yet another independent basis to deny all of the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
without reaching the issue of surplus.
12 See Hearing, Ex. A and Z-AB.
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$6 Million Promissory Note ).13 Moreover, Paul Pederson testified that the shareholder deficit
and earned surplus at year-end 1995 was over reserved, as evidenced by a $8,820,000 "write up"
in 1997 and a $900,505 "write up" in 1996. 14

D.

The Defendants and Plan Have Failed to Prove The Redemption of Reed
Taylor's Shares Rendered AlA Services Insolvent.

A corporation's solvency is presumed:
As a general rule, solvency is presumed, especially where a going concern is involved,
and if shows to have existed as of a certain date, it will be presumed to have continued
until the contrary is shown. Furthermore, if a corporation ceases to do business; such fact
does not raise a presumption of insolvency prior to the time of cessation of business; nor
does the mere appointment of a receiver raise such a presumption. Similarly, an
adjudication of bankruptcy has been held to raise no presumption of insolvency prior to
the filing of the petition seeking such adjudication.
The presumption in favor of solvency is to be considered
circumstances of the case and the object of the suit ...

III

connection with the

Generally, a person challenging a transfer of property has the burden of proving that the
transferor was insolvent at the time of the conveyance ...
15A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 7364 (2009) (internal foot notes and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also discussed the factors used to determine the insolvency
of a corporation:
The cases very generally agree that a corporation is not insolvent within the meaning Of
the rule which prevents a preference to directors merely because it cannot meet its
obligations as they become due or because its assets are not equal to, or would not pay
all, its liabilities, where it is still a going concern-that is, continuing its business with

13 It is unknown whether shareholders approved the other 113,464 shares (which were redeemed in exchange for
airplanes (including Reed's assumption of debt owed on planes) and other consideration. However, AlA Services
was obligated to obtain all necessary consents, represented it had obtained all necessary consents and its counsel
even provided Reed Taylor an opinion letter stating that all necessary approvals and consents had been obtained.
14 See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009; Hearing, Ex. AM, p. 5.
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some expectation and a reasonable prospect of being able to continue the corporate
enterprise.

LaVoy Supply Co., 84 Idaho at 126-27 (citing 13 Am.Jur., Corporations, § 1261) (emphasis
added).
1. The Burden Is On The Defendants and the Plan To Prove The
Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Caused AlA Services' Insolvency.
The burden to prove insolvency rests upon the party asserting that a corporation is
insolvent. See LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45 (1962).
Thus, the Defendants and Plan must carry the burden of proving that AlA Services was
insolvent in 1995 or that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares made it insolvent in 1995
through expert witness testimony. They have failed in their burden.
2. The Defendants and Plan Are Estopped From Asserting Insolvency.
The purpose of restricting a corporation's ability to redeem its own shares is to protect
creditors and minority shareholders:
So-called stock repurchase statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority
stockholders from corporate mismanagement of assets ...
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus ...

See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (citing Minnelusa Co. v. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d l321
(Colo. 1996); American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis
added».
Here, even if the redemption rendered AlA Services insolvent, the Defendants and Plan
are estopped from asserting insolvency because they participated in the scheme.
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3. The Defendants Represented that AlA Services Was Not Insolvent In
1995 By the Terms of the Redemption Agreements and Are Judicially
Estopped From Now Asserting Otherwise.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions,
whether legal or factual, absent newly discovered evidence or fraud.

McKay v. Owens, 130

Idaho 148, 155,937 P.2d 1222 (1997). The policies underlying judicial estoppel
are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to
protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a
court at its discretion.
Id., 130 Idaho at 152, quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343,94 F.3d 597, 601

(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
Here, the Defendants have all asserted in pleadings that AlA Services was not insolvent.
The Defendants are judicially estopped from asserting insolvency.
As the Court is well aware and as argued by the Defendants, AlA Services defaulted on
its obligations to Reed Taylor in 1995 and 1996. In 1995 and 1996, Richard Riley was AlA
Services' counsel who negotiated the redemption agreements, drafted the redemption
agreements, issued of an opinion letter to Reed Taylor, and negotiated the restructure of the
redemption agreements.

Mr. Riley, obviously quite persuasively, argued that appraisals

conducted by AlA Services confirmed that the value of AlA Services' exceeded all of its debts
(including the over $7 Million owed to Reed Taylor) by over $2.5 million on December 31,
1995. 15 It is noteworthy that neither AlA Services nor its counsel has provided this appraisal to

15

See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 30, p. 3.
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Reed Taylor for obvious reasons. In addition, Mr. Riley also provided Reed Taylor an opinion
letter stating that the transaction was legal and AlA Services had the authority and power to enter
.
' agreements. 16
mto
the red
emptIOn

Nevertheless, the valuation of AlA Services alleged by it in 1996 and Mr. Riley's opinion
letter dated August 15, 1995, create issues of fact that denying the partial summary judgment
requested by the Defendants and the Plan. 17
4. On December 31, 1995, AlA Services' Appraised Value Exceeded Its
Liabilities to Creditors and Its Obligations To Reed Taylor By Over $2.5
Million and Over $4 Million As Of December 31, 1996.
In order to determine the insolvency of a corporation pertaining to a stock redemption,
the court must determine the financial status of the corporation on the date of the redemption.
LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 125,369 P.2d 45 (1962). The burden is on the party
asserting insolvency. Id.
In LaVoy Supply Co., the trial court concluded that that the corporation was insolvent on
the date of the redemption agreement after considering evidence from audits performed by each
party's accountant. Id. at 125 (although the issue of whether future creditors have standing was
also addressed, which they don't).
However, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the factors used to determine the
insolvency of a corporation:
III

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. I; Statement of Facts, ,
Mr. Riley's individual knowledge was expressly included in the opinion letter, even though the opinion letter was
issued by Eberle Berlin. Id It is also noteworthy that Mr. Riley is also a factual witness and his knowledge is
imputed on all of the attorneys at Hawley Troxell and his opinions and factual statements are counter to the very
arguments being asserted by Hawley Troxell on behalf ofthe Defendants.
16

17
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The cases very generally agree that a corporation is not insolvent within the meaning of
the rule which prevents a preference to directors merely because it cannot meet its
obligations as they become due or because its assets are not equal to, or would not pay
all, its liabilities, where it is still a going concern-that is, continuing its business with
some expectation and a reasonable prospect of being able to continue the corporate
enterprise.

LaVoy Supply Co., 84 Idaho at 126-27 (citing l3 Am.Jur., Corporations, § 1261) (emphasis
added).
The insolvency principal set forth in LaVoy Supply

IS

sound, particularly when

determining the insolvency of a corporation for purposes of determining whether a stock
repurchase scheme orchestrated by the Defendants in this action violates I.C. § 30_1_6. 18
On July 1, 1996, Richard Riley, attorney for AlA Services, specifically discussed the
value of AlA Services in 1995 when he was attempting to persuade Reed Taylor to not exercise
his contractual rights to retain the collateral when AlA Services defaulted in 1996:
As your client [Reed Taylor] is aware, the value of the Pledged Collateral [the collateral
granted to Reed Taylor for the redemption of his shares] greatly exceeds the obligations
owed to him by AlA. This value is evidenced by the annual appraisals of the
Company ... The preliminary appraisal value of the Company as of December 31, 1995,
net of all liabilities including the Company's obligations to Mr. Taylor, exceeds $2.5
million. The principal component of this value is the value of the Company's subsidiary,
AlA Insurance, Inc. Information supporting the long-term value of AlA Insurance, Inc.
in substantial excess of amounts due Mr. Taylor. .. AIA has a material interest in ensuring
that the Pledged Collateral is sold for its fair market value so that the Company's equity
in its operating subsidiaries is preserved. 19
Regardless of the approach utilized by the Court to determine insolvency, the Defendants have
18 The insolvency test for determining a corporation's ability to repurchase its own shares and the principals behind
such a test has no application to the insolvency test pertaining to creditors. Defrauding creditors constitutes
defrauding creditors, which is precisely what has transpired in this case to the detriment of Reed Taylor. Moreover,
the Defendants have intentionally paid Reed Taylor less than AlA Services was able and in the process unlawfully
diverted funds which should have been paid to Reed Taylor to others. The Defendants have breached their fiduciary
duties owed to Reed Taylor. In fact, Paul Pederson testified in his affidavit that it is quite plausible that Reed Taylor
would have been paid in full but for the acts ofthe Defendants. See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009.·
19 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 30, p. 3 (emphasis added).
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failed to provide any credible evidence as to the financial status of AlA Services on July 22,
1995, or any other date. Moreover, the Defendants are estopped from now asserting that AlA
Services was insolvent, when they argued that the assets exceeded all debts (including Reed's
debt) by over $2.5 Million on December 31, 1995. 20
5. In 1995, AlA Services Was Not Insolvent Under the I.e. § 30-1-2(n).
The definition of "insolvent" under I.C. § 30-1-2 is the "inability of a corporation to pay
its debts as they become due." See I.e. § 30-1-2(n) (1995).
Here, AlA Services has paid its debts over the past 13 years with the exception of its
obligations to Reed Taylor. 21 In fact, AlA Services has produced over $3.5 Million in earnings
over and above all payments made to Reed Taylor and all inappropriate deductions and use of
assets and funds for CropUSA and other entities to the determinant of Reed Taylor. 22 The only
person who has been prejudiced in this action has been Reed Taylor, and the Defendants'
intentional failure to pay the obligations owed to Reed Taylor.
6. Even though The Defendants Themselves Raise An Issue of Fact Which
Precludes the Court from Making a Finding of Insolvency, The Court's
Analysis Should Continue Because Reed Taylor Is Entitled to Partial
Summary Judgment.
Although issue of facts raised by the Defendants preclude granting their motion for
partial summary judgment, the Court's analysis must not stop here as Reed Taylor is entitled to
partial summary judgment barring the Defendants and the Plan from attacking the redemption of

Id.; Statement of Facts, , RR.
Reed Taylor has maintained, and still maintains, that AlA Services became insolvent in 2001 as a result of the
unlawful actions and mismanagement of the Defendants.
22 The fact that AlA Services was not insolvent for purposes of I.e. § 30-1-6 has no application to the future
insolvency which resulted in harm to Reed Taylor. Significantly, Reed Taylor is also an innocent creditor who has
been harmed.
20

21
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his shares for the reasons set forth below.
Moreover, even if the Court does not grant partial summary judgment in favor of Reed
Taylor, then he is still entitled to immediate possession of the collateraL See La Voy Supply Co.
v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962) (while the trial court initially restrained the creditor

from selling pledged assets in light of allegations of an illegal corporate act, the court later
permitted the creditor to sell the pledged assets even though at trial the court held the transaction
was illegal).
7. The Defendants and the Plan Have Failed to Provide Any Credible
Evidence As to the Insolvency of AlA Services on July 22, 1995.
As explained above, the burden is on the Defendants and the Plan to prove insolvency,
not Reed Taylor to prove solvency. The Defendants and Plan have failed to submit any credible
evidence as to the financial status of AlA Services on July 22, 1995, the only date in question.
Instead, the Defendants utilize mathematical estimations to "guess" at what the number would
have been on July 22, 1995, without looking at the accounting journal entries and work papers.
They have failed to meet their burden.
8. Reed Taylor Has Been the Only Creditor Not Timely Paid.
As noted above, the intent of stock redemption statutes is to protect innocent creditors
and minority shareholders who have not knowledge of an improper redemption or timely oppose
an improper redemption.
Here, Reed Taylor is the only creditor who was owed money on July 22, 1995, and is till
owed money today. Paul Pederson testified that he was unable to find any creditors who were
owed money on July 22, 1995, who have not been paid. The Defendants and Plan's arguments

REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS - 18

make no logical sense.

Under their theory, the can intentionally not pay a creditor and,

consequently, ask a court to rule a redemption was illegal (while waiting 13 years to do so) and
only after siphoning off millions of dollars that could have satisfied the obligations to the
creditor. The alleged "illegality" in this case is a misapplication of I.C. § 30-1-6 and is against
' po l'ICy. 23
publIC
E.

The Defendants and the Plan Are Not Intended Beneficiaries ofI.C. § 30-1-6.

"Stock redemption statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority stockholders
from corporate mismanagement of assets." See The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos,
929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996) (citing Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211,
213 (Fla. 1978)); Lewis v. Powell, 203 So.2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1967); American Family Care, Int:.
v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990); Hawkins v. Mall, Inc., 444 S.W. 2d 369, 386 (Mo.
1969); see also In re Reliable Manufacturing Corporation, 703 F.2d 996, 1001 (7th

Cir.

1983)(The purpose of stock redemption statutes is to protect creditors); Askanase v. Fatjo, 130
F.3d 657, 675 (5th Cir. 1997) ("LivingWell...was insolvent when the assumed redemption
occurred ... The issue, however, is whether LivingWell redeemed the stock to defraud creditors.")
(emphasis added); see also 40-APR Advocate (Idaho) 24 (1997) (by Richard Riley) ("The
current statute imposes legal capital requirements which were originally intended to protect
creditors and senior security holders ... "); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 824 (2008) ("The purpose of
a statute prohibiting a corporation from redeeming its own shares .. .is to protect creditors ... ");
18A Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 458 (2008) (" ... neither existing creditors nor its later creditors

See 27 A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 99 (2008) (Relief in equity may be obtained where there is an inequality of position
between the wrongdoers, or where public policy dictates such, despite the doctrine of equal fault")(citing Choquette
v. Isacoff, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 1,836 N.E.2d 329 (2005).
23
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can complain.").
Moreover, only creditors who were owed money on the date of the transaction have
standing to challenge a transaction, while future creditors get the corporation as they find is and
lack standing to challenge any past transactions. LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,
369 P.2d 45 (1962)
Idaho has also construed statutes to only benefit the intended beneficiaries. See e.g.,

Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 316-17, 824 P.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that extending anti-deficiency statute protection to others is for the Legislature to decide).
Here, none of the defendants in this action and none of the shareholders in AlA Services
are intended beneficiaries of the stock redemption statute, specifically, I.e. § 30-1-6. They all
took part in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, they all had knowledge of the terms of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, and they all are precisely the parties that stock redemption
·
d to protect. 24
statutes are not d eSlgne
Had the Idaho Legislature intended I.C. § 30-1-6 to be extended to parties who acquiesce
or engineer stock redemption that later turn sour, the Legislature would have made such a
provision in I.C. § 30-1-6, but the Legislature didn't.

Nowhere in I.C. § 30-1-6 did the

Legislature state that persons behind an allegedly illegal redemption were entitled to wait 13
years and then attack the redemption as if they were innocent shareholders.

Thus, the

Under the Defendants' theory, they could simply sit back and wait 13 years to see whether or not AlA Services
ever when public before acting. If AlA Services went public and they made millions, then they would happily pay
Reed Taylor off and go on their merry way. However, if things didn't work out, such as what has happened in this
case, then they can siphon off millions of dollars to other corporations and then demand that the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares be held illegal because they have been unable to timely pay Reed Taylor. The Defendants'
arguments are not only a misapplication of the applicable law, but they are disingenuous arguments. Or, in the
alternative, the Defendants could mismanage the business and misappropriate assets (which they have done) and
then assert that it was illegal to redeem Reed Taylor's shares some 13 years later to avoid liability for their actions.
Such a position is preposterous.
24
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Defendants are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6. However, the Legislature did intend
to bar actions against stockholders and directors to three years, thereby preventing the precise
argument now being asserted by the Defendants.
1. James and Corrine Beck Are Not Intended Beneficiaries.

James and Corrine Beck did not become shareholders in AlA Services until August 15,
1995, after the July 22, 1995, date of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. See Affidavit of
Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. G. Moreover, James and Corrine Beck conditioned the
purchase of their shares on the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares on terms that were
"satisfactory" to them. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. E, p. 10, § d. Then,
to make matters even worse, James and Corrine Beck unlawfully converted their Series C
Preferred Shares in AlA Services to common share in CropUSA, an entity that was wrongfully
spun off from AlA Services. See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 26.
James and Corrine Beck are not only the type of parties that stock redemption statutes are
not intended to benefit from redemption statutes, but they are the type of parties that I.C. § 30-146 requires to return their CropUSA shares to AlA Services. They are not intended beneficiaries
of I.C. § 30-1-6.
2. Connie Taylor and John Taylor Are Not Intended Beneficiaries.
John Taylor was intimately involved in the negotiation and redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares. As the Court is well aware, John Taylor executed all of the redemption documents and
restructure documents on behalf of AlA Services.

See Hearing, Ex. A-F, Z, and AA-AD.

Moreover, John and Connie Taylor received a direct benefit from the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares in that they obtained "operational and financial control" of AlA Services and
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transitioned from minority shareholders to majority shareholders. See Affidavit Roderick Bon?
dated September 3, 2008, Ex. 45. John and Connie Taylor are not intended beneficiaries of I.C.
§ 30-1-6. They have no right to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. 25

3. Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos Are Not Intended Beneficiaries.
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos have never been shareholders of AlA Services. See
Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 20-22. They are not creditors of AlA
Services. Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6.
They have no right to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
4. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Are Not Intended Beneficiaries.
AlA Services and AlA Insurance were involved in the redemption and are not innocent
shareholders or innocent creditors. See e.g., LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369
P .2d 45 (1962)("A corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal,
nor can creditors who are not injured have a right to complain.").

AlA Services and AlA

Insurance are also not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6. They have no right to attack the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares under Idaho law.

Moreover, Richard Riley and Eberle

Berlin provided Reed Taylor a direct opinion letter that represented AlA Services had the
authority to enter into the redemption agreements, had obtained the necessary shareholder

"Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and may bind
the community property by contract..." I.C. § 32-912. Moreover, " ... it has been flatly held that any defense
applicable against a husband in an action for the protection of the community property is similarly applicable against
the wife." Yokochi v. Yoshimoto, 44 Haw. 297, 353 P.2d 820, 825 (Haw. 1960). This same authority applies to
every argument against Connie Taylor, as her and John Taylor were married until 2005 and AlA Services' shares
were held in John Taylor's name, and to Corrine Beck and James Beck. This footnote is incorporated by reference
into every argument pertaining to John Taylor and Connie Taylor and James Beck and Corrine Beck (or any other
shareholder).
2S
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approval, and that the redemption agreements did not violate any laws. 26
5. The Plan Is Not An Intended Beneficiary.
Like all of the other Defendants, the Plan is not an intended beneficiary of I.C. § 30-1-6.
The Plan was not owed any money at the time of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the
Plan was not a shareholder of AlA Services until after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares ..
6. Reed Taylor Is An Intended Beneficiary.

Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed in 1995 by the request of the very Defendants in
this action seeking to invalidate the redemption agreements.

In the years following the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, the Defendants declared unlawful dividends, redeemed
other common shares, and misappropriated millions of dollars in funds and assets belonging to
AlA Services and its Subsidiaries. Reed Taylor is the intended beneficiary of I.C. § 30-1-6.

F.

The Defendants Do Not Have Standing To Attack the Redemption of Reed
Taylor's Shares.

The majority of jurisdictions, including Idaho, prohibit corporations from using stock
repurchase statutes to void stock repurchase agreements.

The Minnelusa Company v. A. G.

A ndrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Col. 1996) (citing American Family Care v. Irwin, 571

So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990); Rainford v. Rytting, 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769, 771 n. 5 (Utah
1969); LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45 (1962)("A corporation itself

cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal. .. "); Triumph Smokes, Inc. v. Sarlo,
482 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1972) (emphasis added»; see also 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663
(2008).

26

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. L
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So-called stock repurchase statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority
stockholders from corporate mismanagement of assets ...
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus ...

See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In The Minnelusa Company, the Colorado Supreme Court explained the purposes of
stock redemption statutes in an En Bane decision:
We agree with the majority view [including Idaho] that the validity of a corporate stock
repurchase may be attacked only by persons who are injured or prejudiced thereby and
not by the corporation itself. Allowing corporations to void these transactions through the
application of a statute designed to protect creditors and minority shareholders would, in
effect, sanction corporate development of improper repurchasing schemes. Such a resuit
is a misapplication of the statute and circumvents its intended purpose. For this reason,
we hold that Minnelusa many not use the Florida stock repurchase statute to void its
obligations under the stock repurchase agreement.

The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Col. 1996) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Swafford v. Berry, 382 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo.
1963) ("a shareholder who, with knowledge of the material facts, has consented or acquiesced in
the transaction of which he complains ordinarily cannot attack the transaction on behalf of the
corporation").
A shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the
shareholder "[w]as a shareholder ofthe corporation at the time of the act or omission complained
of..." See I.C. § 30-1-741.
The United States Supreme Court first adopted the contemporaneous ownership rule in
1974, under the contemporaneous ownership rule:
III
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a stockholder bringing suit after acquiring his shares has sustained no injury because he
received what he paid for ... to permit such an action would result in a windfall to the
subsequent stockholder. .. permitting such an action would allow the stockholder to reap a
profit from wrongs done to others, thus furthering such speculation.
Ettridge v. TSIGroup, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2578,2583

(1974)) (emphasis added). The other applicable principal holds:
that those who acquired their shares from one who participated or acquiesced in the
allegedly wrongful transactions, is not only grounded in the same consideration as the
[contemporaneous ownership rule], but also in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands ...
Id. at 817 -818 (emphasis added).

The contemporaneous ownership rule and the rationale behind its application is also
discussed in Federal Practice and Procedure:
raJ plaintiff cannot complain of acts occurring prior to the time he or she became a
shareholder, but only of acts occurring after becoming a shareholder. ..
A primary purpose of the contemporaneous ownership requirement is to curtail strike
suits by prohibiting potential plaintiffs from buying into a lawsuit through the purchase of
shares of stock in a corporation after an alleged wrong has occurred ...
See 10 Fed. Pro., L.Ed. § 25:74 (2008).

The Defendants and the Plan are all attacking the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares

a~d

are asking the Court to find that the redemption agreements violated statutes and were illegal.
They also argue that the money and assets already paid to Reed Taylor should be returned to
AlA Services. The individual Defendants and the Plan are seeking derivative relief, i.e., asking
the Court to rule the redemption was illegal and require Reed Taylor to pay back the money.
However, as discussed below, they have no standing to attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's
shares.
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1. James Beck and Corrine Beck Purchased Their Preferred C Share After
The Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares.
James Beck and Corrine Beck purchased their Preferred C Shares in ALA Services after
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed on August 16, 1995. 27 Not only were they not shareholders
at the time Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed, but they conditioned their purchase of shares o!l
Reed Taylor's shares being redeemed. 28 However, although the Becks later acquired common
shares in ALA Services through unlawful means, they acquired their common shares in ALA
Services over 5 years after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares with full knowledge of the
terms of the redemption transaction.

Moreover, the Preferred C Shares that they initially

purchased were unlawfully transferred to CropUSA wherein the Becks became significant
common shareholders of CropUSA, and then had knowledge of the scheme to unlawfully
transfer over $1.5 Million to CropUSA in an alleged stock purchase.
Thus, James Beck and Corrine Beck were not shareholders at the time of the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares and they have no standing to attack the redemption of his shares.
2. JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman Have Never Been Shareholders and
Have Never Had Standing.
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos are not shareholders of ALA Services and have never
been shareholders of ALA Services. The only shares that Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos own
are in Crop USA-the same corporation that they served as board members and the same
corporation that has been the recipient of millions of dollars of ALA Services assets, funds, labor
and trade secrets.

27
28

See Affidavit of Michael BisseIl dated February 26, 2009, Ex. 39-40 and 57.
See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. E, p. 10, § d.; Ex. G; Statement of Facts, ~ R.
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Bryan Freeman and J oLee Duclos do not have standing to attack the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares. 29
3. John Taylor and Connie Taylor Were Involved In the Transaction and
Have Unclean Hands.
Shareholders who participate in a questionable transaction have unclean hands and may
not later attack it. See e.g., Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct.
App. 1988) (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703,
711,94 S.Ct. 2578, 2583 (1974)).
John Taylor and Connie Taylor are the only persons who were actually shareholders at
the time of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. However, John Taylor (and Connie Taylor
through their community property) negotiated and executed the redemption agreements on behalf
of AlA Services?O Their hands are unclean, they were behind the transaction, they used the
redemption to gain "operational and financial control" of AlA Services and its subsidiaries, and
they are barred under equity from attacking the redemption. 31 Moreover, Connie Taylor is not
even listed as a shareholder and her interest is simply of a community property nature.
4. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Lack Standing Because a Corporation
May Not Attack a Stock Redemption Agreement.
AlA Services and AlA Insurance have no standing to attack the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares. 32 LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (1962)("A
corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegaL.").
See Statement of Facts, ~ BB.
They are estopped from asserting any defenses, particularly insolvency.
31 See doctrine of unclean had discussed above as it pertains to shareholder transactions.
32 Counsel for Reed Taylor has consistently objected to AlA Services and AlA Insurance's actions asserting the
defense of violation of a statute and illegality. Reed Taylor is not permitting AlA Services and AlA Insurance to
assert these defenses by acquiescence or any other waiver.
29

30
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5. James Beck, Corrine Beck, JoLee Duclos, and Bryan Freeman Also Lack
Standing Under the Contemporaneous Ownership Rule.
James Beck and Corrine Beck did not become shareholders in AlA Services on August
15, 1995, which was after the date Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed on July 22,1995. 33 They
have no standing under any scenario.
JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman were not shareholders of AlA Services when Reed
Taylor's shares were redeemed and they have never been shareholders of AlA Services. 34 They
have no standing under any scenario.
6. The Plan Does Not Have Standing To Attack the Redemption of Reed
Taylor's Shares.
The Plan acquired its shares in AlA Services in 1996 and 1997, well after the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares on July 22, 1995. 35 The Plan has no standing.
G.

The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking The Redemption Of
Reed Taylor's Shares Because They Have Acquiesced for 13 Years.

"Stock redemption statutes are designed to protect creditors and minority stockholders
from corporate mismanagement of assets." See The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos,
929 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996) (citing Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211,
213 (Fla. 1978)); Lewis v. Powell, 203 So.2d 504, 506 (Fla. 1967); American Family Care, Inc.

v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053, 1060 (Ala. 1990); Hawkins v. Mall, Inc., 444 S.W. 2d 369, 386 (Mo.
1969); State v. Helen Shop, Inc., 211 Tenn. 107, 362 S.W.2d 787 (1962); see also 40-APR
Advocate (Idaho) 24 (1997) (by Richard Riley) ("The current statute imposes legal capital
As noted above, James Beck conditioned the purchase of his Preferred C Shares on the requirement that Reed
Taylor's shares be redeemed under terms "satisfactory" to him. See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008,
Ex. F, p. 10, § d; Statement of Facts, ~ R.
34 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12,2009, Ex. 20; Statement of Facts, ~ BB.
35 See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 5,2009, Ex. A-B.

33
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requirements which were originally intended to protect creditors and senior security holders ... ");
19 C.J.S. Corporations § 824 (2008) ("The purpose of a statute prohibiting a corporation from
redeeming its own shares of capital stock when its capital is or would become impaired is to
protect creditors ... "). A stockholder who acquiesces or consents to a questionable transaction
may not thereafter attack the transaction. The Minnelusa Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929
P.2d 1321, 1323 (Col. 1996).
In The Minnelusa Company, the Colorado Supreme Court explained the purposes of
stock redemption statutes:
Similarly, Gower [a shareholder] raises the Florida stock repurchase statute as a defense
to his obligations under the promissory notes. A shareholder who is fully aware of, and
consents to, a questionable transaction may not thereafter attack that transaction by
requesting it be declared illegal.. . Gower [a shareholder] is not an intended beneficiary of
the Florida stock repurchase statute, we hold that Gower [a shareholder] may not use the
Florida stock repurchase statute to relieve him of his personal guarantee on the
promissory notes.

The Minnelusa Company, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Col. 1996) (internal citations omittedi 6
(emphasis added); see also Swafford v. Berry, 382 P.2d 999, 1002 (Colo. 1963) ("a shareholder
who, with knowledge of the material facts, has consented or acquiesced in the transaction of
which he complains ordinarily cannot attack the transaction on behalf of the corporation").
Here, the similarities between the Defendants' assertion of the illegality defense and The

Minnelusa Company are almost identical, except that the Defendants in this action are requesting
the transaction be rescinded some 13 years after the fact. 37 Shareholders who approved and/or
acquiesced in the redemption of Reed's shares are now attempting to attack the redemption to
Significantly, Minnelusa declined to follow any of the key cases cited by the Defendants and the Plan.
The undersigned was unable to find a single case where a court went back 13 years to undo a stock redemption
transaction, regardless of how "illegal" the transaction may have been. This does not even take into consideration
that there are no innocent creditors or shareholders.

36

37
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relieve themselves of their "personal guarantee," i.e., the significant claims against them for
fraud, breach of fiduciary duties and other claims pertaining to their acts of corporate
malfeasance in transferring millions of dollars of AlA's cash and assets to CropUSA and the
individual defendants. However, the Defendants are barred from asserting violations of I.C. §
30-1-6, I.C. § 30-1-46, and illegality as defenses or counterclaims, regardless of the merit of such
arguments.
1. John Taylor and Connie Taylor Have Acquiesced in the Redemption of
Reed Taylor's Shares for 13 Years and May Not Attack the Transaction
John Taylor and Connie Taylor were shareholders (through John Taylor) before, during
and after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. John Taylor had more knowledge of the books
and records of AlA Services Corporation and its financial status than any other party. John
Taylor and Connie Taylor not only acquiesced in the redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares, they
were one of the driving forces behind the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. John Taylor
approved, consented and acquiesced in the redemption and so too did Connie Taylor by way of
her community property interest in the shares. Moreover, John Taylor and Connie Taylor are the
largest shareholder of CropUSA, a corporation unlawfully spun off from AIA.38 They not only
acquiesced, but their hands are unclean. They are barred from attacking the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares.

2. Even if James Beck and Corrine Beck Had Been Shareholders at the
Time Reed Taylor's Shares Were Redeemed, They Acquiesced for 13
Years and May Not Attack the Transaction
Although the Becks did not become shareholders until after Reed Taylor's shares wer'e

38

See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 12, 2009, Ex. 26.
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redeemed and they required the redemption as a condition precedent to investing in AlA
Services, they too have acquiesced for over 13 years. James Beck was a board member of AlA
Services from 1995 through part of 2001. Corrine Beck has the imputed knowledge of James
Beck for her acquiescence. James Beck and Corrine Beck are barred from attacking the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.
3. Even if JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman Were Shareholders at the Time
Reed Taylor's Shares Were Redeemed, They Have Acquiesced for 13
Years and May Not Attack the Transaction
JoLee Duclos attending board meetings, typed letters to shareholders pertaining to the
terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and drafted board meeting minutes. JoLee
Duclos assisted John Taylor in unlawfully transferring over $1.5 Million of funds from AlA
Insurance to CropUSA.

Both Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos were employees at AlA

Services from the time Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed through the time they became
employees of CropUSA. In fact, the only shares they own are in CropUSA, which such shares
were unlawfully acquired. Thus, even if they were ever shareholders, Bryan Freeman and JoLee
Duclos are both barred from attacking the redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares.
4. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Have Acquiesced in the Redemption of
Reed Taylor'S Shares for 13 Years and May Not Attack the Transaction;·
Although AlA Services and AlA Insurance do not have standing to attack the redemption
In

the first place under any possible scenario, both corporations have acquiesced in the

redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and both corporations have acquiesced in the transaction for
13 years. ALA Services and AlA Insurance are barred from attacking the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares.
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5. The Plan Has Acquiesced in the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares for
Over 12 Years.
The Plan acquired shares in AlA Services in 1996 and 1997-after Reed Taylor's shares
were redeemed. Even so, the Plan failed to complain or challenge the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares. The Plan, like the other Defendants, has acquiesced in the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares.
H.

The Statute of Limitations Bars The Defendants From Asserting Their
Counterclaim and Declaratory Judgment Action.

There is a difference between a claim and a defense, a "claim" seeks affirmative relief,
where a "defense" seeks to diminish or defeat relief sought by a claim. Idaho Dept. of Labor v.

Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 208,91 P.3d 1111 (2004).
Here, Connie Taylor and James Beck are the only parties with a counterclaim against
Reed Taylor pertaining to the "illegality" of the redemption of his shares. 39
1. Connie Taylor and James Beck's Counterclaim Is Barred By the Statue
of Limitations.

The statute of limitations applies to claims pertaining to illegal corporate acts. See e.g.,

In re Lake Country Investments, LLC v. Noyes, 255 B.R. 588, 602 (Idaho Dist. Ct. 2000)
(discussing the application of the statute of limitations for actions against shareholders and board
members, but holding that it did not apply because recording a mortgage was insufficient notice).
Actions against directors and stockholders of a corporation are governed by the three year
statute oflimitations set forth in I.C. § 5-237, while actions for other relief are governed by the

The Plan has asserted no claims against Reed Taylor. lfthe Plan were to do so, it too is barred under the statute of
limitations. Moreover, Reed Taylor has no claims against the Plan and no other party to this action has any claims
against the Plan. Thus, the Plan should be dismissed from the action as previously requested by Reed Taylor
pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(6). Reed Taylor's Motion to Dismiss the Plan has not been filed but not heard.

39
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four year statute oflimitations set forth in I.C. § 5-224. Specifically, I.C. § 5-237 provides:
This chapter does not affect actions against directors or stockholders of a corporation to
recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created by law; but such
actions must be brought within three (3) years after the discovery by the aggrieved party
of the facts upon which the penalty or forfeiture attached, or the liability was created.
I.C. § 5-237 (emphasis added). In addition, I.C. § 5-224 provides:
An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four (4)
years after the cause of action shall have accrued.
I.C. § 5-224 (emphasis added).
The pertinent code section applicable to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares is I.C. §
30_1_6. 40 This Section is unchanged in 1996. See I.C. § 30-1-6 (1996).
Idaho Code has a savings provision that require the provision in place as of the date of the
transaction to govern transactions occurring prior to the repeal of the Idaho Business
Corporations Act:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the repeal of a statute by this
chapter does not affect:

***

(c) Any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred
because of the violation, before its repeal.
.

See I.C. § 30-1-1703 (emphasis added).
Here, it is undisputed that Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed and canceled in 1995.41
It is undisputed that Reed Taylor became a secured creditor of AlA Services on July 22, 1995.
Id. It is undisputed that in 1995 and thereafter R. John Taylor, Connie Taylor, James Beck and

Corrine Beck had full knowledge of the details of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares in
Connie Taylor and James Beck previously relied upon I.C. § 30-1-46 as the authority for their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed in April 2008, however, they now concede that I.C. § 30-1-6 is the proper Code Section.
41 See Hearing, Ex. A, Z and AA-AD; Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. H.
40

REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS - 33

1995. It is undisputed that the 1996 restructuring did not increase the amount of debt issued for
Reed Taylor's shares or result in the cancelation of any further shares, and the $6 million
promissory note remained unchanged. 42 Thus, any claims and defenses regarding attacking the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares accrued in 1995, and the statute of limitations ran in 1999 at
the latest under any possible scenario.
Likewise, the statute of limitations for any modification of the agreements would have
accrued in 1996 and ran in no later than 2000. Even if AlA Services was insolvent at the time
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed, Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck are barred
from asserting any counterclaims or defenses against Reed Taylor.
Accordingly, partial summary judgment is appropriate and warranted, and the Court
should dismiss the Defendants' Counterclaims and request for Declaratory Judgment pertaining
to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares violating I.C. § 30_1_6. 43
2. The Defendants and The Plan Are Barred By the Statute of Limitations
From Attacking the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares.
The statute of limitations ran years ago for any violations of I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995), I.C. §
30-1-6 (1996), I.C. § 30-1-46 (1995) and I.C. § 30-1-46 (1996). Under any applicable statute of
limitation, the Defendants are barred from asserting counterclaims or defenses based upon the
violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 or I.C. § 30-1-46.

This argument would hold true regardless of

whether the claims accrued on the redemption date of July 22, 1995, whether the claims accrued
See Hearing, Ex. A-F.
The statute of limitations does not necessarily bar AlA Services or AlA Insurance from asserting a compulsory
defense or claim based upon a violation of I.e. § 30-1-6; however, as noted above, the corporations do not have
standing the attack the redemption in the first place and, therefore, the issue is moot. See e.g., The Minnelusa
Company v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321, 1324 (Col. 1996) (citing LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho
120, 127, 369 P.2d 45 (l962)("A corporation itself cannot have a stock repurchase agreement declared illegal, nor
can creditors who are not injured have a right to complain."))

42

43

REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS

34

on the date AlA Services executed the $6 Million Promissory Note on August 1, 1995, or
whether the date the redemption agreements were restructured and amended on July 1, 1996.
Under any possible date, the statute oflimitation has ran at the very latest on July 1,2000. 44 See
I.e. § 5-237; I.C. § 5-224.

The Defendants and the Plan are barred under the statute of

limitations.
I.

Assuming AlA Services Was Insolvent or Had Insufficient Surplus, the
Defendants and Other Shareholders May Not Attack the Redemption Because
They Developed An Improper Scheme To Acquire Reed Taylor's Shares.

It is impermissible for a corporation and shareholders to develop a stock redemption

scheme and then later assert insolvency as a defense:
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped from raising, the issue of
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus. A shareholder who personally
guarantees promissory notes issued to effectuate a stock repurchase is precluded from
asserting a statute prohibiting insolvent corporations from repurchasing their own stock
in order to void his or her obligations.
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (citing Minnelusa Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d

1321 (Colo. 1996); American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1990) (internal
footnotes omitted) (emphasis added».
Here, the Defendants have failed to submit any admissible evidence that Reed Taylor did
anything inappropriate. Reed Taylor agreed to sell his shares back to AlA Services at the request
of the Defendants.

Instead of paying Reed Taylor as required, the Defendants decided to

unlawfully transfer and utilize millions of dollars of AlA Services funds and assets to the benef~t
of the Defendants and to the detriment of Reed Taylor. Thus, assuming AlA Services was
Nevertheless, the July 1, 1996, restructure date has no application because Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed
on July 22, 1995, and he became a creditor after his shares were redeemed. See Hearing, Ex. A-E, Z, and AA-AD;
Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9, 2008, Ex. H.
44

REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS

35

insolvent, the Defendants are barred from utilizing an improper share buyback scheme to raid the
coffers of AlA Services and void its obligations to Reed Taylor in order for the individual
defendants to avoid liability for their unlawful acts.
J.

Assuming AlA Services Was Insolvent or Had Insufficient Surplus, the
Defendants, Plan and AlA Services Are Not Entitled to Any Relief Becaus'e
AlA Services Released Reed Taylor and Agreed to Indemnify and Hold Him
Harmless.

Releases bar parties from asserting claims for claims which have accrued through the
date of the release:
[nn the absence of fraud in obtaining such general release, [a release] will be sustained,
even though the parties did not have in mind the alleged wrongs complained of. .,
Heath v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 89 Idaho 490, 495-96,406 P.2d 341 (1965) (internal citations

omitted) (emphasis added).
1. AlA Services Released Reed Taylor From All Claims On July 1, 1996.

On July 1, 1996 (the date the redemption agreements were signed), AlA Services entered
into a mutual release with Reed Taylor as a portion of the consideration for the Stock
Redemption Restructure Agreement:
Each of Companies and Creditor hereby releases the other from any and all claims
(whether known or unknown, anticipated or unanticipated, contingent or liquidated) such
party may have arising out of the previous agreements (including, without limitation, the
Original Documents) or other business arrangement between Company and Creditor or
arising out of Creditor's ownership of or employment by Company prior to the date of
this Agreement. 45
III
III

45

See Hearing, Ex. B, p. 6, § 3 (emphasis added).
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Thus, AlA Services released Reed Taylor from any and all claims accruing through July 1, 1996.
The released claims would include any violations of any law or code through July 1, 2006. 46
This release applies to the claims and defenses being asserted by the Defendants in this action
because the Defendants are all asserting derivative claims for the voiding of the redemption of
Reed Taylor'S shares.
2. AlA Services Released Reed Taylor on August 15, 1995 and Agreed to
Hold Reed Taylor Harmless.
When Reed Taylor agreed to sell his shares to AlA Services, the corporation agreed to
indemnify him and hold him harmless. 47

This indemnification was later promised through a

separate and distinct document. 48
On August 16, 1995, AlA Services agreed to release, indemnify and hold Reed Taylor
harmless in a separate and distinct document:
Reed 1. Taylor is hereby fully and forever released, discharged and indemnified by the
Company from all claims, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs expenses,
fees, compensation, liabilities and other obligations to the Company or any of its
Subsidiaries of whatever kind or nature now possessed by or which may hereafter accrue
to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries, on account of or arising out of any agreement
with or any act or omission by Mr. Taylor at any time prior to the date hereof. .. 49
Thus, AlA Services and AlA Insurance released Reed Taylor and agreed to indemnify him on
August 15, 1995, over two weeks after the $6 Million Promissory Note was signed and over
three weeks after the redemption agreements and $1.5 Million Promissory Note were signed. 50
Indemnification includes all damages incurred by Reed Taylor or damages Reed Taylor would

See Hearing, Ex.
See Hearing, Ex.
48 See Hearing, Ex.
49 See Hearing, Ex.
so See Hearing, Ex.
46

47

B, p. 6, § 3.
Z, p. 11, § 6.1.
AC.
AC, pp. 1-2, ~ U) (emphasis added).
A, Z, and AA-AD.
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be forced to pay others.
3. AlA Services Would Be Required to Return All Funds Recovered to Reed
Taylor Under Either the Release Provision or the Indemnification
Agreement.
Because AlA Services is required to indemnify and hold Reed Taylor harmless from any
claims that accrued up to and after August 15, 1995, and again released Reed Taylor from all
claims on July 1, 1996, the defenses and counterclaims asserted by the Defendants are futile and
moot. 51 All damages would simply be required to be returned to Reed Taylor, along with any
lost security interests, lost payments, attorneys' fees, costs and any other expense. 52
K.

AlA Services' Insolvency or Surplus Is Irrelevant Because Reed Taylor
Became A Secured Creditor.

There is an exception to the general rule that a corporation cannot purchase its stock
when insolvent:
An exception to the rule [that a corporation cannot redeem its own shares when insolvent
or be required to make payment when insolvent] exists when security interests are given
to secure payment, as the rights of the sell to the proceeds of the property given as
security vest when the security interest is given and cannot be voided by resort to the
general rule ... The same result was also reached under a statute providing that a
corporation which has purchased its own shares out of surplus may defer payment, the
obligation so created constitutes an ordinary debt, and the validity of any payment made
on the debt is not affected by the absence of surplus at the time of payment.
See 18B Am. JUL 2d Corporations § 1785 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Here, Reed Taylor transitioned from being a shareholder of AlA Services to a secured
creditor on July 22, 1995. 53 Because Reed Taylor became a secured creditor, with security
interests in all revenues and stock in AlA Services' subsidiaries, the statutory requirements are
51
52

See Hearing, Ex. AC, pp. 1-2, ~ 0); Hearing, Ex. B, p. 6, § 3.
See State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 91 P.3d 1127 (2004)(moot); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 582

(6th Cir. 1982) (futile).
53 See Statement of Facts, ~ L.
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not relevant.
L.

The "Illegality" Standard.

The principals of justice and equity are nicely illustrated in 30A C.J.S. Equity § 96
(2008):
Equity courts are not bound by strict common law rules, and, further, they have the
power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory rules to prevent injustice. They possess
broad powers and should exercise them so as to do substantial justice.
Id (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Contracts made between competent persons should not be set aside lightly on public
policy grounds. Smith v. Idaho Hospital Services, Inc., 89 Idaho 449,504,406 P.2d 696 (1965).
Each case wherein it is contended that a contract is void as against public policy must necessarily
depend upon its own facts and circumstances, and analogous cases involving the same principals
may be looked to by the court in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion. Id.
Even so, the rule that an agreement in violation of a statute is illegal and void is not
inflexible or inexorable. Not all contracts in violation of the provisions of a statute are
void or necessarily void. Generally, although a contract is in violation of a statute, it will
not be declared void unless such was the intention of the legislature.
A contract made to further any matter or thing prohibited by statute is void. Thus,a
contract for an object prohibited by a penal law is void.
17A Am. Jur.2d Contracts § 229 (2008) (internal foot notes and citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine
from all of the facts and circumstances of each case; public policy may be found and set forth in
statutes, judicial decisions or the constitution. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 567, 944 P.2d
695 (1997). Under Idaho law, a contract is not necessarily illegal simply because the contract
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violates a statute. See Williams v. Continental Lift & Accident Company, 100 Idaho 71, 73-74,
593 P.2d 708 (1979).
Here, entering into a stock redemption agreement is not a prohibited act under I.C. § 301-6 or a violation of an Idaho penal code or criminal ordinance. It follows that the only parties
who may attack the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares as the transaction pertains to a violation
of I.C. § 30-1-6 are innocent creditors and innocent shareholders, all of whom must not wait 13
years to come forward. The redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was not illegal, even assuming
all of the Defendants' allegations are true.
1. The Burden Is Upon the Defendants and the Plan To Prove that the
Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Was Illegal.

A contract is presumed to be valid and enforceable and proving that a contract is illegal
rests upon the party asserting illegality:
The presumption ordinarily is in favor or legality of a contract, and the burden of proving
illegality, not apparent on the face of the contract, is on the party asserting it.
A contract is presumed to be valid and enforceable. Accordingly, where the illegality of
a contract is not apparent from its face, the burden of proof is on the party asserting it.
The presumption is in favor of legality, and that the parties intended to make a lawful
agreement. There is no presumption that the parties intended to make an illegal contract.
Similarly, illegal action under the terms of the contract will not be presumed. If an
agreement which does not provide for a method of accomplishing its purpose can be
accomplished by any legal method, it must be assumed that such method was
contemplated when the contract was made and will be pursued.
In the application of the foregoing rules, the burden is on the party asserting that a
contract is invalid as in contravention of public policy ... or the compounding of crime.
The courts should focus on whether a contract could have been performed without
anyone acting contrary to the public welfare.

See 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 706 (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"The defendant, likewise, has the ultimate burden of establishing any defense based upon
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a contention that the consideration for a negotiable instrument was illegal." See 12 Am. Jur. 2d
Bills and Notes § 663 (2008).
Here, the Defendants and Plan have not met their burden of proving that the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares was illegal.
2. Even if the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Violated I.C. § 30-1-6,
the Redemption Agreements Should Be Enforced Because I.e. § 30-1-6
Does Not Declare An Agreement Void that Violates I.e. § 30-1-6.
A contract may not be illegal if the applicable statute does not declare the contract void
upon a violation of the statute. See Williams v. Continental Life & Accident Company, 100 Idaho
71, 73-74, 593 P .2d 708 (1979). Treatises have also embraced the principal that a contract that
violates a statute is not necessarily an illegal contract:
In general, unless an agreement necessarily contemplates violating a statute, it is
enforceable, and if it is later performed in a way that involves some slight violation Of
law, not seriously injurious to the public order, the person performing may recover. The
principal stated more broadly:
Where a bargain does not in terms necessarily involve a violation of law, the fact
the plaintiff performs it in a way not allowed by law, does not preclude recovery,
if not seriously injurious to the public order.
See 8 Williston on Contracts § 19:51 (4th ed.) (2008) (internal citations omitted) (emphaSIS

added).
In Williams, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that the
agreement was illegal:
Inasmuch as there is no statute declaring the [insurance] policies in this case void, it
seems only fair and just that the foregoing principals be applied and that appellant be held
estopped from asserting the illegality of its bargained for [insurance] policies.
See Williams, 100 Idaho 71, 74 (emphasis added).
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Here, John and Connie Taylor are both licenses attorneys in Idaho and were licensed
attorneys when Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed. 54

Moreover, John Taylor obtained a

college degree in accounting and at one time was a C.P.A.55 Finally, John Taylor was in charge
of AlA Services' finances, while Reed Taylor worked outside the office in sales. 56 As such, the
Defendants had an unfair advantage over Reed Taylor and, if the Court believes the redemption
was illegal, they are more guilty parties and the agreements should be enforced.
3. A Stock Redemption Agreement Is Not An Illegal Contract.
Stock redemption agreements are not illegal contracts. I.C. § 30-1-6. Contracts made
between competent persons should not be set aside lightly on public policy grounds. Smith

v.

Idaho Hospital Services, Inc., 89 Idaho 449, 504, 406 P.2d 696 (1965). "Whether a contract is
illegal is a question of law for the court to determine from all of the facts and circumstances of
each case." Farrell v. Whiteman, WL 198516 *2 (2009) (citing Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 6,
56 P.3d 765 (2002)). "Since the consequences of a court finding a contract to be illegal are
harsh, only those contracts which involve consideration that is expressly prohibited by the
relevant prohibitory statute are void." Id.; Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corporation,
137 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1017,40 Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (entering into a
redemption agreement is not illegal nor are making payments under a redemption agreement
illegal).
Here, a corporation redeeming shares in not a per se violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 (such as
conducting business as an unlicensed architect as in Farrell). Making payments under a valid
See Statement of Facts, ~ A.
s5Id.
S6 See Statement of Facts, ~ B.
S4
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and enforceable redemption agreement when it is proven that a corporation was insolvent could
be a violation ofLC. § 30-1-6, but it is not an illegal contract.
4. Even If the Court Were to Find that AlA Services Was Insolvent As
Contemplated by I.e. § 30-1-2, The Pari Delicto Rule Is Inapplicable to
the Facts in This Case And The Redemption Agreements Should Be
Enforced.
Even if a contract is found to be illegal, it may still be enforced by the less guilty party:
Where the parties are not in pari delicto, or equally guilty, as to an illegal element ofa
contract and where there are elements of public policy more outraged by the conduct of
one than ofthe other, then relief in equity may be granted to the less guilty party.
17A C.J.S. Contracts § 282 (2008) (emphasis added); see also 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 315

(2008); Maudlin v. Pacific Decision Sciences Corporation, 137 Cal.AppAth 1001, 1017, 40
Cal.Rptr.3d 724, 735 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also I.e. § 30-1-6 (1995).
In Maudlin, the California Court of Appeals relied upon the holding from the California
Supreme Court in Tri-Q, Inc. v. Sta-Hi Corp., 63 Ca1.2d 199, 45 Cal.Rptr. 878, 404 P.2d 486
(1965):
[T]he courts should not be so enamored with the Latin phrase 'in pari delicto' that they
blindly extend the rule to every case where illegality appears somewhere in the
transaction. The fundamental purpose of the rule must always be kept in mind, and the
realities of the situation must be considered. Where, by applying the rule, the public
cannot be protected because the transaction has been completed, where no serious moral
turpitude is involved, where the defendant is the one guilty of the greatest moral fault,
and where to apply the rule will be to permit the defendant to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the plaintiff, the rule should not be applied.

Id. at 732 (quoting Tri-Q at pp. 218-29) (emphasis added).
Here, even if the Court finds that AlA Services has insufficient surplus to redeem Reed
Taylor's shares or that the redemption rendered AlA Services insolvent, the redemption
agreements should be enforced because Reed Taylor is by far the least guilty party. Indeed, John
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Taylor and Connie Taylor were attorneys and John Taylor was in charge of all financial aspects
of AlA Services, while Reed Taylor was in the field selling insurance. 57

AIA Services'

attorneys, Eberle Berlin, approved the redemption agreements' representations that the
transaction was legal and also provided an opinion letter to Reed Taylor representing the
agreements were legal.

Because there are no creditors with standing to complain and Reed

Taylor is the least guilty party, Reed Taylor should be permitted to exercise all of his contractual
rights.
5. It Would Be Inequitable to Permit the Defendants to Purposely Not Pay
Reed Taylor and Instead Siphon Off Millions of Dollars in Assets and
Corporate Opportunities.

When determining the illegality of an agreement, courts should balance competing public
policies to determine the enforceability of an illegal transaction.

Smith v. Idaho Hospital

Service, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999).

Public policy would not be served to allow persons to unwind a stock transaction 13
years after the fact. Public policy would not be served by permitting individuals to transfer
millions of dollars out of a corporation, not pay a creditor, and then ask a court to rule that an
agreement was illegal to avoid liability for extensive corporate malfeasance.

Public policy

would not be served by invalidating an agreement that is not per se illegal. Public policy would
be best served by granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor and stop the
madness in this case. As demonstrated by the Affidavit of Paul Pederson, the Defendants have
engaged in numerous inappropriate transactions that have diverted millions of dollars away from
AlA Services to their benefit and to the detriment of Reed Taylor as the evidence shows he likely
57

See Statement of Facts, ~'\I A-B.
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could have been paid in ful1. 58 Public policy should not reward such conduct.
6. Even If The Court Found That the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares
Were Illegal, He Should Be Permitted To Recover Under Unjust
Enrichment and Other Claims.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a party to an illegal contract may still recover in
circumstances where denying a party relief would frustrate the pubic interest more than "leaving
the parties where they lie" and that "barring the strict application of the illegality doctrine, the
central focus must be whether the ends of the law will be furthered or defeated by granting the
relief requested."

Trees v. Kersey, 138 Idaho 3, 9, 56 P.3d 765 (2002); see also Farrell v.

Whiteman, WL 198516 *5-6 (2009); Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. NW Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho

754, 767, 929 P.2d 627 (1999) (holding that quantum meruit and unjust enrichment are simply
different measures of equitable recovery).
Thus, Reed Taylor should still be permitted to recover from the defendants for their
operational and financial control of AlA Services' over $65,000,000 in revenues from 1995
through the present time. Of course, the foregoing amount excludes all of the other acts of
corporate malfeasance and unlawful asset transfers during the same time period. 59
III
III
III

See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, ~~ 26 and 29.
Should the Court find that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares was iIIegal and elects not to enforce the
redemption agreements, then Reed Taylor requests leave to amend and supplement his complaint pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 15(a)-(c) to include various new causes of action against the same defendants and others for quantum
meruit, unjust enrichment, securities fraud, negligent issuance of an opinion letter, and other causes of action and
relief. Thus, contrary to the Defendants' assertions, the alleged "iIIegality" is far from the "silver bullet" that the
defendants would like the Court to believe.
58

59
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7. Assuming the Court Finds Redemption Agreements Were Illegal
Contracts, The Court Should Enforce The Redemption Agreements
Based Upon The Necessary Balancing of Competing Public Policies.
Contracts made between competent persons should not be set aside lightly on pUblic
policy grounds. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 100 Idaho 883, 606 P .2d 987 (1980); Smith v.

Idaho Hospital Services, Inc., 89 Idaho 449,504,406 P.2d 696 (1965).
Here, it is not a violation to enter into a redemption agreement under I.C. § 30-1-6. It is
not a violation of a criminal statute or code even if the redemption agreements had violated every
provision set forth in I.C. § 30-1-6. There are no companion criminal codes for violating I.C. §
30-1-6 and it does not hold that a contract made in violation results in a void contract. Based
upon competing public policies, it would be unjust and inequitable for the Defendants to obtain
control of AlA Services and its over $65 Million in revenues through 2005, siphon off millions
of dollars of assets, convert assets in violation of security agreements and perfected security
interests, and to avoid liability for the millions of dollars wrongfully transferred and substantial
acts of corporate malfeasance. Finally, public policy would not be served by punishing Reed
Taylor for the acts of others, particularly when he obtained an opinion letter from one of the
attorneys representing AlA Services representing that the redemption was lega1. 60

III

1//
III
III

60

See Affidavit of Reed Taylor dated May 9,2008, Ex. I.
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M. Even If The Redemption Agreements Violated I.e. § 30-1-6 in 1995 and 1996,
Reed Taylor Should Be Permitted to Enforce The Redemption Agreements
Because I.e. § 30-1-640 Governs the Transaction After The Idaho Legislature
Repealed I.e. § 30-1-6 in 1997.
When Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed, the pertinent code section applicable to the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares is I.C. § 30_1_6. 61 Idaho Code has a savings provision that
require the provision in place as of the date of the transaction to govern transactions occurring
prior to the repeal of the Idaho Business Corporations Act:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the repeal of a statute by this
chapter does not affect:

***

(c) Any violation of the statute, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred
because of the violation, before its repeal.

See I.C. § 30-1-1703 (emphasis added).

From 1997 to the present time, I.C. § 30-1-640 governs the redemption of shares and
distributions made under any redemption agreement. See I. C. § 30-1-640. In 1997, the Idaho
Legislature abandoned the earned surplus and capital surplus requirements when it adopted I.C. §
30-1-640, the pertinent portion of which states:
(3) No distribution may be made if, after giving effect:
(a) The corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the
usual course of business; or
(b) The corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities
plus, unless the articles of incorporation permit otherwise, the amount that would
be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time of the distribution,
to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of the shareholders whose
preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.
Connie Taylor and James Beck previously relied upon I.e. § 30-1-46 as the authority for their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed in April 2008, however, they now concede that I.C. § 30-1-6 is the proper Code Section.

61
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(4) The board of directors may base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited
under subsection (3) of this section either on financial statements prepared on the basis of
accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or on fair
valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances.
(5) Except as provided in subsection (7) of this section, the effect of a distribution under
subsection (3) of this section is measured:
(a) In the case of distribution by purchase, redemption or other acquisition of the
corporation's shares, as of the earlier of:
(i) The date the money or other property is transferred or debt incurred by
the corporation, or
(ii) The date the shareholder ceases to be shareholder with respect to the
acquired shares ...
See I.C. § 30-1-640(3)-(5).

Thus, even if the redemption agreements violated I.C. § 30-1-6 in 1995 and 1996, those
payments have already been made. To the extent that any payments made after 1996 violate
Idaho law, I.C. § 30-1-640 would be the controlling authority. Since earned surplus and capital
surplus are not elements of determining the legality of a redemption under I.C. § 30-1-640, the
fair-market-value of the assets on the date of the redemption would control, i.e., the value of the
assets on July 22, 1995. As the Court is now well aware, appraisals conducted for AlA Services
demonstrate millions of dollars over and above the amounts owed to Reed Taylor and he values
AlA Services assets not listed on the financial statements at over $24,000,000 in 1995. 62
III
III

62

See Statement of Facts, "RR and UU.
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N.

Assuming the Redemption Agreements Violated I.C. 30-1-6, the Agreements
Should Be Enforced Subordinated Only to Claims By General Creditors.

Even if a redemption agreement rendered the corporation insolvent, the redemption
agreements would remain valid and enforceable subject only to a subordinated position to
general creditors with standing to complain. McConnell v. Estate of WH. Butler, 402 F.2d 362
(9th Cir. 1968).
Here, even if the Court finds that the redemption violated I.C. § 30-1-6 and/or was

illega~,

the redemption agreements should be enforced and Reed Taylor's claims should be subordinate
only to claims by general creditors who were creditors in 1995 and who have not been paid.
Significantly, however, no such creditors exist. 63 Moreover, even if general creditors were owed
money after the 1995 time frame with full knowledge of the redemption agreements and relate4
security interests, then Reed Taylor should still be only subordinated to such claims and not
eliminated as a creditor. Moreover, Paul Pederson testified that there is no evidence creditors
who were owed obligations in 1995 have not been paid, other than Reed Taylor. 64
O.

The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking the Redemption of Reed
Taylor's Shares Based Upon Fraud, Estoppel, Unclean Hands, Laches, and
Acquiescence.

The principals of justice and equity are informatively discussed in 30A C.J.S. Equity § 96
(2008):
Equity courts are not bound by strict common law rules, and, further, they have the
power, where necessary, to pierce rigid statutory rules to prevent injustice. They possess
broad powers and should exercise them so as to do substantial justice.
Id (internal footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

63

64

See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, ~ 14.
See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, ~ 14.
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Reed Taylor is the only innocent party and the only creditor affected by the acts and
omissions of the Defendants. The Defendants should not be permitted to escape their significant
acts of fraud and corporate malfeasance by asserting that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
was illegal because AlA Services had a significant negative shareholder equity balance. Such
arguments are fundamentally unfair and violate the very reason this legal system was established,
which is to prevent unjust and inequitable results.
1. The Defendants and Plan Are Estopped From Attacking the Redemption
of Reed Taylor's Shares.
The legal defense of estoppel may be applied to stock redemption transactions:
A corporation and shareholders who develop an improper scheme to acquire the
corporations' stock lack standing to raise, and are estopped (rom raising, the issue of
insufficiency of the corporation's earned surplus...
.
See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 663 (2008) (citing Minneluse Co. v. A.G. Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d

l321 (Colo. 1996); American Family Care, Inc. v. Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala. 1990) (emphasis
added»; see also 18B Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1745 (2008).
Stock redemption statutes safeguard the rights of creditors and when no creditors have
complained a corporation is estopped from denying the validity of the transaction. See e.g.,
Lanpar Company v. Stull, 405 S.W.2d 235,237 (Ct. App. Texas 1966).

Here, the Defendants and Plan are estopped from attacking the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares. They are also estopped from asserting insolvency. They made representation of
solvency to Reed Taylor as an inducement to have him agree to sell his shares.
estopped.
III
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They are

2. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking the Redemption of
Reed
Taylor's
Shares
Based
Upon
Their
Fraud
and/or
Misrepresentations.
To successfully bring an action for fraud, a plaintiff must establish the existence of the
following elements:
(1) a statement or representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the
speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be reliance; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) justifiabl.e
reliance; and (9) resultant injury.
Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) (holding that misrepresentations

and discrepancies in corporate financial statements precluded summary judgment in buyer's
action for fraud).
Idaho Courts have long recognized "constructive fraud" as an alternative cause of action
to common law "fraud" and that "constructive fraud" does not require a plaintiff to plead the
nine elements of common law "fraud." See e.g., McGhee v. McGhee, 82 Idaho 367, 371, 353
P.2d 760 (1960) (Recognizing constructive fraud as an alternative cause of action to fraud and
that the requirement of pleading and proving all nine elements of fraud "is not the case");
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 61, 415 P.2d 698 (1966)(a promise to build a house to certain

standards constitutes "constructive fraud" when the builder failed to do so).
AlA Services and John Taylor made representations in all of the redemption agreements
that the actions were authorized, legal and that all approvals had been obtained. 65 AlA Services,
by and through John Taylor, also made numerous representations through an indemnification and

65

See Statement of Facts, , Q.
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release agreement dated August 16, 1995. 66 Finally, AlA Services, by and through its attorney
Richard Riley and Eberle Berlin, made representations to Reed Taylor through an opinion letter
dated August 15, 1995. 67 All of the representations contained in the foregoing documents were
relied upon by Reed Taylor. Reed Taylor had a right to rely upon these representations and did
in fact justifiably rely upon such representations. To the extent that Defendants and the Plan are
successful with their arguments, the representations made to Reed Taylor were false and Reed
Taylor has been damaged.
3. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred From Attacking the Redemption of
Reed Taylor's Shares Because Their Hands Are Unclean.

Under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, the court has the discretion to evaluate the
relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the party seeking equitable relief
should in light of all the circumstances be precluded from such relief. Thomas v. Medical Center
PhysiCians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210, 61 P.3d 557 (2002).

Shareholders who participate in a questionable transaction have unclean hands and may
not later attack it. See e.g., Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct.
App. 1988) (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703,
711, 94 S.Ct. 2578,2583 (1974» (discussing the doctrine of unclean hand and its application to
shareholder transactions as adopted by the United States Supreme Court).
Shareholders who participate in a questionable transaction or acqmre shares with
knowledge of a questionable transaction have unclean hands and may not later attack the
transaction. See e.g., Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 314 Md. 32, 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. App.
66Id. at ~~ Q and V.
67 Id. at~P.
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1988) (citing Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 711,

94 S.Ct. 2578, 2583 (1974) (discussing the doctrine of unclean hand and its application to
questionable shareholder transactions as adopted by the United States Supreme Court)).
Here, the Defendants and Plan's hands are unclean.
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares.

They all were involved in the

They all had intimate knowledge of the redemption of

Reed Taylor's shares. The Plan, James Beck and Corrine Beck acquired their shares in AlA
Services with specific knowledge of the terms of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the
reSUlting debt and security interests. They participated in the process in an attempt to take AlA
Services public. They transferred millions of dollars from AlA Services to CropUSA and other
. . an d parties.
. 68
entItles

Indeed, John Taylor was the trustee of the Plan who signed the

subscription agreements to purchase the Series C Preferred Shares for the Plan.

Then, the

Defendants (including John Taylor and JoLee Duclos, the Co-Trustees of the Plan from 2001
through 2008) elected to unlawfully transfer millions of dollars in assets and funds.

The

Defendants and Plan have no standing because their hands are not clean.
4. Even If the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares Was Illegal, The
Payment Terms Could Be Severed and The Court Should Order The
Collateral Turned Over To Reed Taylor and That All Funds Exceeding
the Cost of Operations Be Paid To Reed Taylor.
Where a contractual transaction is composed of both benign and offensive components
and the different portions are severable, the unobjectionable parts are generally enforced.
Farrell v. Whiteman, 200 P.3d 1153 (Idaho 2009).

III

68

See Affidavit of Paul Pederson dated April 9, 2009, , 26.
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This legal principal of severability was also specifically agreed upon by the parties in the
various redemption agreements. See Hearing, Ex. Z, p. 16, § 9.6 ("The invalidity of all or any
part of. .. this Agreement shall not render invalid the remainder of this Agreement ... ").

Although this argument should not be applicable because the shareholders approved the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, severability would still prevent ruling that the redemption
was illegal. 69 Because only payments made could be deemed the only illegal element of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares during times in which AlA Services was unable to meet its
obligations, then the Court could simply sever the required payments and order that payments be
made from available funds only. This would also leave Reed Taylor to exercise his contractual
rights to operate AlA Insurance and also prosecute claims against the Defendants for the millions
of dollars unlawfully transferred out of AlA Services and AlA Insurance.
5. The Defendants and Plan Are Barred Under the Doctrine of Laches From
Attacking the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares.

Laches is a type of equitable estoppel and may be applied in circumstances in which the
trial court finds a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted and the
prejudice to the party asserting the defense. See Callenders, Inc. v. Beckman, 120 Idaho 169,
174,814 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1991). Minority shareholders must act promptly and not wait an
unreasonable amount of time when they are allegedly injured or their claims are barred by laches
and acquiescence.

See 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2001 (2008); 18B Am. Jur. 2d

Corporations § 1745 (2008).
III
Based upon the documents that have been produced thus far, AlA Services' shareholders approved the redemption
of 500,000 of Reed Taylor's shares for $7.5 million and the related security interests on March 7, 1995. See
Affidavit ofJoLee Duclos notarized on February 11,2009, Ex. B-F.

69
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Here, the Defendants and Plan have waited almost 13 years to attack the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares.

Such a delay bars the Defendants and the Plan from attacking the

redemption under the doctrine oflaches, regardless the merit of their claims.

P.

To The Extent that Shareholder Approval or Ratification Is at Issue, the
Passage of 13 Years Constitutes Ratification.

If shareholders waive formalities or acquiesce to a transfer made without ratification,
they cannot later challenge the transfer and this rule also applies to minority shareholders.
th

Philips Petroleum Co. v. Rock Creek Min. Co., 449 F.2d 664, 667-68 (9 Cir. 1971) (citing 19

Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 1014) (emphasis added».
"An affirmance of an unauthorized transaction can be inferred from a failure to repudiate
it." See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 94 (2008).
"Generally, a corporation which has received and retained the benefits and advantages of
a contract or transaction may not raise the defense of ultra vires in order to escape its obligations
under the contract." See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 677 (2008).
Thus, the Defendants and any other shareholders may not challenge the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares by asserting that proper shareholder or board approval was not obtained.
To the extent that approval was not obtain, the requirement has been waived.
III
III
III
III
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Q.

The Defendants Are Judicially Estopped From Attacking the Redemption of
Reed Taylor's Shares.

1. AlA Services and AlA Insurance Are Judicially Estopped From
Attacking the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes parties from taking inconsistent positions,
whether legal or factual, absent newly discovered evidence or fraud. McKay v. Owens, 130
Idaho 148, 155,937 P.2d 1222 (1997). The policies underlying judicial estoppel
are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice and regard for
the dignity of judicial proceedings ... Judicial estoppel is intended to protect
against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts ... Because it is intended to
protect the dignity of the judicial process, it is an equitable doctrine invoked by a
court at its discretion.
Id., 130 Idaho at 152, quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers and Steamfitters Local 343,94 F.3d 597, 601

(9th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Put another way, one who has "taken a particular position
deliberately in the course of litigation, must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and
loose." Id., 130 Idaho at 152 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The doctrine was adopted in
Idaho in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94,277 P.2d 561 (1954), wherein the court stated:
where a litigant, by means of such sworn statements, obtains a judgment,
advantage or consideration from one party, he will not thereafter, by repudiating
such allegations and by means of inconsistent and contrary allegations or
testimony, be permitted to obtain a recovery or a right against another party,
arising out of the same transaction or subject matter.
Id. The doctrine was expanded and clarified in McKay, which stated "the concept of

judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in open court,
but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position was
adopted." McKay, 130 Idaho at 155.
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Here, AlA Services, through its attorneys, argued in its Memorandum In Support of
Motion to Dismiss filed on May 22,2007, that Reed Taylor's unjust enrichment claim should be
dismissed because "various agreements govern the rights of respective parties in this action, and
a claim for unjust enrichment is, therefore, precluded.,,7o John Ashby signed the document,
thereby verifying that it was well grounded in fact (LR.C.P.ll(a)(1», and binding his client to
the assertions therein. Jaquith v. A. G. Stanger, 79 Idaho 49, 53, 310 P.2d 805 (1957) (client is
bound by attorney's actions according to ordinary rules of agency). Connie Taylor, John Taylor,
Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos joined in the motion, thereby adopting those assertions.
Notably, this Court granted the motion. 71 In addition, John Taylor, in an affidavit relied upon in
opposition to Reed Taylor's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (which the Court denied), and in
support of Defendant AlA Services' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (which the Court
granted), affirmatively stated that "AlA Services Corporation is indebted to the plaintiff under
the terms of a written agreement."n
Based upon the foregoing, the above defendants are judicially estopped from asserting
illegality as a defense.
2. AlA Services, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and JoLee
Duclos May Not Assert Illegality as A Defense Because They Admitted
the Validity of the Redemption of Reed Taylor's Shares.
The same facts outlined in the preceding section constitute judicial admissions by AlA.
Services, John Taylor, Connie Taylor, Bryan Freeman and Jolee Duclos that AlA Services is

AlA Services and AlA Insurance's Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss at p. 19, dated May 22,2007.
Although the Court's stated reason for doing so was the failure of Reed to confer a benefit on Defendants, that
should not make any difference. The point is that Defendants took a position in support of their motion, they were
'
successful, and now, to suit the circumstances resulting from their motion, they are taking an opposite position.
72 Affidavit of John Taylor dated February 28,2007, at 4J 4,
70

71
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indebted to Reed Taylor, and they cannot now assert a contrary position. In other words, they
cannot now claim that the subject agreements with Reed Taylor were illegal.
"A judicial admission is a formal act or statement made by a party or attorney, in the
course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for
proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616,618, 930 P.2d
1361 (Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

"The party making a judicial

admission is bound by the statement and may not controvert the statement on trial or appeal."

Id., 129 Idaho at 619.
Furthermore, as stated in McLean v. Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783, 430 P.2d 670
(1967):
It is settled law in this state that a formal admission made by an attorney at trial is
binding on his client as a solemn judicial admission .. .It is well recognized that a
judicial admission, applied to the judicial proceedings in which it is made, limits
the issues upon which the cause is to be tried and obviates the necessity for proof
of facts within the ambit of a distinct and unequivocal admission or stipulation so
made.

Id (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, the subj ect defendants, through their attorneys and adoptive admissions, are bound
by their statement that the redemption agreements at issue "govern the rights of the respective
parties in this action." As such, they cannot now claim that there are no such agreements.
R.

The Cases Cited By The Defendants Are Either Inapplicable Or Not on Point.
1. The Stock Redemption Cases Cited By the Defendants Are All
Distinguishab Ie.

Idaho law is well settled that only persons who have been injured may attack an allegedly
illegal corporate act. See e.g., In re Lake Country Investments, 255 B.R. 588, (D. Idaho 2000);
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LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho 120, 127,369 P.2d 45 (1962).

As discussed above, stock redemption statutes cannot be used as schemes to repurchase
shares and the Defendants and Plan are not intended beneficiaries of I.C. § 30-1-6 or any other
provision of Idaho Code.
The following table is an analysis of the facts and legal issues in this case compared to
the cases cited by the Defendants and cases cited by Reed Taylor:

Case

Reed Taylor v. AlA Services,
et aL
The Minelusa v. Co. v. A. G.
Andrikopoulos, 929 P.2d 1321

(Col. 1996)
LaVoy Supply Co. v. Young,

Approx.
Time Until
Transaction
Attacked
12 years 10 months

Who
Attacked
Transaction

Security
Interests
Granted
to Seller
Yes

N/A

Shareholders
Corporation

No

Reed

2 years

Creditor

No

Reed
Defendants

1-3 years??

Shareholders

No

Reed

2 years??

Corporation

No

Reed

Not more
than 2Yz
years

Creditor

Yes

Defendants

1 year

Corporation

No

Defendants

Officer

No

Defendants

2 years11 months

Shareholders
Corporation

84 Idaho 120 (1962)
American Family Care v.
Irwin, 571 So.2d 1053 (Ala.

Party
Citing the
Case

1990)
Triumph Smokes v. Sarlo, 482

S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1972)
Naples Awning & Glass, Inc.
v. Cirou, 358 So.2d 211 (Fla.

App.1978)
American Heritage Inv. Corp.
v. Illinois Nat. Bank of
Springfield, 386 N.E.2d 905

6 months

(Ill. App. 1979)
Baird v. McDaniel Printing
Co., 153 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn.

App. 1941)

7 months

Corporation
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McGinley v. Massey, 525 A.2d
1076 (Md. App. 1987)

8 months

In re Trimble, 339 F.2d 838
(3rd Cir. 1964)

4 years-

Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs
Co., 298 P. 508 (Cal. App.
1931)
White v. Lorimer's City Dye
Works, 269 P. 90 (Idaho 1928)

Sellers of

No

Defendants

Creditors

No

Defendants

??

Creditors

No

Defendants

??

Shareholder

No

Defendants

Yes

Defendants

Stock

3 months

Brown v. T.R. Reed & Co., 174 2 years
P. 136 (Idaho 1918)
6 months

2. Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc. Is an Example of an Illegal Contract Because It
Violates a Criminal Ordinance and Idaho Code that Expressly Prohibits
An Act.
Connie Taylor and James Beck argue that if a violation of a criminal statute constitutes
an illegal contract, then doing the lawful act of redeeming shares should also be illegal. 73 A
contract that violates a criminal statute is far different than a legal and binding redemption
agreement. See Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 612, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that a contract that violates a regulatory criminal ordinance is illegal and unenforceable
so that "citizens will have no incentive to knowingly enter into contracts in direct contravention
of regulatory criminal ordinances.").

3. Wheaton v. Ramsey Does Not Reject the Argument that Only An Intended
Beneficiary Can Assert Illegality.
Connie Taylor and James Beck argue that Idaho courts have declined to accept arguments
pertaining to the intended beneficiary of a statute. 74

73

74

But Connie Taylor and James Beck's

See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 29.
See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Supplemental Memorandum, p. 30.
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reliance on Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 436 P.2d 248 (1968), is misplaced and not
analogous to the present case. In Wheaton, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the violation ofa
Montana real estate broker statute that states "[i]t is unlawful for any licensed broker to employ
or compensate directly or indirectly any person ... who is not licensed ... " and that the contract was
consequently illegal. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
However, as with the other Idaho cases cited by the Defendants, the facts and applicable
code are not on point. Idaho, like most states, has strong public policy in requiring contractors,
real estate brokers and other professionals to be licensed in order to be compensated. Wheaton is
simply holding to this public policy tradition. I. C. § 30-1-6 does is state that it is "unlawful" or
"illegal" for a corporation to redeem shares. I.C. § 30-1-6 does not state that certain acts are
"prohibited" or "void" if they violate the code section. I.C. § 30-1-6 does not state that it is
"unlawful" for a corporation to redeem shares and grant the selling shareholder a security interest
in collateral owned by the corporation to secure payment. Rather, I.C. § 30-1-6 is a flexible code
section that is intended to protect creditors and shareholders. Wheaton is not on point, not
analogous, and inapplicable to the facts in this case.

4. Farrell v. Whiteman Also Involves the Violation of a Criminal Ordinance,
Is Inapplicable and Not On Point.
Like other cases cited by the Defendants, the Defendants disingenuously argue that
Farrell v. Whiteman, WL 198516 (Idaho 2009), is applicable, even though it involves a contract

that violates a criminal ordinance.

Id.

Moreover, in Farrell, the applicable code section

specifically states that it is "unlawful" to be an unlicensed architect in Idaho. Comparing the
facts and Idaho Code in Farrell to the facts and Idaho Code in this case are not analogous.
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Entering into a stock redemption agreement is not an illegal contract.

S.

The Defendants Have Not Pled a Violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 As An Affirmative
Defense or As Authority for a Counterclaim.
1. The Defendants Have Not Pled A Violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 As an
Affirmative Defense and Are Barred From Asserting It Now.

A party must plead affirmative defenses.

I.R.C.P. 8(c). The failure to plead an

affirmative defense is a waiver of the defense. Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107,
1111 (Ct. App. 2008).
In Nguyen v. Bui, the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed the purpose of requiring a party
to plead affirmative defenses:
The purpose of this rule requiring that affirmative defenses be pleaded is to alert the
parties about the issues of fact that will be tried and to afford them an opportunity to
present evidence to meet those defenses.
ld. The application of the requirement to plead an affirmative defense in context of a statute was
specifically addressed by the Arizona Supreme Court:
[I]f the defendants wish to base their defense on a particular statute, then that statute must
be cited specifically in their answer in accordance with the rule that affirmative defenses
must be pleaded specifically.
Mohave County v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc., 120 Ariz. 417, 586 P.2d 978, 984 (Ariz. 19n)

(emphasis added).
Here, all of the Defendants have failed to plead a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 as an
affirmative defense or as the basis for a counterclaim. 75 In fact, Connie Taylor and James Beck
admitted in their Memorandum filed on February 12, 2009, that their prior reliance on I.C. § 30See Answer of Defendants Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck dated April 16, 2008, pp. 10-13; Answ<;r
of R. John Taylor dated February 25, 2008, pp. 15-17; AlA Services and AlA Insurance's First Amended Answer
dated March 7, 2008, pp. 14-18; Answer of Bryan Freeman and JoLee Duclos filed on April 15,2008, pp. 15-18
(Duclos and Freeman also incorrectly rely upon I.C. § 30-1-46 and fail to cite I.e. § 30-1-6).
75
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1-46 was incorrect (they asserted a violation of I.C. § 30-1-46 as an affirmative defense and
counterclaim). 76 The Defendants cannot raise a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 because they have
failed to plead the statute as a defense.
The Defendants are barred from asserting a violation of I.e. § 30-1-6 as an affirmative
defense in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Joinders.
2. Connie Taylor and James Beck Have Failed to Plead a Violation of I.C. §
30-1-6 In Their Counterclaim Against Reed Taylor.
"A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary
judgment." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9,15,72 P.3d 849 (2003) (citations omitted).
Here, Connie Taylor and James Beck have failed to alleged a violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 as
the basis of their counterclaim against Reed Taylor. Significantly, Connie Taylor and James
Beck even freely admit that they relied upon the wrong code section in their counterclaim. They
are barred from asserting a violation of I.e. § 30-1-6 in their Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. Their motion must be denied on this ground alone. Likewise, none of the other
Defendants have a counterclaim based upon I.C. § 30-1-6. For the same reasons, they are also
not entitled to counterclaim relief, i.e., affirmative relief.
T.

The Court Should Strike and Exclude The Entire Expert Affidavits Submitted
By Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth.

A party has the right to object to evidence prior to such evidence being admitted by the
trial court:
III

Connie Taylor and James Beck acknowledge that their reliance upon I.C. § 30-1-46 is misplaced, however, they
failed to move to amend their Answer and Counterclaim as required by I.R.C.P. 15. Reed Taylor expressly objects
to the Defendants asserting a violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 as an affirmative defense.
76
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The time for the trial court to rule on the admissibility of evidence is after the party
against whom it is offered has had an opportunity to object ... [a] party must be given an
opportunity specifically to object to the introduction of evidence and is entitled to a ruling
thereon by the trial judge.
Theesen v. Continental Life & Acc. Co., 90 Idaho 58,62,408 P.2d 177 (1965) (emphasis added).

A trial court may exclude evidence offered by a party on its own authority without a motion to
strike or an objection made by opposing counsel. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co;,
122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992).
1. Reed Taylor Moves To Strike and Exclude The Expert Witness Affidavit
of Kenneth Hooper.
The trial court has broad discretion to exclude certain evidence as sanctions or under
other legal authority. See e.g., Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 48 P.3d 672 (2002)(holding that the
exclusion of physicians testimony for discovery violations was proper); Priest v. Landon, 135
Idaho 898, 26 P.3d 1235 (2001)(holding that the exclusion of an expert witness was warranted
for failure to comply with discovery deadlines). "[A]ny redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter" may be stricken by the court. I.R.C.P. 12(f). A party seeking to exclude
evidence must object "stating specific ground." I.R.E. 103(a)(1).
Specifically, a trial court has the authority to exclude an expert witness that a party fails
to timely disclose in accordance with a pretrial order, together with any report submitted by such
expert. Priest v. Landon, 135 Idaho 898, 900-01, 26 P.3d 1235 (2001). In Priest v. Landon, the
trial court excluded a party's expert witness when that party disclosed the name of the expert
witness more than two months after the court-ordered deadline. Id. at 901. Moreover, the party
failed to timely disclose the expert in responses to interrogatories. Id.
III
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Here, Reed Taylor objects to the expert witness Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper.
Hooper's Affidavit and testimony should be excluded in full.

Mr.

Mr. Hooper's Affidavit is

"scandalous." Connie Taylor and James Beck did not disclose Mr. Hooper as required by the
Court's scheduling order. Moreover, Connie Taylor and James Beck have not responded to any
requests for production or interrogatories submitted to them by Reed Taylor pertaining to expert
witnesses, which such requests were served well over one year ago. 77 78
But the unfairness does not end with the above facts. James Beck specifically testified
about his expert witnesses on February 4, 2009 (seven days before Mr. Hoover signed his
Affidavit):
Q. (By Mr. Bond):

And have you retained any expert witnesses for this case?

A. (By Mr. Beck):

No. 79

Connie Taylor, a licensed attorney, also specifically testified about expert witnesses on February
5, 2009 (six days before Mr. Hoover signed his Affidavit):

Q. (By Mr. Bond):

Can you tell me the names of your expert witnesses that you're
relying upon in Reed Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.?

A. (By Ms. Taylor): No, I cannot.
Q. (By Mr. Bond):

And have you hired an expert to reconstruct the value of AlA's
assets an debts as of certain dates in 1995 or 1996?

A. (By Ms. Taylor): Any expert?
Q. (By Mr. Bond):

Yes.

See Affidavit of Roderick Bond dated February 26,2009, p. 2, ~ 3.
Reed Taylor would waive his objection to Mr. Hooper being named as an expert if he is permitted the opportunity
and time to conduct full and fair discovery regarding Mr. Hooper, the documents provided to Mr. Hooper, the
information provided to Mr. Hooper, communications with Mr. Hooper and, most importantly, provided the
opportunity to depose Mr. Hooper.
79 See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated February 26,2009, Ex. 33, p. 534, II. 23-25 (emphasis added).
77
78
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A. (By Ms. Taylor): Not to my knowledge.

Q. (By Mr. Bond):

And do you have any knowledge of whether [an expert] has been
retained for that purpose, an expert?

A. (By Ms. Taylor): I do not. so
Accordingly, the Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper should be stricken and/or excluded as evidence
and Reed Taylor should be awarded attorney fees and expert witness fees incurred in responding
to the Affidavit pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(g).

2. Reed Taylor Moves to Strike and Exclude the Expert Witness Affidavit of
DrewVoth.
"[A]ny ... scandalous matter" may be stricken by the court. LR.C.P. 12(f). A party seeking
to exclude evidence must object "stating specific ground." LR.E. 103(a)(1). Idaho discovery
rules require an expert witness and his opinions to be the subject of discovery. See I.R.C.P.
Reed Taylor objects to the Court considering any portion of the Affidavit of Drew Voth.
The Plan was permitted to intervene in this action on February 12, 2009. The Court's present
discovery order has prevented Reed Taylor from propounding discovery or taking any
depositions pertaining to the Plan's evidence and witnesses, including Mr. Voth. Moreover, the
Plan has not provided any of the information or documents provide to Mr. Voth.

3. Assuming the Affidavits of Hooper and Voth Were Properly Before the
Court, Reed Taylor Objects to Portions of the Affidavits, and,
Consequently, Moves to Strike the Objectionable Portions.
In the context of summary judgment, affidavits must comply with LR.C.P. 56.
LR.C.P. 56(e).

See

"[A]ny redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" may be

See Affidavit of Michael Bissell dated February 26,2009, Ex. 34, pp. 71, 74-76) (emphasis added); see also id.,
at. pp. 90,105-106.
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stricken by the court. LR.C.P. 12(f). A party seeking to exclude evidence must object "stating
specific ground." LR.E. 103(a)(1). Portions of affidavits which are argumentative, speculative,
conclusory, inaccurate, unfounded, and/or unsupported should be stricken. Sprinkler Irrigation
Company, Inc. v. John Deere Insurance Company, Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 697, 85 P.3d 667 (2004).

Evidence must be relevant. LR.E. 402. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its ... outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues ... or by considerations
of delay, waste of time, or needless ... cumulative evidence." LR.E. 403. Hearsay is not
admissible evidence. LR.E. 802. Legal opinions and conclusions of law contained in an affidavit
may not be considered and should be stricken. Tortes v. King County, 119 Wn. App. 1,12-14,84
P.3d 252 (2003). Matters of law are the improper subject of an expert witness. Aguilar v.
Longshoreman's Union Local No. 10,966 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1992).
a. Reed Taylor Objects to Portions ofKennetlt Hooper's Affidavit.

Assuming the Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper was properly before the Court, Reed Taylor
objects to, and requests that the Court strike, the following portions of the Affidavit of Kenneth
Hooper (incorporating the legal authority cited above into every objection):
Paragraph
Entire Aff.

0

Entire Aff.

0

Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.

0
0
0
0
0

Objections
Scandalous and improper to permit an affidavit based upon evidence and/or
documents not provided to the other party
Mr. Hooper's testimony is not based upon the review and consideration of the
supporting documents which are relied upon to draft the financial statements
upon which his testimony relies
Mr. Hooper bases his opinions on inappropriate assumptions
Not based upon personal knowledge
Expresses opinions beyond the scope of the documents reviewed
Financial Statements relied upon are not properly authenticated by the auditor
Affidavit does not comply with LR.C.P. 56(e)
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b. Reed Taylor Objects to Portions of Drew Voth 's Affidavit.
Assuming the Mr. Voth's Affidvit was properly before the Court, Reed Taylor objects to,
and requests that the Court strike, the following portions of the Affidavit of Drew Voth
(incorporating the legal authority cited above into every objection):
Paragraph
Entire Aff.

•

Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.

•

Page 7, ~ 6

..

Page 8, ~ 9

•

Page 10,
~ 16
Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.
Entire Aff.

•

•

•
•

•

Objections
Scandalous and improper to submit an affidavit for another party and/or to
allow an affidavit based upon documents and/or evidence not provided to
another party
Not based upon personal knowledge
Mr. Voth's testimony is not based upon the review and consideration of the
supporting documents which are relied upon to draft the financial statements
upon which his testimony relies
Opinion as to the "meaning" of terms used in the 1995 statute, including the
term "Earned Surplus," is a legal opinion and as such is improper.
Opinion that "Earned Surplus" is equivalent to "Retained Deficit" is based
upon the expert's improper opinion as to the meaning of "Earned Surplus."
Makes a legal opinion.
Ultimate Opinion is predicated upon the expert's improper opinion as to the
meaning of "Earned Surplus." Makes a legal opinion.
Expresses opinions beyond the scope of the documents reviewed
Financial Statements relied upon are not properly authenticated by the auditor
Affidavit does not comply with LR.C.P. 56(e)

4. Hooper and Voth's Affidavits Must Be Excluded Because They Did Not
Attach All Documents Relied Upon to Their Affidavits as Required By
I.R.C.P. 56(e) and No Discovery Has Been Permitted.
"Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith." See LR.C.P. 56(e).
Here, the documents relied upon in the Affidavits of Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth
were not attached to their respective Affidavits nor were such documents served with their
respective Affidavits. Thus, the Affidavits of Drew Voth and Kenneth Hooper must be excluded
pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e) and the authority cited above since Reed Taylor has not been
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permitted to conduct any discovery pertaining to these expert witnesses and the Affidavits are
scandalous.
5. The Affidavits of JoLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman Are Objectionable
Because They Assert, Without Any Foundation or Evidence, that they
Held Options in AlA Services Shares and Fail To Assert the Required
Personal Knowledge.
The Affidavits of J oLee Duclos and Bryan Freeman contain no foundation for their
assertions that they owned stock options in AlA Services at one time.

Furthermore, their

Affidavits are not based upon personal knowledge as required by I.R.C.P. 56(e). As such, Reed
Taylor objects to these Affidavits and requests that they be stricken and/or excluded as evidence
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(e).
U.

Even If The Court Grants Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, the Motion Has Been Brought Only As an Affirmative
Defense.

"An affirmative defense will defeat the plaintiffs claim if it is accepted by the district
court or the jury." See 5 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ.3d § 1270 (2008).
The distinction between an affirmative defense and a counterclaim is significant:
A counterclaim is a counter-demand or a cause of action that exists in favor of the
defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have brought a separate
action and recovered judgment. A counterclaim represents the defendant's right to have
the claims of the parties counterbalanced, in whole or in part, and to have judgment
entered for any excess.
If established, a counterclaim will defeat or in some way qualify the judgment or relief to
which the plaintiff is otherwise entitled .. .Indeed, a counterclaim presupposes affirmative
relief and may be entitled to adjudication, even after the plaintiff has voluntarily dismiss
his or her complaint.
See 20 Am. JUL 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, Etc. § 1 (2008) (internal citations omitted)

(emphasis added).
REED TAYLOR'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THE DEFENDANTS AND PLAN'S JOINDERS - 69

There is a difference between a claim and a defense, a "claim" seeks affirmative relief,
where a "defense" seeks to diminish or defeat relief sought by a claim. Idaho Dept. of Labor v.
Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 208, 91 P.3d 1111 (2004).

Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is based upon an
affirmative defenses. 81
Reed Taylor's causes of against Connie Taylor and James Beck pertain to claim
derivative of the redemption agreements, i.e., fraud, conversion, breach of fiduciaries dutie:;,
etc. 82 Thus, even if Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion was granted, they would only
avoid liability for Reed Taylor's direct causes of action which can be derived from the
redemption agreements. 83 Connie Taylor and James Beck would not be entitled to any further
relief under their affirmative defenses. 84 Moreover, Connie Taylor and James Beck would not be
entitled to an order invalidating the redemption agreements as to all parties and would not be
entitled to seek the return of any payments or other relief associated with a counterclaim. These
same arguments hold true as to all of the individual Defendants and the Plan in this action.
III
III
III

81 See Connie Taylor and James Beck's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Partial Summary
Judgment.
82 See Fifth Amended Complaint.
83 In an abundance of caution, Reed Taylor has also filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement his Complaint to
assert new claims and facts for fraud, unjust enrichment and securities fraud against the Defendants.
84 Connie Taylor and James Beck's alleged Counterclaim pertaining to the '~illegality" of Reed Taylor's shares is not
a compulsory counterclaim and therefore is time barred by the statute of limitations, as discussed in detail above.
The same holds true for all of the individual Defendants and the Plan in this action.
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V.

The Defendants Have Not Contested and Have Not Disputed the Validitv of
Eberle Berlin's Opinion Letter Or AlA Services and John Taylor's Written
Representations to Reed Tavlor.

Eberle Berlin's opinion letter represented to Reed Taylor that the transaction was legal,
that the redemption agreements were enforceable by their terms. 85

AlA Services and John

Taylor made the same representations to Reed Taylor. 86 Now, over 13 years have elapsed since
Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed in 1995 and the Defendants are for the first time
representing to the Court that they made false representations to Reed Taylor in 1995. These
issues alone create genuine issues of material fact that preclude granting partial summary
judgment to Connie Taylor and James Beck and place the burden squarely upon the Defendants
to explain these misrepresentations. See LR.C.P. 56.
W. The Court Should Enter Partial Summary Judgment In Favor of Reed Taylor.
The court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not
filed its own motion with the court. Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612
(2001).

It is permissible for the trial court to strike affirmative defenses on a motion for

summary judgment. Idaho Department of Labor v. Sunset Marts, Inc., 140 Idaho 207, 91 P.3d
1111 (2004).
Here, for all of the reasons set forth above, Reed Taylor requests that the Court enter
partial summary judgment finding that all of the Defendants and the Plan are barred from
attacking the redemption of his shares.
III

85
86

See Statement of Facts, ~ P.
I d. at ~~ Q and V.
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X.

The Individual Defendants and the Plan Should Be Ordered To Pay Reed
Taylor's Attorneys Fees and Costs Incurred in Defending Against Their
Counterclaim and Defenses Pertaining to "Illegality" and This Motion.

A court may award attorney fees to the party defending the derivative action, which
includes derivative actions brought for improper purposes. See I.C. § 30-1-746(3). Similarly,
the Defendants should be ordered to pay Reed Taylor's attorney fees and costs pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 37 for their intentional failure to comply with discovery requests despite numerous and
repeated requests and discovery conferences. Moreover, fees and costs are warranted under
I.R.C.P. 56(g) as the Affidavits of Drew Voth and Kenneth Hooper were submitted in bad faith
and scandalously.
As such, Reed Taylor requests that the Court award him all attorneys' fees and costs in
defending against the alleged "illegality" arguments along with those fees and costs attributable
to this Motion and the Joinders, including the hearing on this Motion. Finally, the Court should
order each individual Defendant and the Plan jointly and severally liable for the attorneys' fees
and costs incurred by Reed Taylor and bar them from having AlA Services or AlA Insurance pay
the fees and costs.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons articulated above, the Court should grant Reed Taylor's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and dismiss Connie Taylor, Corrine Beck and James Beck's
counterclaim. Moreover, the Court should deny Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and enter an order striking and/or dismissing their affirmative
defenses based upon violations of I.C. § 30-1-6 and I.C. § 30-1-46 and any claims or defenses
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based upon the alleged "illegality" of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. s7
For the same reason stated above, the Court should also enter identical orders denying the
Defendants' Joinders to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reed Taylor.
Reed Taylor should be awarded his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in dismissing the
individual Defendants counterclaims and defenses (and the Plan's) pursuant to I.C. § 30-1746(3).
DA TED: This 9th day of April, 2009.
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC

By: _ _~~,----::.
Roderick C. Bond
Michael S. Bissell
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed 1. Taylor

For anyone or more of the reasons articulated above, partial summary judgment would be appropriately granted
in favor of Reed Taylor against any party that is not presently involved in this action because there are no
shareholders and no creditors who may attack the redemption of his shares, even if statutory requirements were not
met.
87
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick Bond; declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct
copy of (1) Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie Taylor and James
Beck's Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and JoLee Duclos, Bryan Freeman, ALA
Services, ALA Insurance, R. John Taylor and ALA Services 401(k) Plan's Joinders and in
Support of Granting Partial Summary Judgment if Favor of Reed Taylor; (2) Amended an~
Restated Affidavit of Paul Pederson; (3) Affidavit of Reed Taylor; and (4) Affidavit of Roderick
C. Bond on the following parties via the methodes) indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston,ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for ALA Services, ALA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
Citigroup Center, 500 West Madison Street
Suite 3700
Chicago, IL 60661-2511
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services 401(k) Plan

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered - Via Messenger
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Signed this 9th day of April, 2009, at Lewiston, Idaho.
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Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501
208-746-9947
208-746-5886 (fax)
ISB # 2129
CharlesABrown@cableone.net
Attorney for Intervenor, 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan
for the AlA Services Corporation.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
AlA SERVICES CORP., an Idaho
)
corporation; AIA INSURANCE INC., an Idaho)
corporation, R. JOHN TAYLOR and CONNIE )
TAYLOR, individually and the community
)
property comprised thereof; BRYAN
)
FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE DUCLOS,)
a single person; CROP USA INSURANCE
)
AGENCY, INC., an Idaho Corporation; and
)
JAMES BECK and CORRINE BECK,
)
individually and the community property
)
comprised thereof;
)
)
Defendants.
)

------------------------------)

Case No. CV 2007-00208

INTERVENOR'S REPLY BRIEF TO
PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR
AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR
PSJ AND REED TAYLOR'S REQUEST
FOR PSJ IN HIS FAVOR DATED
APRIL 9, 2009

AIA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho )
corporation; and AlA INSURANCE, INC., an )
Idaho corporation,
)
)
Counter-Claimants,
)

INTERVENOR'S REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR
AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PSJ AND REED TAYLOR'S
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Charles A. Brown, Esq.
P.O. Box 1225/324 Main St
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax)

v.
REED J. T AYLOR, a single person,
Counter-Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)

------------------------------)
CONNIE W. TAYLOR and JAMES BECK,
Counterclaimants,
v.

REED J. T AYLOR, a single person,
Counterdefendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

------------------------------)
401(K) PROFIT SHARING PLAN FOR
THE AlA SERVICES CORPORATION
Intervenor.

)
)
)
)

------------------------------)
COMES NOW the Intervenor by and through its attorney of record,
Charles A. Brown, and provides this reply brief to Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against
Bryan Freeman, JoLee Duclos, R. John Taylor, AIA Services, AIA Insurance, and AIA Services
40l(k) Plan's Joinders and in Support of Granting Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of
Reed Taylor dated April 9, 2009, and all other supporting documents filed therewith.

INTRODUCTION
The complexities of this case have been distilled down to three issues:
1.

The standing of the 40 1(k) Plan;

2.

Retained deficit as defined by I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995); OR

3.

Insolvency as defined by I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995).

INTERVENOR'S REPLY BRIEF TO PLAINTIFF REED TAYLOR'S
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO CONNIE TAYLOR
AND JAMES BECK'S MOTION FOR PSJ AND REED TAYLOR'S
-2
REQUEST FOR PSJ IN HIS FAVOR DATED APRIL 9,2009

Charles A. Brown, Esq.
P.O. Box 1225/324 Main St
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
208-746-99471208-746-5886 (fax)

THE STANDING OF THE 401(K) PLAN
The Plaintiff spends a great deal of time attempting to argue his way around the fact
that the contract(s) in question are unenforceable due to their illegality. But the case law in Idaho
is consistent in this regard.
However, neither of these doctrines applies in the case of a contract
that violates the law. If a contract is illegal and void, the court will
leave the parties as it finds them and refuse to enforce the contract.
The contract cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or
estoppel. Whitney v. Cant 'I Life & Accident Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105,
403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965). Therefore, because the Agreement was
illegal and violative of the Act, ISIF cannot rely on the doctrines of
waiver and estoppel to enforce the Agreement against Wemecke.
Absent limited circumstances not present here, this Court will not
enforce an illegal contract, regardless of the fact that the parties
knowingly entered into that contract.

See Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 2009 WL 982690, *8 (Idaho) (emphasis
added).
The standing of the 401(k) Plan is unassailable. The uncontroverted affidavits, as
they stand before this Court, have established that in March of 1996 AlA Services Corporation stock
was transferred to the 40 1(k) Plan in the amount of$565,000.00. Of that amount, $400,000.00 went
directly to pay an indebtedness with First Interstate Bank of Idaho, the primary obligors of which
were Mr. Reed Taylor, AlA Services Corporation, and Mr. John Taylor. (See Exhibit 6 to the
Affidavit of Aimee Gordon dated February 11,2009.) There is no doubt that said transfer was never
brought to a shareholder vote, nor even to the Board of Directors for a directors' vote.
Again, the October 1996 minutes reflect the financial straits in which AIA Services
Corporation found itself and also that the obligations to Mr. Reed Taylor and Mrs. Donna Taylor had
to be dealt with. (See Affidavit of Charles A. Brown dated February 27,2009.) Within a 45-day
time period, another $250,000.00 was transferred from the 401 (k) Plan to AlA Services Corporation
to financially keep it afloat and to help sustain payments to Mr. Reed Taylor and Mrs. Donna Taylor.
Again, this exchange of monies and stock went without shareholder notice or approval and even
went without directors' notice or approval.
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The 401(k) Plan stands before tlus Court for the fIrst time and is simply stating its
position - that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure
Agreement as entered into by Mr. Reed Taylor and AIA Services Corporation are illegal, and, thus,
unenforceable because they violate the applicable 1995 statutes (I.C. §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-46).
As to an illegal contract in Idaho, standing is granted to anyone, even the Court, who
can or should raise the issue of illegality. The 401(k) Plan certainly has standing.

EARNED DEFICIT AS DEFINED BY I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995)
The Plaintiff, Mr. Reed Taylor, has had two opportunities to have his experts work
what magic they may. The Amended and Restated Expert Witness AffIdavit of Paul E. Pederson
again reiterates that the earned defIcit was as follows:
1994

<$919,700.00>

1995

<$18,760,127.00>

1996

<$17,037,673.00>

1997

<$7,247,168.00>

1998

<$7,881,005.00>

See p. 7 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness AffIdavit of Paul E. Pederson.
Mr. Pederson does not state that the audited fInancials for 1994, 1995, and 1996 were
in violation of the applicable GAAP standards, although he has had two opportunities to do so.
Mr. Pederson does not say that the audited fInancials for 1994, 1995, and 1996 were
unethical, incompetent, false, or misrepresentative ofthe fInancial status ofthe company as it existed
at that time. The closest Mr. Pederson comes to taking issue with the audited fInancials is on page
8 of his affIdavit where he states:
With the hindsight afforded by obtaining fInancials statements and
documents for the years following 1995 in order to look back at 1995,
it is my opinion that AIA's write-offs taken in 1994 and 1995 to
account for discontinued operations were overstated or overly
conservative, thus the year-end equity defIcits in 1994 and 1995 were
also overstated.
See pp. 7-8 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness AffIdavit of Paul E. Pederson (emphasis
added).
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I am sure that Mr. Pederson would readily agree that it is not "20/20 hindsight" by
which the accountants should have operated when they were preparing the audited financials for
1994,1995, and 1996. Instead ofapplying "20/20 hindsight" they had to apply the applicable GAAP
rules and regulations that applied to accountants in such a situation and by which accountants and
business professionals must operate.
Bizarrely, Mr. Pederson finds that ifhe is to apply his "20/20 hindsight" to the earned
deficit figure for 1995, he still comes up with an earned deficit of <$10,718,574.00> instead ofa
deficit of <$18,760,127.00>. See p. 8 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness Affidavit of
Paul E. Pederson.
Additionally, the facts as established before this Court include Mr. Reed Taylor as
founder of AIA Services Corporation over 30 years ago and at which time he was chairman, CEO,
and the majority shareholder. There is no doubt and no question that by being the CEO and the
majority shareholder of AIA Services Corporation, Mr. Reed Taylor was in control of his
corporation, and, as such, he is imbued with intimate knowledge of the same.

When

Mr. Reed Taylor was in charge, two accounting firms were involved in doing the audited financials
for 1995 and those audited financials come within dollars of each other in regard to the earned deficit
for the year.
This brings the analysis to an end. As such, the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement
and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement as entered into by Mr. Reed Taylor are
illegal and in violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) and, thus, unenforceable today.
The only possible "out" that Mr. Reed Taylor can fashion is one that is set forth in
Mr. Pederson's affidavit on page 22 where he states:
This information is required to reconstruct and determine the amount
of adjusted earned surplus for AlA in 1995 or 1996.
See p. 22 of the Amended and Restated Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson (emphasis

added).
Thus, the only escape route for Mr. Reed Taylor is an argument to the Court whereby
he pleads that he should not be bound by the audited financials arrived at by his own accounting
firms in 1994, 1995 (twice), and 1996; his new accountant should be allowed to "cook the books"
and go back and "reconstruct" the remnants of whatever financial information might still exist in
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order to arrive at an earned deficit which allows him to avoid the applicability of I..c. § 30-1-6
(1995). In other words, Mr. Reed Taylor is arguing that he should not be bound by the audited
financials ofthe two separate and highly respected accounting firms he used back in 1995, but should
now be able to "reconstruct the books" to his own liking.
The 401(k) Plan was not given such an option. The monies from the 401(k) Plan
were taken in exchange for worthless AIA Services Corporation stock; the same corporation which
was saddled and hamstrung (excuse the mixing of metaphors) with the obligation to Mr. Reed Taylor
as a result of his stock redemption agreements.

INSOLVENCY AS DEFINED BY I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995)
Normally the issue of insolvency would be laden with factual issues, but this case is
very peculiar. Mr. Reed Taylor has admitted, and it has been established by affidavit, that the
$1.5 million Down Payment Note was supposed to be paid at the time of closing, then within ninety
(90) days of closing, and then some other time period, none of which were ever met. Additionally,
Mr. Reed Taylor has alleged that the $6 million Promissory Note payment schedule was in default
from the beginning, and, of course, as the basis for the lawsuit it still remains in default. Thus, the
affidavits before this Court clearly establish that the amount obligated to Mr. Reed Taylor as a result
of the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement and the 1996 Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement
simply could not be paid without obtaining involuntary capital contributions (that is a nice way of
phrasing it) from the 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan for AlA Services Corporation in March of 1996,
November of 1996, and again in 1997. All of this is uncontradicted.
Even the Plaintiff s expert agrees, but with a twist:
With the exception of Reed Taylor, no creditors have been impaired
by AIA through non-payment or failure to fulfill financial obligations.

See p. 21 of Amended and Restated Expert Witness Affidavit of Paul E. Pederson.
This is like saying that I was able to pay the utilities on the house, but not the
mortgage. As the bank forecloses on the house, at least one can tum off the lights on the way out
the door.
When faced with the inconsistent positions the Plaintiff has taken, his counsel
Mr. Bissell, in open Court, took the path of expediency - i.e., the corporation was solvent to the
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extent necessary to advance Plaintiff s case (1995 and 1996), but it was insolvent after that date in
order to advance Plaintiff s case against the other Defendants. This smacks more of convenient
rather than principled argument.
In fact, ever since July of 1995, AIA Services Corporation has been unable to pay

ALL of its creditors as the debts became due which fits the statutory definition of insolvency found
in the corporate code.
Please note that the definition of insolvency in La Voy Supply Co. v. Young, 84 Idaho
120, 369 P.2d 45 (1962) predated the applicable statute that applies herein. The enactment of the
corporate statute explicitly defmed insolvency for purposes ofthe application to the corporate code.
Mr. Reed Taylor tries to use the La Voy definition as if a case decided before the statute was enacted

can be used to interpret the same statute. The law should be just the opposite; the legislature
explicitly defined insolvency in a manner different than LaVoy, and, thus, supplanted the LaVoy
definition with the more precise statutory definition.
Additionally, insolvency has been pled by Mr. Reed Taylor throughout four amended
complaints and also throughout two separate lawsuits which he filed against the lawyers representing
the defendants in this matter.
Mr. Reed Taylor had to plead insolvency of AIA Services Corporation in order to give
himself a scintilla of footing to allege a breach of fiduciary duties owed to him individually by said
attorneys.
Again, when the parties were in open Court on March 12,2009, this conflict was
brought to the above-entitled Court's attention. Mr. Bissell, on behalf ofMr. Reed Taylor, declared
in open Court that Mr. Pederson's affidavit was in error and that AIA Services Corporation was,
indeed, insolvent from 1997 onward.
Well, we thought we had that issue tidied up until we received Mr. Pederson's
amended and restated affidavit in which he states again that AIA Services Corporation was not
rendered insolvent by the redemption ofMr. Reed Taylor's shares.
In open court, Mr. Reed Taylor's counsel said Mr. Pederson was in error and that AlA

Services Corporation was insolvent from 1997 onward.
Mr. Pederson said in his previous affidavit that AIA Services Corporation was

solvent, and again reiterates that position.
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So, which affidavit is in error?
Which complaint alleging insolvency is in error?
..

The Second Amended Complaint;

..

The Third Amended Complaint;

..

The Fourth Amended Complaint;

..

The Fifth Amended Complaint;

..

The first complaint against Clements, Brown and McNichols,

..

The First Amended Complaint against Clements, Brown and McNichols;

..

The first complaint against Hawley, Troxell, Ennis and Hawley;

..

The First Amended Complaint against Hawley, Troxell, Ennis and Hawley;

..

The Notice of Appeal filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on the appeal
against the Clements, Brown and McNichols firm; or
The Notice of Appeal filed with the Idaho Supreme Court on the appeal
against the Hawley, Troxell, Ennis and Hawley firm?

Judicial Admission Discussion.
"A judicial admission is a formal act or statement made by a party or attorney, in the
course of judicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for
proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d
1361 (Ct. App. 1997), citing McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783,430 P.2d 670, 674
(1967); 29A AM JUR 2D EVIDENCE, § 770 (1994); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (6th ed. 1990).
Judicial admissions generally remove the admitted facts from the field of controversy. Perry v.

Schaumann, 110 Idaho 596, 598, 716 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ct. App. 1986). A party who makes a
judicial admission is bound by the statement and may not dispute the statement on trial or appeal.

Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619, citing 29 Charles A. Wright and Michael H. Graham, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6726 (Interim Edition 1992).
"Statements in a party's pleadings are generally seen as bindingjudicia1 admissions."

Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619. While in some states a pleading must be admitted into evidence to serve
as a judicial admission, in Idaho the pleadings may be considered for the purpose of judicial
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admissions, within the case in which they were filed, without admission into evidence. Id. citing

Koser v. Hornback, 75 Idaho 24, 33, 265 P.2d 988 (1954).
In the Strouse case, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he had received a certain
sum as compensation for his services from the defendant, a construction company for which the
plaintiffhad worked as a real estate agent. At the trial of the matter, however, the district court made
a finding that the plaintiff had actually been paid a different amount. This resulted in the court
making a damage award to the plaintiff that did not take into consideration the amount that the
plaintiff alleged he had already received. The defendant filed a motion to amend the damage award,
arguing that the question of the amount of compensation received by the plaintiff was admitted in
the plaintiffs pleading and the court had erred in making a finding contrary to that amount. The
district court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed the award of damages.
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the plaintiffhad made an allegation
in his complaint ofthe amount the defendant had paid to him. Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619. The court
also noted that the allegation was stated clearly and was within the plaintiffs personal knowledge.

Id. Furthermore, the complaint did not state a belief that the amount was uncertain or unknowrld.
Therefore, the court concluded the statement qualified as a formal judicial admission and, as such,
removed that particular issue from the consideration of the trial court. Id. The court also held that,
"regardless of the nature of his in-court statements [the plaintiff] was bound by the judicial
admission made in his complaint and the district court could not make factual findings in
contravention ofthe facts stated in [the plaintiffs] complaint." The court then went on to find that
the damage award was in error, and reversed and remanded the case to the district court for entry of
judgment denying the plaintiff relief. Id. at 620.
The case of Anderson v. Hoops, 52 Idaho 757, 19 P.2d 908 (1933) considered the
effect of a later amendment to a pleading upon an admission made in the initial pleading. In that
case, the defendants, in their answer, admitted certain paragraphs of the complaint. During the
course of the trial, the defendants asked for and received leave to amend portions of their answer,
changing an admission to a denial. The plaintiffs did not offer the previous admission contained in
the answer as evidence, nor did they attempt to prove the admission by any other method. One of
the jury instructions instructed the jury that admissions made by the defendants in their verified
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answer were to be considered as evidence in the case. A judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiffs and the defendants appealed.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered the effect of the defendants'
amendment oftheir answer. The court commented that, before the amendment was granted, the prior
answer had been a judicial admission of the material allegations contained in the complaint, which
would have limited the issues and put certain facts beyond dispute. Anderson, 19 P.2d at 909-910.
However, once the answer was amended, the prior admission became "a mere ordinary admission,
subject to proof and to explanation as fully and as though it had been made in a letter." Id. The
court also noted that "[t]his court has held that when a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the
superseded portion disappears from the record as a judicial admission ... nevertheless, it exists as
an utterance once seriously made by the party, and for certain purposes may be admitted in
evidence." !d. at 910, citing Shurtliffv. Extension Ditch Co., 14 Idaho 416,627,94 P. 574 (1908).
On that basis, the court concluded that giving the disputed jury instruction was reversible error. Id.
at 910.
CAPITAL SURPLUS AS DEFINED BY I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995)

Desperate times really do call for desperate measures.
Mr. Reed Taylor is now trying to argue that the "capital surplus" language of
I.e. § 30-1-6 (1995) saves the day.
Not so.
The applicable provision within I.C. § 30-1-6 (1995) upon which Mr. Reed Taylor
focuses reads as follows:
... if the articles of incorporation so permit or with the affirmative
vote ofthe holders of a majority of all shares entitled to vote thereon,
to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available
therefor.
AIA Services Corporation's Articles of Incorporation do not allow for such event to
occur. Mr. Reed Taylor does not even try to argue the same.
What Mr. Reed Taylor is trying to argue is that when there was a shareholder vote
back in March of 1995, it somehow authorized the sale to Mr. Reed Taylor

co •••

to the extent of

unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available therefor." Id.
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The details of the March 1995 shareholder vote are buried in footnotes #37 and #38
on the bottom of page 8 of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts. He references Exhibits B-F
attached to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos notarized on February 11, 2009, in order to support the
fo llowing statement:
... the payment of $1.5 Million down at closing, the issuance of a $6
Million Note, the balance payable in ten years, and the granting of
security interests were all overwhelmingly approved by the
shareholders of AIA Services. 37

See p. 8 of Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Statement of Facts.
Not so fast.
Exhibits B-F of said affidavit are the various minutes of the shareholder meeting
which occurred in March of 1995. What Mr. Reed Taylor does not point out is that the meeting also
contemplated:

3.

Issuance of the newly authorized Series B and Series C
Preferred Stock and related Series B and Series C Warrants
pursuant to a private placement conducted by J. G. Kinnard
and Company, Incorporated.

4.

Redemption of500,000 of Reed J. Taylor'S 613,494 shares of
Company's Common Stock for $7.5 million; application of
the proceeds of sale of the Series C Preferred Stock and
Warrants to the $1.5 million down payment ofthe redemption
price for Reed J. Taylor's Common Stock; issuance of the
Company's $6 million promissory note for the balance of the
redemption price for Mr. Taylor's Common Stock; and
approval of related transactions with Mr. Taylor.

5.

Application of a portion of the proceeds of sale of the Series
B Preferred Stock and Warrants to the partial or complete
redemption of the outstanding Series A Stated Value
Preferred Stock.

6.

Contribution of at least $4.2 million ofthe proceeds of sale of
the Series B Preferred Stock and Warrants to the Company's
subsidiary, The Universe Life Insurance Company ("ULIC");
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and distribution of ULIC's subsidiary, AIA Insurance, Inc., to the
Company.

See pp. 1-2 of Exhibit B to the Affidavit of JoLee Duclos notarized on February 11, 2009,
(AIA0025254-AIA0025255).
In other words, the March 1995 transaction contemplated a redemption of only
500,000 ofMr. Reed Taylor's shares of stock, but more importantly it contemplated an infusion of
millions of dollars as a result of 735,000 shares of Series B Preferred Stock (at $10.00 a share it
equals approximately $7,350,000.00) which never occurred. If I was a shareholder at that meeting,
I would have voted for it too with the understanding that the tremendous infusion of cash was going
to happen as a result ofthe Series B Preferred Stock. The "sale" of Series B Preferred Stock went
so poorly that the Series B was withdrawn.
Additionally, the notice of special meeting of shareholders did not even include
discussion of capital surplus as required by the statute. See pp. 1-2 of Exhibit B to the Affidavit of
JoLee Duclos notarized on February 11, 2009.
Desperate times do call for desperate measures. Mr. Reed Taylor is so desperate to
try to avoid the illegality of the applicable statute he is arguing the infusion of millions of dollars as
a result of the Series B Preferred Stock, which did not occur, and he now acts as if it had occurred
for purposes of his argument before this Court.

It should be noted that Mr. Reed Taylor filed a fifty-six page "Statement of Facts"
signed by Mr. Rod Bond, and, thus, it is not in the form of an affidavit.

It should be noted that when Mr. Reed Taylor's affidavit is reviewed he does not
declare in any manner that the shareholders voted on his stock redemption agreements as reflected
in the July 22, 1995, Stock Redemption Agreement. Nor does he attempt to argue that the
shareholders voted on the August 1, 1996, Stock Redemption Restructure Agreement.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Reed Taylor cannot avoid the application ofLC. § 30-1-6 (1995), and, thus, is
asking this Court for leave to "reconstruct" (alkla cook the books) from date of incorporation to 1996
instead ofrelying upon audited financials prepared by two separate, nationally recognized accounting
firms for the year 1995. Hmmmmmmmmmm.
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The acts of Mr. Reed Taylor are an exemplification of why the public policy as
captured by I. e. § 30-1-6 and I.e. §30-1-46 were statutorily in place.
Additionally, one can tell by the tone, tenor, and attitude of the appellate courts on
illegal contracts issued just this year that the courts are not going to be involved in the enforcement
of such contracts. The courts are not going to waste their time trying to carve out exceptions for rich
people who have already walked away with over $9 million.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 16th day of April, 2009.

Charles A. Brown
Attorney for Intervenor, 401 (k) Profit
Sharing Plan for the AIA Services Corporation
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mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited
in the United States Post Office to:
sent by facsimile to:
sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst
class mail, deposited in the United States Post
Office to:
sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery
hand delivered to:
Emailed to: rod@scblegal.com

RoderickC. Bond, Esq. @ 746-8421
Ned A. Cannon, Esq.
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, ID 83501

mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and
deposited in the United States Post Office to:
sent by facsimile to:
sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first
class mail, deposited in the United States Post
Office to:
sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery
hand delivered to:
Entailed to: mbissell@cbklawyers.com

Michael S. Bissell, Esq. @ 509-455-7111
Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, PLLC
416 Symons Building
7 South Howard Street
Spokane, ViA 99201

mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited
in the United States Post Office to:
sent by facsimile to:
sent by facsimile and mailed by regular fIrst
class mail, deposited in the United States Post
Office to:
sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery to:

Michael E. McNichols, Esq. @ 746-0753
Bentley G. Stromberg, Esq.
Clements, Brown & McNichols, P .A.
321 13th Street
P.O. Box 1510
Lewiston, ID 83501

hand delivered to:
Emailed to: mmcnichols@clbnnc.com

[Attorneys for Defendant R John Taylor]
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in the United States Post Office to:
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jash@hteh.com

Gary D. Babbitt, Esq. @ 208-342-3829
D. John Ashby, Esq.
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
[Attorneys for Defendants AIA Services
Corporation, AIA Insurance, Inc., and CropUSA
Insurance Agency]
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sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first
class mail, deposited in the United States Post
OffIce to:
sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery
hand delivered to:
Emailed to: jarnes.gatziolis@quarles.com &
charles.harper@quarles.com

James J. Gatziolis, Esq. @312-715-5155
Charles E. Harper, Esq.
Quarles & Brady LLP
300 North LaSalle Street, Ste 4000
Chicago, IL 60654

[Attorneys for Defendant CropUSA Insurance
Agency]

mailed by regular fIrst class mail, and deposited
in the United States Post OffIce to:
sent by facsimile to:
sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first
class mail, deposited in the United States Post
Office to:
sent by Federal Express, overnight delivery
hand delivered to:
Emailed to: david@gittinslaw.com

David A. Gittins, Esq. @ 758-3576
Law Office of David A. Gittins
843 Seventh Street
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403

mailed by regular first class mail, and deposited
in the United States Post OffIce to:
sent by facsimile to:
sent by facsimile and mailed by regular first
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
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508 Eighth Street
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FILED
2tm Rrl17 Pr\ Lf 11.

MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, VVA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,
v.

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;

AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT
VVITNESS AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E.
PEDERSON IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS AND AlA SERVICES 401(k)
PLAN'S MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND JOINDERS,
IN SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S
MOTIONS FOR I.R.C.P. 56(f) MOTIONS
FOR CONTINUANCE, AND IN SUPPORT
OF REED TAYLOR'S MOTION TO
DISSOLVE AND MOTION RELINQUISH
COLLATERAL

Defendants.

STATE OF MONTANA
COUNTY OF FLATHEAD

)
) ss:
)
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ORIGI

I, Paul E. Pederson, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, and

make !his Affidavit based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

I am the President of Pederson Associates, Inc., a consulting firm that

primarily provides financial advisory services to clients involved in civil litigation
matters. I have been retained by the law firm of Smith Cannon & Bond on behalf of the
named plaintiff, Mr. Reed Taylor ("Reed Taylor"), to review, evaluate, consult and
possibly testify regarding claims for financial impacts suffered from the actions, and or
inactions of the named defendants and others in the instant matter, and to ascertain the
financial status of AlA Services Corporation in 1995 and 1996.
3.

Prior to founding Pederson Associates, Inc., I was employed from January

1, 1993 through October 15, 1995 as a Director in the Financial Advisory Services Group
of Coopers & Lybrand, an international public accounting firm. From December 1, 1987
through December 31, 1992, I was employed as an Executive Consultant with Peterson
Consulting Limited Partnership, a national consulting firm. I was also employed in the
audit division of Arthur Andersen & Co., an international public accounting firm, from
approximately June 1981 until September 1987.
4.

I possess a Bachelor of Arts

III

Business Administration from the

University of Puget Sound, with an emphasis in accounting, and I passed the Certified
Public Accountant ("CPA") examination in 1981.

I was licensed to practice public

accounting in the State of Washington shortly thereafter and continued to do so until I
fonned my consulting firm in 1995. I am a member of the Washington Society of
Certified Public Accountants and a past member of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants.
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5.

Throughout the course of my career as a CPA and a consultant, I have

personally reviewed financial agreements, contractual stipulation or consideration
sectio~s

and the financial records of hundreds of companies involved in a variety of

industries, including construction, real estate development, wholesaling, distribution,
agency, retailing, restaurants, agriculture, fishing, forest products, and others.

In

conjunction with these efforts, I have often been asked to evaluate and testify to the
meaning and interpretation of financial statements, financial agreements, stipulations or
consideration in contracts, and the direct and consequential financiaLimpacts caused by a
breach of contract or some other action. On occasion, I have been asked to determine the
value of a particular contractual relationship and the value of businesses based upon
anticipated future income. My experience also includes review, analysis and the
determination of unpaid claims from events presumably covered by insurance policies.
Attached, as Exhibit A to this Affidavit, is a copy of my curriculum vitae, and Exhibit B,
which is a client listing for Pederson Associates, Inc. (covering the period from its
inception in October 1995 to current).

Virtually all of our projects require us to

investigate and review financial records and supporting documentation of financial
transactional activity.
6.

This Affidavit supersedes and replaces my Affidavit signed on February

26, 2009.

I am amending and superseding my Affidavit dated February 26, 2009, to

correct typographical errors, clarify certain opinions and facts, clarify differences
between the financial condition of AlA Services Corporation and its Subsidiary AlA
Insurance, to expand on certain opinions and facts, and to provide a description of
documents that have not been produced which are required for me to provide a full and
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complete opinion on the earned surplus of AlA Services on the date Reed Taylor's shares
were redeemed, specifically, July 22, 1995.
7.

As part of our efforts, we reviewed and, to the extent applicable, offer

opinions based upon the following documents (and exhibits thereto), all of which were
forwarded by email transmittals which indicated such documents were provided to all
other Counsel in this action:
II

Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's Supplemental Memorandum

III

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;
II

Affidavit of Aimee Gordon;

II

Affidavit of JoLee Duclos;

II

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

II

Affidavit of Kenneth E. Hooper;

II

Affidavit of Connie W. Taylor;

II

Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

II

Intervenor's Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

II

Brief in Support of Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and the Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

II

Affidavit of Drew E. Voth, CPA, CFE, CV A, CIRA in Support of
Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for
Reconsideration of Opinion and Order on Plaintiff s Motion for
Summary Judgment;
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•

Plaintiff Reed Taylor's Response in Opposition to Connie Taylor and
James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Bryan
Freeman, Jolee Duclos, R. John Taylor, AlA Services, AlA Insurance,
and AlA Services 401(k) Plan's Joinders;

•

Affidavit of Reed J. Taylor in Opposition to AlA Services and AlA
Insurance's Motion to Amend Answer and Motion for Rule 67 Deposit
and in Opposition to Connie Taylor, James Beck and Corrine Beck's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment;

•

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order;

•

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion to
Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley LLP, Clements Brown & McNichols, P.A., and Quarles &
Brady LLP; Motion to Relinquish Collateral; Moti<:n to Compel;
Motion to Protect Collateral; and Motion for Continuance;

• Second Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of
Reed Taylor's Motion to Disqualify the Attorneys and Law Firms of
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, Clements Brown & McNichols,
P.A., and Quarles & Brady LLP.; Motion to Relinquish Collateral;
Motion to Compel; Motion for Continuance and Opposition to AlA
Services' 401(k) Plan's Motion to Intervene;
•

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Support of Reed Taylor's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment Against the Defendants Re: Illegality and

in Support of Motion to Shorten Time;
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AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON - 5

..

Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition of AlA Services 401 (k)
Plan's Motion to Intervene;

..

Supplemental Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond in Opposition of AIA
Services 401(k) Plan's Motion to Intervene;

..

All exhibits admitted at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing on March
1,2007; and

..

Attached as Exhibit C is an additional listing of documents further
relied upon in developing the opinions outlined in_this Affidavit.

8.

In addition to the documents listed above, we also relied upon the

financial and accounting documents that have been produced to date in this matter
[AIAOOlOOOl through AIA0024875]. These documents were produced to us on data
disks and consist generally of certain financial records and accounting workpapers from
1995 through 2006 for AlA Services Corporation and Subsidiaries, including AlA
Insurance, Inc.
9.

Unless I specifically refer to a subsidiary of AlA Services Corporation by

name, I will collectively refer to AlA Services Corporation and its Subsidiaries as "AlA"
in this Affidavit.

My opinions in this Affidavit are based upon the assumption that the

financial records produced to us are true and accurate copies of the original documents as
produced by in-house accountants, attorneys and/or outside consultants. At this time, we
still have not been granted access to the full range of documents necessary to adequately
investigate this matter.
10.

The Defendant's motions and affidavits listed above generally allege or

assert that the 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement (" 1995 Agreement") and the 1996
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Restructure Agreement (" 1996 Agreement") are void and unenforceable based upon
interpretations ofIdaho Code 30-1-2 and 30-1-6.
11.

In Connie Taylor's and Jim Beck's Supplemental Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Risley maintains that the 1995 and 1996
Agreements are void and unenforceable based upon AlA's lack of an earned surplus. As
noted in the motion, AlA recorded substantial earned deficits in 1995 and 1996 primarily
due to the writing off assets and liabilities associated with its insurance underwriting
operations mainly attributable to The Universe Life

Insuran~e

Company ("The

Universe"). Amounts written off which are attributable to discontinued operations total
$13,662,629, with $4,657,509 being written off in 1994 and $9,005,120 being written off
in 1995.

In addition, AlA wrote off an additional $2,331,166 in 1995 of deferred

acquisition costs associated with the discontinued underwriting operations. As you can
see in the table below, these write-offs had a significant impact on AlA's Earned Deficit,
Total Stockholder's Deficit, Operating Income after Interest Expense, and.Net Income.

1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Earned Deficit
($ 919,700)
(18,760,127)
(17,037,673)
( 7,247,168)
( 7,881,005)

Total
Stockholder's
Deficit
($ 852,374)
(17,018,838)
(14,792,476)
( 5,223,433)
( 6,053,439)

Operating
Income after
Interest
Expense
($ 260,640)
( 84,479)
868,033
1,162,900
820,960

Net Income
($4,867,962)
(10,650,150)
1,722,454
9,790,505
( 726,381)

The Defendants and AlA Services 401(k) Plan ("Plan") fail to note that AlA's earned
deficits recovered significantly in 1996 and 1997 as AlA recognized income associated
with the "write up" of assets attributable to discontinued operations of $900,505 in 1996
and $8,820,000 in 1997. The earned deficit in 1996 and 1997 actually improves over the
previous year's totals, by $1,722,454 in 1996 and $9,790,505 in 1997. With the hindsight
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afforded by obtaining financial statements and documents for the years following 1995 in
order to look back at 1995, it is my opinion that AlA's write-offs taken in 1994 and 1995
to

acc~)Unt

for discontinued operations were overstated or overly conservative, thus the

year-end equity deficits in 1994 and 1995 were also overstated.

In addition, AlA's

earned surplus was affected by dividends paid to the Series C Preferred Shareholders of
AlA Services Corporation who invested in AlA Services Corporation concurrent with the
redemption of Reed Taylor'S shares. It should be noted that there was no obligation to
invest unless Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed. In addition, Reed Taylor originally
was to be paid $1,500,000 from the sale of Preferred C Shares, however the funds
generated from this sale were not paid to Reed Taylor.

Instead, Reed Taylor was

provided an interest bearing promissory note in the same amount. The interest payments
on this promissory note also negatively impacted AlA's earned surplus in future periods.
Considering only the impact of other questionable transactions that occurred in 1995 and
"write ups" in the value of assets in the years after 1995, an adjusted

e~ned

surplus for

AlA as of December 31, 1995 is shown in the following table:
Adjusted Earned Surplus (Deficit) Summary as of 12/31/95
Earned Surplus (Deficit)

$

(18,760,127)

$

67,123
41,932
50,000
900,505
8,820,000
(1,838,007)

Total Adjustments

$

8,041,553

Adjusted Earned Surplus (Deficit)

$

Adjustments:
Payment of dividends
Payment to Beck & Cashman for attorney fees
Payment to Eberle Berlin for consulting fees
1996 write-up for discontinued operations
1997 write-up for discontin ued operations
1998 write-off for discontinued operations
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(10,718,574)

This table does not include financial impacts from management decisions that may have
negatively impacted AlA's earned surplus after Reed Taylor's shares were redeemed.
12.

Despite the substantial earned deficit amount in 1995 (which is presented

only on a book value basis and does not include the value of assets not listed on AlA's
financial statements such as the present value of commissions), AlA's counsel, Richard
A. Riley, maintains in his July 1, 1996 letter to Reed Taylor's counsel that "the

preliminary appraisal value of the Company as of December 31, 1995, net of all liabilities
including the Company's obligations to Mr. Taylor, exceeds $2.5 million."

This

valuation is certainly at odds with the book value estimate as presented in AlA's financial
statements and the calculated amount presented in the Affidavit of Kenneth Hooper.
Since I submitted my Affidavit dated February 26, 2009, more appraisals have been
produced, including an appraisal valuing AlA at $19,391,414 or $19.03 per share
(AIA0029303-05). This valuation is also at odds with the book value valuation indicated
on AlA's financial statements
13.

The Defendants and Plan also argue that the 1995 and 1996 Agreements

violated the solvency requirements and maintains that "AlA was either unable to pay its
obligations as they became due prior to the redemption transaction or was rendered
unable to pay its obligations as they became due as a result of the redemption
transaction." According to Idaho Code 30-1-2, insolvent is defined as the "inability of a
corporation to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of business."
Although I cannot express a legal opinion as to the meaning of this code, it is certainly
open to interpretation.

To my knowledge, and based upon our review of AlA's

accounting documents from 1995 through 2006, AlA's business operations were never
impaired because of a failure to pay operating expenses and maintain positive financial
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relationships with third-party vendors.

In fact, for the II-year period between 1996

through 2006, AlA has generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of$3,867,584
and N~t Income of$10,194,714 [see attached Exhibit C]. Based upon these facts, it is my
opinion the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares did not render AlA insolvent.
14.

With the exception of Reed Taylor, there is no evidence of any general

creditors that have not been paid who were creditors in 1995.

Further, there is no

evidence of creditor or shareholder lawsuits filed against AlA related to the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares based upon the documents provided to -us by AlA.

By all

accounts, AlA was able to continue operations and generate positive cash flow from 1996
through 2006, and is still in business today.
15.

In the three year period year period following the signing of the 1995

Agreement (1996 through 1998), AlA produced total Operating Income after Interest
Expense of $2,851 ,893. This amount excludes any recognition of 1996 and 1997 income
or losses related to the discontinuation of operations and represents, actual income
produced through operations (after interest expense).

AlA's financial performance

through 1998 is critical because beginning in 1999, AlA management begins to conduct a
series of questionable transactions that divert funds away from AlA to the benefit of other
entities, putting into question its ability to meet the outstanding obligation of Reed
Taylor. This issue will be further explained in sections below.
16.

In the Affidavit of Kenneth E. Hooper, Mr. Hooper addresses the issue of

solvency and concludes AlA's earned surplus is negative on July 22, 1995 based upon
1994' s year-end retained earnings balance and a pro-rata allocation of 1995 losses. It is
my opinion that Mr. Hooper has not adequately assessed or audited the financial status of
AlA as of July 22, 1995 (the date the 1995 Agreement and the $1.5 Million promissory
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note were signed) or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. This
exercise would require an exhaustive review of the books of original entry and ledgers
along .with perfonning a detailed valuation of the assets and liabilities to be disposed of in
AlA's discontinuation of its insurance underwriting operations. The valuation provided
by Mr. Hooper is cursory in nature based upon an estimated mathematical allocation and
not supported by actual documents. Mr. Hooper also does not address the significant
"write ups" in asset values that I discussed above that accounted for over $9,000,000 in
profits in 1996 and 1997. At this time, I have not detennined the _financial status as of
July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years as we have never
been provided full and complete access to the necessary documents. Such a review is not
possible based upon the documents produced to date and would require an exhaustive
review of the AlA's books of original entry and ledgers, all of which have not been done
by Mr. Hooper.
17.

As discussed above, the magnitude of the 1995 write-off,

~losely

followed

by substantial write-ups in 1996 and 1997 totaling $9,720,505, demonstrate the arbitrary
nature of estimating the net impact of discontinued operations and invalidates the net
deficit amount calculated on a pro rata basis by Mr. Hooper as of July 22, 1995. Based
upon our retrospective look at the impact of discontinued operations on AlA's financial
statements, it is apparent that they significantly overestimated the impact of discontinued
operations in 1995, thereby resulting in an inflated deficit amount as of December 1995.
18.

Practically, it is very difficult to detennine the net impact of discontinued

operations and its effect on the net deficit amount in 1995. This is further complicated by
the fact that after the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, new management was
responsible for making operational and financial decisions.
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The net impact of these
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decisions may have further negatively impacted the resultant end-of-year net deficit
amounts.
19.

Even if a business entity's overall book value is negative, this may not be

indicative of the entity's ability to maintain normal operations into the future or indicate
that the entity has no significant net value. Additional factors include its ability to obtain
credit and/or produce future positive operating results and cash flow. Likewise, an entity
can have asset book values that are sizably less than fair market values, which, upon
liquidation, can reduce or eliminate equity deficits.
20.

Mr. Hooper also notes that the 1995 Auditor's Report raised doubt as to

AlA's ability to continue as a Going Concern. The Going Concern issue was removed
prior to issuance of the Auditor's Report for AlA's 1997 audited financials. This fact
further undermines any insolvency argument attributable to the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares.
21.

In the Affidavit of Drew E. V oth, CPA, CFE, CVA, CIM in Support of

Intervenor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Motion for Reconsideration of
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Voth comes to
many of the same conclusions as Mr. Hooper. Namely, that AlA was insolvent as of July
22, 1995, and had insufficient earned surplus. For the same reasons that apply to Mr.
Hooper's opinions, Mr. Voth's opinions are not supported by the review and
investigation of all the required documents necessary to form his opinion.
22.

It appears that neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper address capital surplus in

their opinions as to the financial ability of AlA to redeem Reed Taylor'S shares in 1995
or 1996.

Neither Mr. Voth nor Mr. Hooper addressed any consideration and due
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diligence considered by the Board of Directors of AlA when determining the financial
condition of AlA in 1995 or the fair market value of its assets.
23.

With the passage of 13Yz years since the date of the 1995 Agreement, one

is now afforded the opportunity to take a more practical and realistic approach as to the
question of solvency. As noted above, for the II-year period from 1996 through 2006,
AlA generated Operating Income after Interest Expense of$3,867,584 and Net Income of
$10,194,714. These financial results, including the ability to continue to operate for no
less than an additional eleven (11) years, should resolve any issue regarding whether or
not AlA was solvent in 1995 as a result of the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I note
that AlA started paying Reed Taylor reduced amounts contemporaneously with the
formation and operation of CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. (f/kJa AlA Crop Insurance,
Inc.).
24.

Mr. Voth notes as evidence of AlA's inability to pay its debts the failure

of the AlA to pay the $1.5 million down payment at closing or within 90 days. In fact, it
was not paid until 2001. Mr. Voth fails to note that as part of the restructuring plan in the
1995 Private Placement Memorandum, AlA was to sell 150,000 shares of Series C
Preferred Stock and receive $1,500,000 from a group of investors. This $1.5 million was
to be used as the down payment on Reed Taylor's $7.5 million stock repurchase deal.
AlA received this money, but never paid the agreed upon down payment amount of
$1,500,000 to Reed Taylor.
25.

Mr. Voth has not attempted to perform a valuation or determined the

financial status, either on an asset valuation model or calculating earned surplus of AlA
as of July 22, 1995 or any other date within the 1995 and 1996 calendar years. He simply
states "there was not sufficient Earned Surplus in order to fund such an obligation based
AMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
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upon how that term is used in Idaho Code 30-1-6 and 30-1-46." As stated above, such a
valuation and opinion would require an exhaustive review of AlA's books of original
entry

~d

ledgers, which Mr. Voth and Mr. Hooper have not done.

In addition, to

properly opine on the amount of AlA's earned surplus in 1995 or 1996, one would need
to review all financial statements, journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents,
auditor and accountant workpapers, and the other documents listed below.
26.

Mr. Voth also notes AlA's failure to payoff the $6.0 million note as

evidence of AlA's inability to "pay its debts as they became due in the usual course of its
business." As noted in my previous Affidavit, dated September 8, 2008, our review of
AlA accounting and financial records disclosed a number of questionable and/or
inappropriate related party transactions. These transactions began started with the arrival
of new leadership at AlA in 1995 and have continued through December 2006, the end
date of records that we have thus far reviewed. Generally, these transactions have had
the effect of increasing AlA's general and administrative costs and

decre~ing

net income

and available cash to pay Reed Taylor. A summary of transactions follow:
a

AlA and CropUSA Insurance Agency, Inc. ("CropUSA") engaged in a
number of transactions to the detriment of AlA creditors and
shareholders:

• AlA Crop Insurance Inc. is incorporated on November 18, 1999. It
appears that this is a subsidiary of AlA. Articles of Amendment filed
November 13, 2000 changed the name to Crop USA Insurance
Agency, Inc. CropUSA apparently became an independent company
at some point in time, although I have been unable to conclusively
make an opinion as to when that event transpired. Mr. John Taylor's
involvement in CropUSA is questionable especially given the nonAMENDED AND RESTATED EXPERT WITNESS
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL E. PEDERSON - 14

-z.t:"9\'0 :;}u~

compete provisions in the Executive Officer's Agreement with AlA
signed August 1, 1995.
II

AlA subsidized expenses related to CropUSA from 1999 and on by
providing general and administrative support and either undercharging
CropUSA for this support, or not charging them at all. For example,
for years

1999 through 2004, none of John Taylor's total

compensation, which ranged from $196,536 to $250,000, was
allocated to CropUSA. Due to the types of accounting records that
were maintained in 1999 and 2000 when CropUSA was an AlA
subsidiary, and based upon the records that have been produced to
date, it is impossible to determine the amount of dollars that should
have rightfully been allocated to CropUSA without an exhaustive
review of the financial records of both entities. Based upon what has
been provided though, costs appear to have been allo<;:ated on a very
subjective basis with no documentation to support the allocation logic.
It appears other costs or expenses paid by AlA for CropUSA may

never be known. With respect to the labor allocations, no substantive
documentation was provided to support the arbitrary allocation of time
between AlA and CropUSA. According to 2001 and 2002 financial
records as represented in the known accounting entries, the unallocated
cost total was approximately $500,000.

This amount was never

allocated to CropUSA.

..

In 2004, AlA Insurance, a subsidiary of AlA, purchased CropUSA's
ownership shares of AlA Services for approximately $1.5 million in
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cash. According to CropUSA's financial records, these shares had a
book value of $21,850. This appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to
capitalize CropUSA while depleting the financial resources of AlA. I
also note that AlA Insurance was responsible for the income taxes on
the $1.5 million transferred to CropUSA.

• AlA Insurance became the guarantor on a loan with AGM, LLC for
$15,000,000. AIA received no consideration for this loan guarantee
and it further demonstrates that the Defendants \\I.ere utilizing AlA for
the benefit of CropUSA without any compensation or return benefit to
AlA.
•

According to a letter to shareholders dated August 18, 2008, certain
CropUSA assets were to be sold to Hudson Insurance Company
("Hudson"). The representation disclosed in the letter indicates "the
sale of the current block will result in a gain in excess

~f $10

million."

There is a legal question as to whether Reed Taylor should have been
entitled to a security interest in the assets that were sold to Hudson
based upon our identification of significant amounts of money that
were transferred to CropUSA by AlA and the fact that this entity was
initially operated as a subsidiary of AlA.
b

AlA engaged in a number of transactions where stock was redeemed and
payments were made to ESOP for put contracts:

•

Based upon my understanding, AlA is specifically prohibited from
engagmg m paying any dividend to the Series C Preferred
Shareholders or redeeming any other shares m AlA Services
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Corporation until it has satisfied the outstanding obligations of Reed
Taylor and redeemed all of the Preferred A Shares in AlA Services
Corporation. Based upon the limited records reviewed, below is a
listing of the transactions:
II

II

c

Payments made to employees for stock redemptions:
II

1997-2002 - $405,658

II

2003-2006 - $14,963

Payments made to the ESOP for put contr,!cts:
II

1999 - $49,626.90

II

2000 - $37,531.88

II

2001 - $42,487.81

II

2002-$31,914.18

II

2003 - $58,114.89

II

2004-$16,671.68

II

2005 - $8,901.13

II

2006 - $2,945.98

AlA paid dividends to Preferred C Stock shareholders from 1995 through
1998:
II

AlA's payment of dividends is hardly the action of an insolvent
corporation.

These payments are made despite the fact that the

obligations of Reed Taylor and the Preferred A Shareholder had not
been satisfied. Based upon the limited records reviewed, amounts paid
in dividends by year total:
II

1995 - $67,123
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•

1996 - $249,888

•

1997 - $289,702

•

1998 - $74,375

d AlA engaged in a number of transactions with Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation ("PERC"). PERC was at one time a related party with AlA:
•

From December 1997 through December 2001 AlA engaged in a
series of transactions where 219,044 shares of PERC common stock
were purchased. The total book value of stock held was $411,844. In
December 2001 and the third quarter of 2004, AlA transferred all of its
ownership shares of PERC to

~ohn

Taylor at a transfer price that may

or may not have been at fair market value.
•

A receivable in the amount of $95,000 owed by PERC to AIA was
transferred to CropUSA on December 31, 2006.

•

Transactional activity reflects an ongoing back and forth transfer of
cash between AlA and PERC, even though AlA was no longer an
owner of PERC stock after the third quarter of2004.

•

Emails and other documents produced by AlA also show that AlA
personnel were providing services for Pacific Empire Radio
Corporation and related entities.

e

John Taylor received total compensation ranging between $196,536 and
$250,000 per year from 1995 through 2006:

One can question the validity of the reasonableness of both the amount of John
Taylor's total compensation and as to why AlA was required to absorb these costs, as his
salary was not allocated to CropUSA until 2006 (his total compensation appears to have
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been allocated after John Taylor testified on March 1, 2007, that his salary was not
allocated to CropUSA and that he spent half of his time working for CorpUSA).
f

John Taylor is charging AlA an excessive amount for the rental of a
parking lot:
•

Prior to John Taylor's purchase of a parking lot in 2001, AlA was
being charged $5,000 per year in rent for the lot.

Amounts paid in

2004,2005 and 2006 were $15,750, 15,000 and $30,000 respectively.
The $30,000 amount paid in 2006 includes $15,000 of "prepaid
parking ~ot rent for 2007."
g

AlA purchased vehicles on behalf of John Taylor:
•

In January 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's BMW for $41,450.

•

In September 2004, AlA purchased John Taylor's Ford Excursion for
$18,770.

27.

Currently our investigation is incomplete because documents requested

during the discovery process have not yet been produced.

The above examples of

questionable transaction are not exhaustive and our investigation in this regard remains
ongoing and incomplete. Upon production of the necessary documents and answers to
questions from various past and present accounting personnel in and outside of AlA, we
will need additional time to review the records of AlA and related parties to scrutinize
investments, transfers and other transactions from 1995 through the present time to
confirm that AlA actually produced sufficient cash flow to pay Reed Taylor. Without
gaining full and unencumbered access to additional financial records and accounting
information, it is impossible to measure the full extent of funds that have been drawn out
of AlA for the benefit of others. With the added complexities of locating historical
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financial records and other documents from over 13 12 years ago, we may never be able
to measure the full amount of the financial impact or to fully rebuild the financial status
of AlA on certain dates in 1995 or 1996.
28.

The previously noted financial transactions identified to date represent

deliberate instances of self-dealing and questionable business transactions involving the
use of AlA as a financial platform to fund other unrelated or competing opportunities.
Without doubt, these transactions were detrimental to AlA and are subsumed in the
balance sheet and operating

result~

for the respective periods in which they occurred;

although as previously mentioned, for the period from 1996 through 2006, AlA generated
positive Operating Income after Interest Expense of $3.8 million. The cumulative effect
of these transactions impacted AlA's ability to meet its existing debt obligations to Reed
Taylor, including amounts owed as a result of the 1995 and 1996 Agreements. Based
upon my understanding of the priority of the various shareholders and creditors of AlA,
the $1.5 million transferred/paid to CropUSA for the Series C Preferreq Shares in AlA
Services should have been paid to Reed Taylor or the Preferred A Shareholder before
being transferred/paid to CropUSA.
29.

Based upon our review of the documents that have been produced to date

in this matter, my findings are summarized as follows:
a

Neither of the financial consultants in this matter (Mr. Hooper and Mr. Voth)
has provided a thorough and accurate financial status of AlA as of July 22,
1995 or August 1, 1995.

b

AlA was not rendered insolvent in 1995 or 1996 as a result of the redemption
of Reed Taylor's shares as evidenced by the following:
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II

Positive cumulative operating results from 1996 through 2006, and no
evidence that any creditors besides Reed Taylor had not been paid.

II

With the exception of Reed Taylor, no creditors have been impaired by
AlA through non-payment or failure to fulfill financial obligations.

c

From 1995 through present, the management of AlA has engaged in a series
of questionable and prohibited transactions with the net effect of diminishing
the value of AlA and Reed Taylor's asserted security interest therein.

d

Given the magnitude ,of AlA's pattern of questionable and prohibited
transactions and transfers of capital that have occurred over a 13 Y2 year
period, it is conceivable that the remaining obligation owed to Reed Taylor for
surrendering his AlA stock presumably could have been satisfied in
accordance with its terms.

30.

As indicated above substantial amounts of financial documents have not

been produced or made available in this action. In order to determine ap.d render a full
and complete opinion on the amount of earned surplus available at AlA in 1995, the
following documents for AlA need to be produced
(a)

All journal entries, general ledgers, supporting documents, income
statements, check registers, tax returns, financial statements,
accounting notebooks (monthly, quarterly and year-end),
workpapers, and account analysis for AlA and all Subsidiaries
from the date of incorporation through the end of 1996;

(b)

All workpapers and notes from all internal and outside
accountants/auditors for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of
incorporation through the end of 1996;

(c)

All record for all dividends, distributions, redemptions and other
corporate transactions for AlA and all Subsidiaries from the date of
incorporation through the end of 1996; and
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(d)

All due diligence information relied upon by the Board of
Directors of AlA and all Subsidiaries for all material transactions
(including the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares) from the date
of incorporation through the end of 1996.

This information is required to reconstruct and determine the amount of
adjusted earned surplus for AlA in 1995 or 1996. This effort will require sufficient
time once the documentation has been provided, along with an allowance of time for
follow up with any other information and/or supporting documents which may have
been omitted and/or may be required to fully' reconstruct an adjusted earned surplus
for AlA in 1995 and 1996.

DATED this 9th day of April 200 .

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to on this 9th day of April 2009, before me, a
Notary Public for the State of Montana, by Paul E. Pederson, known to me to be the
person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he
executed the same.

Pri nted N am e :--''-'----'-'~-=:.L..f1'F---F-'::'tt~>.LJ..J.,'tf-_\_
Notary Public in and for
Montana, residing at __--""'--'L""-"'~'-""\--"'--L..-"'-:-"-'-"~~I\
My Commissi on Expires :--L-="A'~-":=~~-;;z,~
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RODERICK C. BOND, ISB No. 8082
SMITH, CANNON & BOND PLLC
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
MICHAEL S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIRBY PLLC
7 South Howard Street, Suite 416
Spokane, ViA 99201
Tel: (509) 455-7100
Fax: (509) 455-7111
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE
REED J. TAYLOR, a single person,
Case No.: CV-07-00208
Plaintiff,
v.
AlA SERVICES CORPORATION, an Idaho
corporation; AlA INSURANCE, INC., an
Idaho corporation; R. JOHN TAYLOR and
CONNIE TAYLOR, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
BRYAN FREEMAN, a single person; JOLEE
DUCLOS, a single person; CROP USA
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and JAMES BECK and
CORRINE BECK, individually and the
community property comprised thereof;
Defendants.

ST ATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE )
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AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND (1)
IN SUPPORT OF REED TAYLOR'S
MOTIONS FOR RULE 56(f)
CONTINUANCE, (2) REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS, (3) IN SUPPORT OF REED
TAYLOR'S PENDING MOTIONS TO
COMPEL DEPOSITIONS AND
DISCOVERY, (4) AND IN OPPOSITION TO
CONNIE TAYLOR AND JAMES BECK'S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND JOINDERS BY THE
40 1(k) PLAN AND OTHER DEFENDANTS

I, Roderick C. Bond, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am over the age of eighteen years, competent to testify in court, one of

the attorneys for the plaintiff Reed Taylor ("Reed") in this action, and make this Affidavit
based upon my personal knowledge.
2.

As an initial matter, I believe that the Defendants in this action will never

comply with discovery requests, produce all documents, attend depositions or otherwise
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure unless they are ordered to do so by the Court or
a discovery master. Reed Taylor will never get a fair trial or fair discovery until the
Court or a discovery master enters an order(s) to compel.

For over two years, the

Defendants have failed to produce documents and answer interrogatories as required by
the Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Court is aware, no orders to compel have been
entered by the Court in this action despite Reed Taylor's warranted and repeated requests
to do so. Knowing that they do not have to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Defendants then persuaded the Court to limit discovery over the objections of Reed
Taylor. The Defendants have and continue to unilaterally narrowly construe the Court's
order. The Defendants' actions have resulted in Reed Taylor incurring tens of thousands
of dollars in attorneys' fees, expert witness fees and costs responding to arguments and
requesting orders to compel and responding to the newly filed expert witness affidavits of
Kenneth Hooper and Drew Voth. Counsel for the Defendants are wrongfully thwarting
discovery in violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure with no ramifications and thereby
prejudicing Reed Taylor'S ability to prosecute this action and respond to Defendants'
assertions and defenses.
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3.

Through the date of this Affidavit, James Beck and Corrine Beck have still

never responded to any of Reed Taylor's requests for production or interrogatories, which
have no date restrictions whatsoever. We have received no documents from James and
Corrine Beck and we have received no responses or documents pertaining to discovery
requests for information pertaining to their expert witnesses. James and Corrine Beck
have still not filed a belated disclosure of expert witnesses as previously ordered by the
Court.
4.

Through the date of this Affidavit, we have received no further

supplemental responses or answers from Connie Taylor.

We have received no

information regarding her expert witness other than the documents filed with the Court.
Connie Taylor has still not filed a belated disclosure of expert witnesses as previously
ordered by the Court.
5.

After the Court set for hearing the motions scheduled to be heard on April

23, 2009 (we were awaiting the order on Reed Taylor's Motions to Compel and Request
for a Discovery Master), I exchanged emails with Gary Babbitt and John Ashby
regarding reviewing documents at AlA Services' offices in light of the Court's order and
apparent decision to not issue an order on Reed Taylor's Motions to Compel. Attached
as Exhibit 1 are true and correct copies of the emails exchanged between me and Gary
Babbitt and John Ashby. Mr. Ashby stated that only documents pertaining to 1995 and
1996 would be produced. As the Court is aware, I brought this issue to the Court's
attention at the hearing held on April 16, 2009, at which time the Court encouraged the
parties to construe its order limiting discovery as broadly as possible. Despite the Court's
order in open court, all responsive documents were not made available to us and have not
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been made available to us. The Court's recent instructions regarding broadly construing
discovery have been ignored by defense counsel.
6.

Through the date of this Affidavit, we have never been provided all the

documents and correspondence pertaining to the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares,
including, without limitation, the documents contained in the legal files of Eberle Berlin
and Hawley Troxell (whether privileged or not) (as further indicated by the exhibits
identified in paragraph 15(a)-(h) below, which have not been produced to my
knowledge). We have not received a full and complete privilege log either. The legal
files are important because they would or could contain information on due diligence,
valuations, correspondence between James Beck and Michael Cashman's attorneys (the
same attorneys AlA Services paid/reimbursed over $40,000 in fees to in 1995)--all of
which could provide documents and/or information to enable Reed Taylor to address
valuations of AlA Services and other issues relating to earned surplus, capital surplus and
related issues.
7.

AlA Services Corporation was incorporated on December 20, 1983 (f/kla

AlA Insurance Corporation), as evidenced by the attached Certificate of Formation and
related documents that I obtained from the Idaho Secretary of State's website at
www.accessidaho.org/public/sos/corp/search, true and correct copies of which are
attached as Exhibit 2. When I was last at AlA Services Corporation's offices last week,
only certain documents from 1986 through 1994 were provided to us for inspection. We
were not provided all documents and were advised that documents had been destroyed.
Obviously, in order to determine the amount of earned surplus, we need to review all
documents, accounting information, accountant/auditor workpapers, accounting and
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depreciation treatment documents and information, financial statements, and everything
relating to the calculation of "earned surplus" and "capital surplus" dating back to the
date of incorporation.

We have not been provided access to all of the forgoing

documents and information, and have been advised that documents have been destroyed.
8.

Since the Court stayed general discovery and limited discovery, we have

only been permitted to take the depositions of Connie Taylor and James Beck. We have
not been permitted by Defense counsel to take any other depositions, despite serving
notices of depositions to John Taylor and JoLee Duclos and requesting other parties to be
made available, e.g., Richard Riley. Reed Taylor previously requested an order from the
Court compelling the depositions of various individuals, but no order has been entered by
the Court. The Defendants' attorneys have refused to make their clients available for
depositions. In addition, I have been unable to locate the legal file for the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares that was originally at Eberle Berlin, et aI., and need to conduct
records depositions at Eberle Berlin and Hawley Troxell regarding the same and issues
pertaining to the formation and operation of Crop USA Insurance Agency, Inc. and other
entities and the wrongful transfer of millions of dollars to such entities, i.e., fraud is a
defense to an illegal contract as recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Trees v.
Kersey, 138 Idaho 3,56 P.3d 765 (2002).

9.

During the week that we deposed Connie Taylor and James Beck (Feb. 2-

6, 2009), we also scheduled depositions for JoLee Duclos and John Taylor. Initially,
Charles Brown and Mike McNichols agreed to make JoLee Duclos and John Taylor
available for depositions; however, on the morning of February 9, 2009, they refused to
do so. Mike Bissell, Charles Brown, Michael McNichols, other counsel and I had a
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telephone conference call with Judge Brudie's clerk, Arne' Cochnauer, at which time she
indicated that Judge Brudie was only authorizing the depositions of Connie Taylor and
James Beck. As a result, the Defendants have refused to attend depositions (by and
through their counsel) and we have not been permitted to depose John Taylor or JoLee
Duclos regarding the "illegality" defense. As indicated in some of the exhibits attached
to this Affidavit and other documents already filed with the Court, JoLee Duclos and
John Taylor were both involved in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and the
negotiations and closing of the transaction, yet Reed Taylor has not been permitted the
right to question them at a deposition. They would likely have information relevant to
the legal issues raised in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Connie
Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

As indicated in my

previous affidavits in support of Reed Taylor's other pending Motions for Rule 56(1)
Continuances and Motions to Compel, there are other individuals who need to be deposed
as well. I believe it is possible that there was miscommunication or a misunderstanding
with the Court as to the depositions that still needed to be taken in this action. Since my
previous affidavits and today, there are other depositions that we need to take as indicated
in my previous Affidavits and as set forth in this Affidavit.

Besides having knowledge

of facts or discoverable evidence pertaining to the "illegality" defense and asserted
violations of I.C. § 30-1-6, some of the individuals who need to be deposed (including,
without limitation, those identified in this Affidavit and my prior Affidavits) will likely
know other facts relating to other claims and/or defenses to the "illegality" arguments,
i.e., fraud, negligent and/or intentional misrepresentations, etc.
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10.

After the Court clarified that discovery should be broad on April 16,2009,

I again requested that John Taylor be deposed (this is after the last time his deposition
was scheduled, but vacated as a result of the guidance we received from Judge Brudie's
law clerk. Attached as Exhibit 3 is a letter from Mike McNichols denying my request to
depose John Taylor and stating that his schedule would not permit the deposition of John
Taylor "even if [I was] authorized ... " We have never been permitted the opportunity to
depose John Taylor on the "illegality" defense and all corporate governance issues
pertaining to the defense.

Contrary to Mr. Nichols' letter, we had already filed two

motions to compel depositions and discovery, both of which have not been ruled on by
the Court. We have repeatedly requested discovery and depositions.
11.
year ago.

The first time I visited AlA Services/AlA Insurance's office was over one
At that time, we were permitted to obtain access to AlA Services/AlA

Insurance's document storage room. Although there were binders of documents that I
picked up and was not permitted to review, there were other binders referred to as
"accounting notebooks" that we were permitted to copy.

These binders contained a

wealth of information not previously provided to us regarding totals for year-end,
financial statements and transactions, despite specific discovery requests. Reed Taylor'S
shares were redeemed in the 3rd Quarter of 1995. We have never been provided the
accounting "quarter end" notebook for the 3rd Quarter of 1995. I believe that this binder
would have significant documents and information pertaining to the redemption of Reed
Taylor's shares, but, again, it has not been produced.
explanation as to possible the location of the binder.
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We have also not received an

12.

Reed Taylor's First Requests for Production of Documents include

specific requests asking for all the "books and records" of AlA Services and AlA
Insurance, among countless other specific requests (See Affidavit of John Ashby
notarized on April 16, 2009, Ex. 1). First, all books and records for AlA Services have
not been produced from 1995 through the present. In fact, Reed Taylor has not been
provided financial statements for 2009 and other accounting information. On April 10,
2009, counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance, for the first time (see Affidavit of
John Ashby notarized on April 16, 2009, Ex. 4), indicated that Reed Taylor's Requests
for Production and Interrogatories propounded to AlA Services and AlA Insurance were
limited to the time period of 1995 through the present (although even if true, AlA
Services and AlA Insurance have not complied with these discovery requests). I pulled
up an electronic version of Reed Taylor's First Requests for Production and the requests
indicted that they "included" the period of 1995 through the present time. I forwarded
these Requests for Production to John Ashby and never heard back until I saw his
Affidavit notarized on April 16, 2009.

I promptly reviewed the pending discovery

requests and served an amended and restated time period for all discovery requests upon
all defendants, which was filed with the Court. Attached as Exhibit 4 is a letter that I
sent with the amended and restated time period. I have received no response from any
defense counsel whether they will provide responsive documents so that I can advise the
Court. I would also note that the purpose for these limitations was that no transactions or
documents were at issue prior to 1995 and the alleged "illegality" defense had not been
asserted.

I would also note that Mr. Ashby's argument that we had not requested

documents prior to 1995 has no bearing whatsoever on the depositions we have requested
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and his requirement to produce documents relating to his clients' affirmative defenses
and counterclaims, e.g., the Defendants' "illegality" arguments and asserted violations of
I.C. § 30-1-6. Counsel for AlA Services and AlA Insurance refuse to provide lists of
creditors in 1995 through the present time so that we can further support our intended
beneficiary arguments.
13.

Prior to February 12, 2009, no defendants had relied upon I.C. § 30-1-6

for any arguments or defenses. When the Defendants (including Connie Taylor and
James Beck) restated their motion for partial summary judgment and filed it on February
12, 2009, they asserted, for the first time, that the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares
violated I.C. § 30-1-6. Shortly thereafter, we filed motions to compel depositions and
discovery. The Defendants have not alleged a violation of 1. C. § 30-1-6 in any of their
Answers, Counterclaims and Affirmative Defenses, and, despite our recent objections,
have still never moved to amend their Answers and Counterclaims.
14.

As a result of the ongoing discovery problems, I drafted and served

additional detailed discovery requests to all the Defendants in this action.

We have

received no responses from the Defendants on the production of the requested
documents, despite my request so as to be able to advise the Court. We have served these
requests to be more specific and also place the burden on the individual directors and
officers to comply with discovery. I would note that Reed Taylor had previously moved
the Court almost one year ago for an order compelling directors and officers to produce
corporate documents and no order has been issued on that issue (it was my understanding
from the hearing held in 2008 that the Court was going to enter an order that had a
mechanism for directors or officers to be required to produce corporate documents in the
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event the corporations failed to produced them). There is substantial discovery that has
intentionally not been complied with by the Defendants and their counsel.
15.

Also after the Court clarified that discovery should be broad, I agam

requested that Richard Riley be deposed. Mr. Riley is a key figure and, as indicated in
many of the attached exhibits, was intricately involved in the negotiation of the
redemption agreements, drafting of the redemption agreements and the issuance of an
opinion letter to Reed Taylor. James LaRue, counsel for Richard Riley, stated that he
would not make Mr. Riley available for a deposition without a Court order. Attached as
Exhibit 5 are true and correct copies of emails exchanged between me and Mr. LaRue.

Attached as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of Eberle Berlin's opinion letter to Reed
Taylor (page 2 indicates that the opinion letter based upon the knowledge of Richard
Riley, which is separate and distinct reason to depose him). As we have previously
indicated, Mr. Riley's firm provided Reed Taylor an opinion letter stating that transaction
was legal and did not violate any laws, Mr. Riley attended many board meetings, drafted
the redemption agreements, drafted resolutions, acted as counsel for AlA Services in the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares and even drafted board resolutions for AlA Services.
The following documents are true and correct copies of documents recently provided to
me by Reed Taylor'S counsel, Scott Bell which demonstrate the need to depose Richard
Riley, 10hn Taylor, 10Lee Duclos, Bruce Sweeny and others to ascertain the issues raised
in paragraph 16 below (which would assist Reed Taylor in fully responding and possibly
defeating any and all assertions relating to the illegality defense):
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a. Attached as Exhibit 7 is a letter from Richard Riley to AlA Services dated
March 7, 1995. This letter was addresses to AlA Services Corporation and
JoLee Duclos and referenced board resolutions drafted by Mr. Riley.
b.

Attached as Exhibit 8 is a memorandum from Richard Riley to Scott Bell
dated May 30, 1995, pertaining to issues relating to the terms and
conditions of Reed Taylor's redemption agreements.

c. Attached as Exhibit 9 is fax cover sheet and revised redemption
agreements from Richard Riley to Reed Taylor dated May 26, 1995, re:
Stock Redemption Agreement, Stock Pledge Agreement and Security
Agreement. It appears that Mr. Riley significantly marked up and revised
the proposed agreements.

This illustrates his involvement in the

transaction and knowledge of the representations and warranties contained
in the agreements.
d. Attached as Exhibit 10 is a letter from JoLee Duclos to Scott Bell dated
August 14, 1995, re the closing of AlA ServiceslReed Taylor transaction.
This document illustrates JoLee Duclos' involvement and the fact that
AlA Services and others were making substantial representations to Reed
Taylor to induce him to close the transaction (Reed had a right to
terminate the agreements if all conditions were not met, e.g., opinion letter
provided, representations and warranties not accurate, etc.).
e. Attached as Exhibit 11 is a fax from Scott Bell to Richard Riley dated
April 11, 1995, re the proposed redemption of 500,000 shares of common
stock. The fax cover sheet indicates that a copy of the proposed letter of

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND - 11

intent needed to be forwarded to Bruce Sweeney, the director of AlA
Services chairing the independent committee established to negotiate with
Reed Taylor. Mr. Sweeney has never been deposed. For all of the reasons
stated in this affidavit, Reed Taylor needs to depose him.
f.

Attached as Exhibit 12 is a memorandum to Richard Riley from Scott
Bell dated April 18, 1995, re the redemption of Reed Taylor stock. This
memorandum again referenced Bruce Sweeney.

g. Attached as Exhibit 13 is fax from Richard Riley to Scott Bell dated June
1, 1995. This document also contains a letter of intent signed by Reed
Taylor and John Taylor.
h. Attached as Exhibit 14 is a fax from John Taylor to Scott Bell, Richard
Riley, and Rich Campanaro dated April 21, 1995. This fax also contains
memorandum from John Taylor to Reed Taylor dated April 21, 1995.
16.

In sum, Reed Taylor needs further time for discovery to respond to the

issues raised by the Defendants in Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and the Defendants and Plan's Joinders for the following relating to
an alleged violation of I.e. § 30-1-6, stock buyback schemes, acquiescence, the parties
who had a larger role in the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares, intended beneficiaries
and other issues and arguments raised in Reed Taylor's Response and Motions
(including, without limitation): (a) ascertain the amount of earned surplus from the date
of incorporation through 1995 and the accounting and related issues used to determine
the earned surplus (all of the documents requested in discovery should provide the
answers, if they have not been destroyed), (b) ascertain what the board of directors of
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AlA Services and independent committee established to negotiate the purchase of Reed
Taylor's shares considered and how they valued AlA Services at the time of the
redemption of Reed Taylor's shares (i.e., earned surplus and capital surplus, etc.), (c)
ascertain what Mr. Riley knew and considered as counsel for AlA Services and the party
responsible for the opinion letter to Reed Taylor stating that the transaction was legal, (d)
ascertain the value of all of AlA Services' assets in the 1995-1996 time frame, (e)
ascertain all documents and information as to what extent shareholders approved the
transaction as this relates directly to using capital surplus under I.C. § 30-1-6 (and if not,
why? (Mr. Riley and John Taylor (also a licensed attorney at the time) would certainly
know the answers to these questions», (f) ascertain the total amount of money and
unallocated expenses fraudulently transferred out of AlA over the years that could have
been paid to Reed Taylor as a defense to an illegal contract (assuming the redemption
violated I.C. § 30-1-6 and assuming the Court finds that the agreements were illegal), (g)
ascertain all knowledge and documents by Richard Riley, Eberle Berlin and others (no
attorney-client privilege exists if the information cannot be found elsewhere or for
opinion letters) to all issues pertaining to an alleged violation ofI.C. § 30-1-6 and related
factual issues, (h) ascertain the value of AIA Services capital surplus in 1995 and 1996,
(i) ascertain why AlA Services, John Taylor, Richard Riley and other applicable parties

would represent to Reed Taylor that the redemption was legal and that the corporation
had the power and right to redeem the shares when they are now arguing otherwise, i.e.,
misrepresentations if sufficient earned and capital surplus was not present, and (j)
ascertain whether any creditors who were owed money in 1995 exist today, and if so, the
amount of money they are owed. In addition, I believe that the above discovery would
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enable Reed Taylor to argue and/or prove that AlA Services, its assets and its contractual
relationships were valued at sufficiently high valuations by the board or committee to
justify the redemption of Reed Taylor's shares. I also believe that based upon aggressive
accounting taken in 1994-1995, the earned surplus of AlA Services could be further
adjusted to properly reflect the amount of earned surplus (i.e., AlA Services wrote off
millions of dollars of assets in excess of that being necessary as it recognized an over $9
million profit from the write up of assets in 1997). I also believe that the more discovery
Reed Taylor is permitted to conduct will only produce more facts and further discovery to
support all of the arguments asserted in Reed Taylor's Memorandum of Law In
Opposition to Connie Taylor and James Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and the Defendants and 401(k) Plan's Joinders.
DATED: This 22 0d day of April, 2009.

Roderick' C.~Bond
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22 0d day of April, 2009.

Notary Public for I aho
.
Residing at: --t~---/rli;~.LL.!~""""'--"""'----;r-:--:-;:o
My commission expires:

_..o...L-T---'-LT-~'-'----''-

-.-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Roderick Bond, declare that, on the date indicated below, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Roderick C. Bond (wi exhibits) on the
following parties via the methodes) indicated below:

David A. Gittins
Law Office of David A. Gittins
P.O. Box 191
Clarkston, WA 99403
Attorney for Defendants JoLee Duclos and
Bryan Freeman

Michael E. McNichols
Clements Brown & McNichols
321 13th Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for R. John Taylor

David R. Risley
Randall, Blake & Cox
1106 Idaho St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Attorney for Connie Taylor, James Beck and
Corrine Beck

Gary D. Babbitt
D. John Ashby
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617
Attorneys for AlA Services, AlA Insurance, and
Crop USA Insurance Agency

James J. Gatziolis
Charles E. Harper
Quarles & Brady LLP
300 North LaSalle Street
Suite 4000
Chicago, IL 60654
Attorneys for Crop USA Insurance Agency
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Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
Lewiston, lD 83501
Attorneys for AlA Services 401(k) Plan
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Via:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered - Via Messenger
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
(X) Email (pdf attachment)
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Roderick C. Bond
From:

John Ashby Uashby@hawleytroxell.com]

Sent:

Wednesday, April 08, 2009 8:52 AM

To:

Roderick C. Bond

Cc:

Gary Babbitt; Mike Bissell; mmcnichols@clbrmc.com; david@gittinslaw.com; David Risley

Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790]
Rod,

I explained very clearly in my earlier email the documents that will be available for your review today -- the 1995
and 1996 ledgers, journals, accounting notebooks and source documents, all of which have been made available
to you previously. You are free to request that the AlA staff assist you in locating source documents. However,
you are instructed not to attempt to discuss substantive issues with the AlA staff. Any discussions related to the
scope of your document review should be had only with counsel.
I am pretty sure we have produced the most recent US Bank statement, but I understand that AlA will have a
copy waiting for you.
-- John

From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 5:25 PM
To: John Ashby; James D. LaRue
Cc: Gary Babbitt; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Mike Bissell; Sarah L. Riedle
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSGl.FID319790]
John:
I called Janet and requested a call with the Judge on this issue. We maintain that it is wholly inappropriate what
you are dOing. Nevertheless, we will be at AlA in the morning and work with what we have. We will want to see
all documents that relate in any way to the judge's order, including all payments to Reed, etc. (which would
include all statements for the US Bank account purportedly established for payments to Reed. We will seek
sanctions for our expert's time. Thank you.
Rod

From: John Ashby [mailto:jashby@hawleytroxell.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 20093:53 PM
To: Roderick C. Bond
Cc: Gary Babbitt
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790]
Rod,

-.

I will let AlA know that you will be at the AlA office tomorrow at 10 am. They will pull the 1995 and 1996
ledgers, journals and year-end accounting notebooks for your review. The documents will be set in a separate
room for your review. If you want to look at additional source documents from the 1995-1996 period, just let
them know and they will do their best to locate the source documents for you.

If you disagree with the procedure or want to discuss issues separate from the 1995-1996 ledgers, journals and
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year-end accounting notebooks, those concerns should be addressed directly with Gary or me, not with the AlA

Staff.
Finally, please let me know what procedure you intend to use for copying. The procedure last time was to mark
documents to be copied and have the Litigation Document Group scan and bates number the documents. I
assume you will use the same procedure. Note, however, that any copy expenses incurred will by paid by Reed
Taylor. AlA will not be paying any copy cost other than the cost of producing a copy of any disks for AlA's
records.
-- John

From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 2009 2:44 PM
To: John Ashby
Cc: Gary Babbitt; Mike Bissell; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Sarah L. Riedle
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790]
John:
We will be at AlA at 10 am tomorrow.
Rod

From: John Ashby [mailto:jashby@hawleytroxell.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 07,2009 1:16 PM
To: Roderick C. Bond
Cc: Gary Babbitt
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790]

Rod,
The Court has limited discovery to the issues related to illegality, specifically referencing "the financial status of
AlA Services and AlA Insurance in 1995 and 1996." Frankly, we don't see the reason to re-review the documents
at this time at all. The summary judgment motions have been fully briefed by both sides. Reed Taylor moved for
56(f) relief to obtain additional discovery, but the Court has now set the summary judgment motions for hearing
without ordering any additional discovery.
Please let us know if and when you intend to review the 1995 and 1996 documents. Please also keep in mind
that the accounting staff are very busy now in tax season.
-- John

From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 07, 20091:53 PM
To: John Ashby
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DM5M5G1.FID319790]
Thanks John. We would like to look at all journal entries, ledgers and supporting documents pre-1995 as well. A
well as all current ones through 2009. Thanks.
Rod

____________________________~I
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From: John Ashby [mailto:jashby@hawleytroxell.com]

Sent: Tue 4/7/2009 12:15 PM
To: Roderick C. Bond; mbissell@cbklawyers.com
Cc: Gary Babbitt
Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al. [DMSMSG1.FID319790]

Rod,
If you would like to review the ledgers, journal entries, year-end closing notebooks, etc. for the 1995 to 1996
time period, AlA can have them available tomorrow at 10:00 am. Let me know if you want to review documents
tomorrow or if you prefer a later date. Just let me know what you decide to do so I can pass it on to AlA.

As far as electronic spreadsheets, you should also know that the Z drive does not contain spreadsheets prior to
1999.
-- John

From: Roderick C. Bond [mailto:rod@scblegal.com]

Sent: Saturday, April 04,20091:46 PM
To: Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; mmcnichols@clbrmc.com; James D. LaRue; jjj@hljlawyers.com
Cc: rjt@lewistondsl.com; mbissell@cbklawyers.com; Sarah L. Riedle
Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
Hi Gary:
I presume that you have seen the Court's order setting the hearings. We would like to be at AlA's offices this
Tuesday and Wednesday. Please confirm the times we can be there. Also, please confirm whether you are
going to produce any of the paper spreadsheets beforehand. Thanks.
Rod

By: Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth st.
Lewiston, 10 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
rod@scblegal.com
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended reCipient, please promptly delete this
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you.

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND
4/21/2009

~lI1l11l1111I1I1I1I1I11I11II1UIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIJ!JlJ!mIllIllIIlIHIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIJlllltlllll/lli1IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIltilllllUIIIIIIIIIIIIIJIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIlllIIllIIIIUllllllllllUIIIIIIIIIIIUlllllllllllllliln 1Il1l1l1ll~

.

AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION

I. PETE T . CARR SA. Secretary of Stale of Ihe State of Idaho. hereby certify that
duplicate originals of

niclc or Incorporation for the incorporatio n of ~lAA--'llbHll!iODw...._ _

CORPORATION
duly signed pursu nl

10

thc pro i ion. of th e Idah

Busi nc~

Corporation Act, ha e been received

in this office a nd arc found to conform to law.
A

OR

I 'C I. Y and by vir ue of the authority e ted in me by law. I iss ue thi

Incorporation and attach herclo a dup licate origina l of the

Dated :

o.c""r

ertificate of

rt ic1c. of Incorporation.

20. 1983

s

RETARY OF ST TE
=

by: _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _

'.

ffiill II 111111111111111111111111111111111 11111111111111 IIhII IIU 11111111111111 11111 1111 II II 1111111 IIIIIIUIIIIIIIIIII IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIUIIII 111111111 II 11111111 1111111111111 111111 11111

CIP 181

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND

EXHIBIT

ARTICLES OF INCORPOI:tA'fnON
OF

Utt.

i.

3 l.i -' pu fQuJ"
I)

AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION ~,,:.
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THE UNDERSIGNED, acting as incorporator of a corporation
under the Idaho Business Corporation Act, adopts the following Articles of
Incorporation for such corporation:
FIRST
The name of the corporation is AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION.
SECOND
The period of its duration is perpetual.
THIRD
The purpose for which the corporation is organized is for the
transaction of any or all lawful business for which the corporation may be
incorporated under the Idaho Business Corporation Act.
FOURTH
The aggregate number of shares which the corporation shall have
authority to issue is 5,000,000 with a par value of $1.00 per share.

FIFTH
Shareholders shall not have a preemptive right to acquire
unissued or treasury shares or securities convertible into such shares or
carrying a right to subscribe to or acquire shares, except as provided in the
Idaho Business Corporation Act.

SIXTH
The location of the initial registered office of the corporation is
One Lewis Clark Plaza, Lewiston, Idaho 83501 and the name of its initial
registered agent at such address is R. John Taylor.
SEVENTH
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of
Directors is four, and the names and addresses of the persons who are to
serve until the first annual meeting of the shareholders and until their
successors are elected and qualified are:

ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION- P. 1
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NAME

ADDRESS

Reed J. Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501

R. John Taylor

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501

Raymond R. Heilman

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501

Mary K. Frost

P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
EIGHTH

The name and address of the incorporator is as follows:
Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston, ID 83501
NINTH
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized to alter, amend or
repeal the By-Laws of the corporation and to adopt new By-Laws, subject to
repeal or change by a majority vote of the shareholders.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal
this ~ day of December, 1983.

£.')

[6,,/1

)~.~
~.

Reed J. 'I"aylo
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CONSENT TO USE CORPORTION NAME

A.I.A., Inc., hereby consents to the use of corporate name, "AlA Insurance
Corporation ll , by the incorporated thereof, and by the corporation to be formed
using that name as its corporate name.

12/19/83
Date

State of Idaho
County of Nez Perce

On this 19..th day of
Dec.
• in the year 1983, before me Bobette Ruddell
personally appeared Reed J. Taylor known to me as President of A.I.A., Inc.,
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that
he executed the same.

My commission expires 3/15/84

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERICK C. BOND

ATE OF AMENDME
OF

AlA INSURANCB CORPORATION
I PETE

. CE

duplicate origin 1 of

RR U A.

ecretary of Slate of the State of Idaho hereby. certif. thai

rticles of Amendment to the rlides of IncorporalJon of

duly signed and verified pursuant to the provisions of the Idaho Bu ine

orpora lion

ACL,

have

been recei ved in Ihi. office and are found 10 conform 10 law.
A

ORO I G Yandbyvirtucoftheaut h

rilyvestl!dinmeb.law . l i s~tlelhis·

n i lt:atcuf

Amendment to the Articles f Incorporation and attaeh hereto a duplicate original of the
of Amendment.

Dated ----------4:~~_Itf!~~6_---. J 9

• F. RF.

CAM 779

AFFIDAVIT OF RODERI CK C. BOND

iHlt---

RY OF ST

rticlc:

ARTICLES OF AMENDMENT
TO THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
OF
AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION
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Pursuant to the provisions of Section 30-1-61 of the Idaho 1f@si.liir.,Qss
rn
• .-4

Corporation Act, the undersigned corporation adopts the following

.z:-

Ar~cl,!,)of

-<

o..,..

Amendment to its Articles of Incorporation.
FIRST:

The

name

of

the

corporation

is

AlA

INS~~E
... CIII:'
"' en

CORPORATION.
SECOND:

0

~

The following amendments to the Articles of Incorporation

were adopted by the shareholders of the corporation on the 29th day of
August, 1986 J in the manner prescribed by the Idaho Business Corporation
Act:
"FIRST
The name of the corporation is AlA SERVICES CORPORATION."
THIRD~

The number of shares of the corporation outstanding at the

time of such adoption was _1-<.....,0,-,0:....0_ _ ; and the number of shares entitled to
vote thereon was
FOURTH:

1,000
The designation and number of outstanding shares of each

class entitled to vote thereon as a class were as follows:
Number of Shares:
1,000

Common
FIFTH:
1 t 000 ;

The

number of shares voted for

such amendment was

and the number of shares voted against such amendment was

o
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DATED this 13th day

ofOc~ober,

1986.

AIA INSURANCE CORPORATION

By

STATE OF IDAHO
Ada.

County of Nez-t'eTce

)
:S8.

)

I,
Ma Amri t Savi to
, a Notary Public, do hereby certify that
on this 13th day of October, 1986, personally appeared before me REED J.
TAYLOR, who, being by me first duly sworn, declared that he is the
President of AlA INSURANCE CORPORATION, that he signed the foregoing
document as President of the corporation, and that the statements contained
therein are true.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at:
Boise> Idaho
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RECF!VED

CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.
LAWYERS
321 13th Street
Post Office Box 1510
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone (208) 743-6538
Fax (208) 746-0753

April 15, 2009
Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
508 Eighth Street
Lewiston,ID 83501
Re:

Sw\l '; i
_... "~d!~)l\'·
1j;:{~FBrb\Vn
Justin J. Coleman
Michael E. McNichols
Sonyalee R. Nutsch'"
Eric K. Peterson'"
Bentley G. Stromberg

'Admitted in Idaho
and Washington

v.R. Clements
(1896-1982)
Reed Clements
(Retired)
Philip E. Peterson
(1922-2003)

Taylor v. AlA, et. al.

Dear Rod:

I received your e-mail stating that the judge had declared discovery to be "as broad as possible"
and your desire to depose John Taylor "again immediately".
Though Judge Brudie did clarify a part of paragraph (2) of his order of January 30, 2009, there
was no discussion about paragraph (1) of the order dealing with depositions.
As you recall, in the context of whether JoLee Duclos' deposition could be taken under the
order of January 30, 2009, all counsel spoke to Judge Brudie's law clerk, Arne' Cochnauer on
the telephone. Ms. Cochnauer told us that it was the Court's intent that no depositions other
than those of Connie Taylor and James Beck were to be taken.
During that telephone conversation, Ms. Cochnauer invited you to fIle a motion and request an
order shortening time for hearing to request the authority to take additional depositions. You
did not fIle a motion requesting permission to take additional depositions.
I have tried to reach both John Taylor and JoLee Duclos today by telephone without success.

I'm going to be out ofthe offIce in Seattle tomorrow and Friday. I have 4 depositions scheduled
on Monday, April 20, and 4 depositions scheduled on Tuesday, April 21, and 1 deposition
scheduled on Wednesday, April 22 in another case. Accordingly, even if you were authorized
to take John Taylor's deposition, we would not be able to accommodate you before the
Summary Judgment hearing on Thursday, April 23.
Very truly yours,
CLEMENTS, BROWN & McNICHOLS, P.A.

J\.1EM/eb
cc AFF fuA«v¥r1(jp!jfODERICK C. BOND

--EX-HIIIlIiIII1IB~IT~'~54 0

lAW OFFICES OF

SMITH, CANNON & BOND
JERRY V.SMITH t
NED A.CANNON
RODERICK C. BOND'

PLLC

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
508 EIGHTH STREET
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83S01

Telephone
(208) 743-9428
Facsimile
(208) 746-8421

t Rerired (12-31-05)
" Licensed in Idaho and WasMnqron

April 17, 2009
VIA EMAIL

Michael McNichols
mm cnicho ls@clbnnc.com

Gary Babbitt
gdg@hteh.com

John Ashby
jash(a),hteh.com

David Risley
david@rbcox.com

James Gatziolis
jjg@quades.com

Charles Harper
charper@quarles.com

David Gittins
david@gittinslaw.com

Re:

Reed Taylor v. AlA Services Corporation, et al.
Case No. CV 07-00208
SC&B File No.1 048-004

Dear Defense Counsel:
Attached are Reed Taylor's Amended and Restated Time Period Applicable to All Requests for
Production and Interrogatories Propounded Upon All Defendants in this Action and Notice of Services
for the same. As a result of the Defendants untimely and un-pled arguments and refusal to produce
documents for earlier time period based upon such new arguments, Reed Taylor has been forced to take
this unnecessary action.
As I want to be clear in my next Affidavit to the Court in Support of Reed Taylor's Rule 56(f)
Continuance, please advise me in writing when you all will be able to provide full and complete answers
and responsive documents. I understand that you have 30 days under the Civil Rules to comply. Thus,
if you need the full 30 days, please let me know so that I can advise the Court in my Affidavit. If you
are going to produce the documents and interrogatories immediately, please immediately let me know in
writing.
In an email to Mr. Ashby, I cited to language that I believed was the proper time period in Reed Taylor's
First Requests for Production. I was incorrect. I apologize to Mr. Ashby as I opened an electronic copy
of Reed Taylor's First Requests for Production, which I have ascertained was an earlier version than the
version actually served, i.e., the language was revised to "cover" from "include."
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All Defense Counsel
April 17, 2009
Page- 2

I have also been highly frustrated by all of your failures to comply with discovery, even after Judge
Brudie ordered that discovery 'regarding the "illegality" argument be construed as broadly as possible
(after you all stated that the order's language of "including" means "only"). I remain perplexed why the
Defendants do not comply with discovery. We can only construe your failure to comply with discovery
as evidence that you are not producing documents and information that is damaging to your arguments.
In addition, I would note, however, that a violation of I.C. § 30-1-6 was first raised on February 12,
2009, by the defendants in this action. Despite Reed Taylor's objections to Connie Taylor and James
Beck's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the Joinders based upon discovery violations, expert
witness deadline and discovery violations, and pleading problems, not a single defendant has moved to
amend hislher/its answer and affirmative defenses and not a single defendant has provided any specific
responses to' interrogatories propounded by Reed Taylor.
Despite our objections, requests and demands, I note that James Beck has still not provided any answers,
responses or documents to Reed Taylor's First Discovery Requests to James and Corrine Beck, which
do not have time period limitations and were served on March 26, 2008. I also note that Connie Taylor
has not provided any responses to Reed Taylor's interrogatories pertaining to defenses and
counterclaims and has not produced a single document, despite being served the requests for production
and interrogatories on October 21, 2007.
I note that all of you have taken the position that Reed Taylor is not entitled to take any depositions
based upon the Court's order limiting discovery, even Judge Brudie again advised us in open Court that
discovery pertaining to "illegality" defense be broadly construed. For example (just a few of many), it is
amazing how you all can sit back and argue that shareholder approval was not obtained and that there
was insufficient surplus (among other arguments) when you know that Reed Taylor has never been able
to question John Taylor, Richard Riley (AlA Services' counsel and the attorney who provided an
opinion letter to Reed Taylor regarding the transaction), JoLee Duclos or other members of the board of
ALA Services and the independent committee established to negotiate and complete the redemption of
Reed Taylor's shares. You all also know how busy the Court is in other actions and you have prayed
upon that fact by disregarding all Idaho Civil Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery.
Finally, based upon the belated expert witness affidavit submitted by Connie Taylor and James Beck
after the deadline to disclose expert witnesses, we will seek sanctions for the attorneys' fees, costs and
thousands of dollars in expert witness fees attributable to responding to Mr. Hooper's untimely and
inappropriate Affidavit as provided in I.R.C.P. 56(g).
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If any of you need additional time to respond or complete discovery and/or you desire to permit Reed
Taylor to conduct full and fair discovery regarding the "illegality" defense and his defenses to this
defense (including depositions), please let me know immediately so that I can fully address these issues
to the Court in my Affidavit or we can stipUlate to such to save the Court and the parties time and
money. Otherwise, I will proceed accordingly on Monday or Tuesday of next week based upon the
information in my possession at that time.
I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you.
Sincerely,
SMITH, CANNwN
& B,'
PLLC

;' ./
--'--10'

//-

By: R~d~ick C. S6nd
RCB:rb
Enclosures
cc:

Reed Taylor via email (wI enclosures)
Michael Bissell via email (wf enclosures)
Charles Brown via email (wI enclosures)
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Roderick C. Bond
From:

James D. LaRue [JDL@elamburke.com]

Sent:

Wednesday, April 15, 2009 2:45 PM

To:

Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Roderick C. Bond

Cc:

mbissell@cbklawyers.com; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Sarah L. Riedle

Subject: RE: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
Mr. Bond:
The issue of whether Richard Riley, or others, can be deposed prior to the summary judgment hearing was
raised in a telephone conference with Judge Brudie's law clerk, attended telephonically by Loren Ipsen of my
firm. During that conference, I understand Judge Brudie's law clerk stated that the Judge had intended only
that Jim Beck and Connie Taylor be deposed. Your client's 2/11/09 Motion to Compel Discovery, etc., argued
that the Court should grant Rule 56(f) relief and your Affidavit of that date identified Richard Riley as an
individual from whom you sought a deposition prior to the hearing on the summary judgment. Your client's
2/19/09 Motion to Compel Discovery, etc., made the same argument. I understand those motions were fully
briefed and argued, though no decision has been rendered by Judge Brudie on either motion. I further
understand that the Court has set the motion for summary judgment for hearing without ordering any additional
depositions. The latest Rule 56(f) Motion, filed 4/9/09 by your client, again argued that Richard Riley should be
deposed. Thus, it appears that the issue of whether Mr. Riley, or others, should be deposed has been placed
squarely before the Court and the Court has not agreed with your position that Mr. Riley's (or Hawley Troxell's)
deposition can be taken. I further understand that at the hearing last Thursday, the Court's limited discovery
order was discussed, but only in the context of a dispute over whether pre-1995 accounting documents should
be produced. I am advised that the Court did not address, nor did counsel for any party inquire about,
additional depositions.
For the above reasons, I will not make Richard Riley available for a deposition or accept service of a subpoena
on his behalf, nor will I make Hawley Troxell available for a record production deposition or accept service of a
subpoena on its behalf, until I receive a copy of an Order from Judge Brudie authorizing such depositions. If
you have such an Order, kindly produce it at your earliest convenience. otherwise, I sincerely hope you don't
cause my clients or my firm to incur unnecessary costs and expenses in filing a motion to quash such
subpoenas, should they be served.
Jim LaRue

James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, P.A.
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
BOise, ID 83701
(208) 343-5454
(208) 384-5844 (fax)
jdl@elamburke.com
Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt from
disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us immediately by
replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute it. Thank you.

05l..f

»> On 4/14/2009 at 3:45 PM, in message
<9D123FFF6EA0644A8F4509AAA2836D5F1FOF28@ALGHOST.alghost.local>, "Roderick C. BJIi."_ _~~O~\_!t.
<rod@scblegal.com> wrote:
EXHIBIT
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Thanks Jim (is it okay to call you Jim?). FYI, because we are on a short time frame, I am looking at early
next week-Monday or Tuesday. I would also like to see the documents at that time as well. I am basing the
depo on the opinion letter provided to Reed Taylor, the fact that Dick Riley was involved in the entire
transaction and the fact that we cannot find answers to many questions elsewhere (although I believe the
opinion letter alone will give us the information we need, which of course is not privileged in any way).
Thanks.
Rod

From: James D. LaRue [mailto:JDL@elamburke.com]

Sent: Tuesday, April 14, 2009 2:38 PM
To: Gary Babbitt; John Ashby; Roderick C. Bond
Cc: mbissell@cbklawyers.com; rjt@lewistondsl.com; Sarah L. Riedle
Subject: Re: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
Mr. Bond.

I am in receipt of your two emails and will be in contact with my clients re: same.
Jim
James D. LaRue
Elam & Burke, P.A.
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-5454
(208) 384-5844 (fax)
.iQl@~lamburke.com

Confidentiality Notice: This e-mail message may contain confidential and privileged information exempt
from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message by mistake, please notify us
immediately by replying to this message or telephoning us, and do not review, disclose, copy, or distribute
it. Thank you.

»> On 4/14/2009 at 2:40 PM, in message
<9D123FFF6EA0644A8F4509AAA2836D5F1FOF25@ALGHOST.alghost.1ocal>, "Roderick C. Bond"
<rod@scblegal.com> wrote:
Hi Mr. LaRue:
Will you accept service of a subpoena duces tecum/records deposition to be served upon Hawley
Troxell? We need to get this done asap as well. Thanks.
Rod
By: Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth St.
Lewiston, ID 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
rod@scblegal.com
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which
only the authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please
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promptly delete this message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you.
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Roderick C. Bond
From:

Roderick C. Bond

Sent:

Tuesday, April 14, 2009 1:38 PM

To:

'James O. LaRue'; 'Gary Babbitt'; John Ashby

Cc:

'rjt@lewistondsl.com'; 'mbissell@cbklawyers.com'; Sarah L. Riedle

Subject: Taylor v. AlA Services, et al.
Hi Mr. LaRue:
In open court last Thursday, the judge stated that everything to do with the redemption was fair game. Please
provide dates for Mr. Riley's deposition. Thank you.
Rod

By: Roderick C. Bond
Smith, Cannon & Bond PLLC
508 Eighth St.
Lewiston, 10 83501
Tel: (208) 743-9428
Fax: (208) 746-8421
[od@Scblegal.com
This email and any attachments may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information, which only the
authorized recipient may receive and/or view. If you are not an intended recipient, please promptly delete this
message and contact the sender at the above address. Thank you.
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Eae:RLE., Ee:RLIN, KADING, TURNaOW &: McKLVe:EN,
CHARTf?:~EO
ATTORNEYS ANI!) COUNS":l.OFtS AT LAw

C"'I>'TO!. PARK f'~A

300 NORTH SIXTM S'tREET
PosT OFF1CE Box 135e
BOISE, IOAHO 'e3701

August 15, 1995

TELIl:"Iofc)~!!:

(20a)

jo...... -SS3S

F"AJ:::SIMI LE
120S) 344-S54l!
.lAMe:s .... el1"UN
Of' CoUNSEL

Reed J. Taylor
P.O. Box 538
4wiston ID 83501

Re:

Common Stock Redemption

,
Dear Mr. Taylor;
This opinion is being delivered to you pl.ttsuant to Section 2.50) of the Stock Redemption
Agreement dated July 22, 1995 ( "Agreement") by and between AIA Services Corporation, an
Idaho COIporation ("Company") and Reed J. Taylor. All capitalized terms not defined herein
shall have the respective meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement. The phrase "Transaction
Documents" refers collectively to the Agreement, together with the Note, the Pledge Agreement,
the Security Agreement, the Consulting Agreement and the Noncompetition Agreement, as such
documents are defined :in the Agreement.

We have acted as general counsel for the Company in connection with the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement. As such general counsell we have assisted in the negotiation,
and have examined executed counterparts (or photostatic copies of executed counterparts) of the
Agreement and other Transaction Documents.
In addition, we have examined originals, executed counterparts or copies of such

agreements, corporate records, instruments and certificates., certificates of public authorities and'
such matters of law as we have deemed necessary for the purpose of rendering the opinions set
forth herein. To the extent we deemed necessary for the pUIposes of this opinion. we have
relied upon. (i) the statements and representations of the Company as to factual matters, (li) the

corporate records provided to us by the Company, and (iii) certificates and other documents
obtained from public officials. We have further relied as to factual matters on the representations
and warranties contained in the Agreement and the other Transaction Docllments (including,
without limitation, Mr. Taylor's representations in Article N of the Agreement) and on the
Company's representations in Schedule m (attached) to the Agreement; and we have assumed
the completeness and accuracy of all such representations and warranties as to factual matters.
We have assumed the genuineness of all signatures (other than those of the Company), the legal
capacity of Mr. Taylor to execute the Agreement and all other documents we have reviewed,
the authenticity of aIJ documents submitted to us as originals. and the conformity to original
documents of all documents submitted to us as certified, photostatic, reproduced or conformed
copies. We have further assumed that the Agreement and the other Transaction Documents have

EXHIBIT
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been duly authorized, executed and delivered by Mr. Taylor and are enforceable against him in
accordance with their respective terms, and that the execution, delivery and performance of the
Agreement and the other Transaction Documents by Mr. Taylor does not and will not result in
. a breach of, or constitute a default under. any agreement, instrument or other document to which
Mr. Taylor is a party, or any order, judgment, writ or decree applicable to such party to which
Mr. Taylor's property is subject.
Whenever our opinion with respect to the existence or absence of facts is indicated to be
based on ,our knowledge, we are referring to the actual knowledge of R. M. Turnbow and
Richard A. Riley, who are the sole atto~eys in Eberle, Berlin, Kading. Turnbow & McKlveen,
Chartered who have represented the Company during the course of our reptesenmtion in this
transaction. Except as expressly set forth ~erein, we have not undertaken any independent legal
or factual investigation to detemline the existence or absence of such facts, and no inference as
to our knowledge of the existence or absence of such facts should be drawn from such
representation.
Based upon and SUbject to our examination and assumptiOml as aforesaid and subject to
the qualifications hereinafter set forth, we are of the opinion that, except as set forth in the
attached Schedule ill andlor the Schedules attached to the Agreement:

1.
The Company is a corporation du1y organized and validly existing under
the laws of the State of Idaho. Based solely on the attached Certificates of Corporate Status
issued by the Idaho Secretary of State, the Company, The Universe Life Insurance Company
("Universe"), AlA Insurance, Inc. ("AIAI") and Fanners Health Alliance Administrators, Inc.
("Farmers") are corporations incorporated under the corporation laws of the State of Idaho and
in good standing on the records of the Idaho Secretary of State.
2.
The Com.pany and its Subsidiaries have full corporate power and authority
to enter into, execute and deliver the Transactions Documents and to perform their respective
obligations thereunder; all corporate action on the part of Company and its SubSidiaries, and
their respective directors and shareholders, necessary for the authorization, execution, delivery
and performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents and the
consummation of the transactions' contemplated thereby has been taken; and the Transaction
Documents have been duly executed and delivered by Company and its Subsidiaries. The
Transaction Documents constitute the valid and binding obligation of Company and its
Subsidiaries enforceable against them in accordance with their respective terms) except that
enforceability may be limited by (a) appUcable bankruptcy,. insolvency, moratorium,
reorganization fraudulent transfer. receivership~ cOllservatorship or similar laws affecting
creditor's rights generally, (b) the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with general
principles of equity (whether applied by a court of law or equity) and (c) considerations of public
j
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policy.
3.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by
Company and its Subsidiaries, nor the consummation the transactions contemplated thereby,
will (a) conflict with. or violate any provision of their respective Articles of Incorporation or
Bylaws, as amended; or (b) constitute a violation or default under any indebtedness, indenture,
mortgage, deed of trust, note, bond, license, lease agreement. or other material agreement or
instrument to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries is a party or to which any of its assets
or the as~s of its Subsidiaries may be subject; or (c) to the best of our knowledge, violate any
law, rule, license, regulation, judgment, order, ruling, or decree, including any il18lltance laws
or regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject,
governing or affecting the operation of Company or its Subsidiaries in any material respect.
Neither the execution and delivery of the Transaction Documents by Company and its
Subsidiaries, nor the consummation of the transactions contemplated thereby. will constitute an
event permitting termination of any material agreement or the acceleration of any indebtedness
of the Company or other liability, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the
creation or imposition of any lien upon the Collateral.

of

4.
No consent, authorization, approval or exemption by, or filing with, any
Person or any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the execution, deliyery and
performance by Company and its Subsidiaries of the Transaction Documents, or the taldng of
any action contemplated thereby, except such as have been obtained prior to Closing.
5.
All of the currently outstanding Pledged Shares are owned beneficially and
of record by Company and, to the best of our knowledge, there are no warrants, options, or
other rights to purchase such Pledged Shares.

Except for the lien of First Interstate Lien upon the First Interstate Shares,
6.
and any interest in the Commission collateral created or granted in fayor of The Centennial Life
Insurance Company pursuant to that certain Reimbursement Agreement dated Angust 11, 1995
among The Centennial Life Insurance Company, AlA Services Corporation, AlA Insumnce,
Inc., The Universe Life Insurance Company and AlA MidAmerica, lnc., the Collateral is free
and clear of all pledges, liens, encumbrances, security interests, equities, claims, or options.
Upon delivery of certificates representing the Pledged Shares of AIAI and Fanners to
Shareho1der at Closing, Shareholder shall have at Closing a perfected first priority security
interest in such Pledged Shares.
7.
To our knowledge, there are no claims, actions, suits, proceedings or
investigations pending or threatened against or relating to Company or any of its Subsidiaries.
at law or in equity before Ot by any Governmental Authority, nor has any such action, suit,
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proceeding or investigation been pending during the three-year period preceding the date hereof.
Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in default with respect to any adjudicatory order,
writ, injunction or decree of any Governmental authority, and neither Company nor any of its
Subsidiaries is a party tD any cease and desist order. supervisory agreement or arrangement,
consensual or otherwise, with any Governmental Authority.
The foregoing opinions are limited to the laws and .regulations of the State of Idaho
(excluding the principles of conflicts of laws); and we have not considered and expressed no
opinion o~ the laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction. This opinion is rendered only with
respect to the laws and the rules, regulations and orders (excluding the principles of conflicts
of laws) of the State of Idaho that are in effect as of the date hereof. We assume no
responsibility for updating this opinion to take into account any event, action, interpretation or
change of law occurring sUbsequent to the date hereof that may affect the validity of any of the
opinions expressed herein.
The enforceability opinion expressed in opinion '2 of this letter is subject to the
following additional qualifications:
(i)
The terms of any commission agreement, lockbox agreement or other
account agreement which may affect the Commission Collateral, the rights of the parties
(other than Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to any such agreement, and any claim
or defense of such parties against the Company or any of its Subsidiaries rising under or
outside any such agreement.

(ii)
The qualification that certain rights, remedies and waivers contained in the
Transaction Documents may be rendered ineffective, or be limited t by applicable Idaho
laws or judicial decisions governing such rights, remedies and waivers; but the inclusion
of such rights, remedies and waivers does not affect the validity or enforceability of other
provisions of the Transaction Documents and, in the event the Company or any of its
Subsidiaries does not comply with the material terms of the Transaction Documents, Mr.
Taylor may exercise remedies that woUld nonnally be available under Idaho law to a
secured party provided Idaho law applies and Mr. Taylor proceeds in accordance with
such law.

(iii)
We express no opinion with respect to the perfection or the relative
priority of the security interests granted to Mr. Taylor in tbe Commission Collateral.
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This opinion is furnished by u.s solely for your benefit for use in connection with the
Transaction Documents and the transactions contemplated therebYt and it may not be furnished
or quoted: to~ or relied upon, by any other person.
Very truly yours,

sf

-,
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ESERLE, BE~LlN, KADING, TURNSOW & McKLVEEN,
CHARTERED
ATTORNEYS ANO COUNSELORS AT LAW
CAPITOL PARK PLAZA

TELEPHONE
(208) 344-8535

300 NORTH SIXTH STREET

FACSIMILE
(208) 344-8542

POST O"ICE Box 1368

BOISE, IOAHO 63701

RICHARO A. RILEY

......... ES L. BERLIN
0 .. COUNSEL

March 21, 1995

T. H. EBERLE

(1922-1977)

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
JoLee Duclos

Legal Assistant
AIA Services Corporation
P.O. Box 538
Lewiston ID 83501
Re:

AlA Corporation Board Meeting - March 7, 1995

Dear JoLee:

Enclosed please find two complete sets of Resolutions adopted at the meeting of AlA
Services Corporation's Board of Directors on March 7, 1995, together with attached exhibits.
The unmarked copy is for the corporation's original records. The second set is a marked copy
showing the changes I made from the drafts contained in the Board notebook. The markup
reflects my understanding of the changes from the drafts which were discussed and agreed upon
by the Board. You and Dan might compare your own notes to verify the accuracy and
completeness of those changes.
Also enclosed please find duplicate original Articles of Amendment to the Articles of
Incorporation of AlA Services Corporation. I would appreciate your verifying the outstanding
shares shown on page 16 of the Articles of Amendment and the number of shares voted for and
against the amendment as set forth on page 17 of the Articles of Amendment. Please have John
and Dan sign and date the Articles of Amendment, have a notary public complete the verification
on page 17 and return both duplicate originals to me for filing.
Please give me a call if the resolutions or exhibits need any further work or
any other questions.

,
'rJ

jf you

Iy yours,

. f·
I

~~

I

£..."f\,

Richard A. Riley

RARls
Enclosure
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EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW
& MeKLVEEN, CHARTERED
300 North Sixth Street
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368

Telephone No.: (208) 344-8535
Facshnile No.: (208) 344--8542

FAX COVER SHEET
DATE: May 30, 1995

PAGES INCLUDING THIS SHEET: 4

TO:

Scott .Bell

NUMBER CALLED: (206) 587-.2308

FROM: Richard Riley
MAITER: 80550-4

MEMO:

If transmission is not properly received please call Savito at (208) 344-8535.

* '"

II<

:I<

*

:I<

The information containfld in this transmission is attorney-client privileged, cOnfidential atld intended only for the use
Qf tIle individual or entity named above. H the reader of this message is not tIle intended recipient, you are herbby
notified that any dig.'lemirultion, distribution or copying of this COIDIl1Umcation is strictly prohibited. It" you have received
this communication in error, pJease notify us immediately QY coUect telephone and relUm the orlginul message to us at
the above address via U.S. Mail. We will rejmhurse you for postage. Thank you.

EXHIBIT
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

SCOTT BELL, R • .JOHN TAYLOR

.I!"'ROM:

RICHARD A. RlLEY

RE:

REED TA YWR.'S STOCK REDEMPTION

DATE:

May 30, 1995

PRINCIPAL

1.

BUSINESS ISSUES

Pledge of stock and commissions is not intended to secure Consulting Agreement

$147,OOO/year.

2.

Definition of proscribed business for noncompete purposes: farm association

insurance business, not farm association

~

insurance business. Must be consistent with

Agent of Record which covers life and disability insurance-only property and casualty insurance
is excluded.

3.

Fix Debit Balance at 4/2t/95 (date of letter of intent). Offset subsequent draws

and advances against Consulting Agreement.

4.

Limit Company's representations and warranties to matters directly related to

authorization of transaction, title to security, etc. Company should not make representations and
warranties about Company's financial condition and other matters which Reed knows as well as
anyone.
5.

Definition of quaJi.fying Bonds (Stock Pledge §1O):
(i)

Stock pledge terminates upon funding of Bonds with $6 million maturity

value at tenth anniversary; security interest in commissions continues to secure payment of
interest.
(ii)

Stock pledge and security interest in cQmmissio!l~ terminate upon funding

MEMORANDUM TO SCOTT Bl:lLL, R. JOHN TAYLOR - Page 1
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with Bonds with current value of $6 million and bearing interest at projected rate comparable
to rate on Note. See Stock Pledge §11.5; Security Agreement §§4,9.4.
6.

Do not incorporate Series' A and First Interstate Bank covenants (Stock

Redemption Agreement §5.1 (m». Replace with cr05s-default provision.

7.

Financial covenants 1n Redemption Agreement (§5.1) cease upon full funding of

8.

Need for escrow agent/trustee to hold pledged stock.

9.

Lockbox agreement not ,irrevocable; but will require institution to notify Reed of

Bonds.

any

cancellation~ termination,

amendment, etc. No $42,000 minimum in lockbox (Security

Agreement §4).
10.

Acceleration of principal (and discounted PV of interest) only if default is

material: Need to work on materiality standard. See Stock Pledge Agreement §8; Security
Agreement §5. Conform Stock Redemption Agreement §8.2.

I-:\uSERS\l!J\VITO\W~"''''IA\AIA\8f.nVlcp.Mtll·MtM,1
o~rJoIU~

1D:31 .. ","
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

SCOTT BELL; R. JOHN TAYLOR

FROM:

RICHARD A. RILEY

RE:

REED TAYLOR'S STOCK REDEMPTION

DATE:

May 30,1995

PRINCIPAL LEGAL ISSUES

1.

Indemnification provision (Redemption Agreement §6.2) doesn't fit indemnity for

breach of representations and warranties.
2.

Add conditions to Company's obligation to close.

3.

Fonu A approval requirement should be condition precedent to foreclosure on

ULle (GFL) stock.

4.

Idaho law should govern aU agreements.

5.

Stock Pledge (§11.5) should terminate upon full funding of bonds.

iNll~""'V?'tplnrl,1,\T,III~trlJtncll:'tlR1-.MtU.,J

MfJfJ,1M

rd.~
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EBERLE, BERLIN, MOING, TURNBOW & McKlVEEN, CHARTERED
300 North Sixth Street
Post Office Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368

Telephone: (208) 344-8535
Facsimile: (208) 344-8542

FAX COVER SHEET
DATE:

i':2f.,tIf;-

PAGES INCLUDING THIS SHEET:

2i-

TO:
NUMBER:
FROM:

. C3t?&J 5~~ - J3D~

UC-IZ (), k~i

RE:

;

MEMO:
(

[]

-'

Original will follow

[ J by U.S, Mail

[ jby ____________

ClLl

~ Original wi/! not follow·

f]

[]

[J

Please review and call me
For your approval/signature
Response needed by _ _ _ _- -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~--

IF TRANSMISSION IS NOT PROPERLY RECEIVED, PLEASE CALL BETH AT (208) 344 8535.
u

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS TRANSMISSION IS ATIORNEY-CLJENT PRIVILEGED,
CONFIDENTIAL, AND INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE, OF THE INOIVIDUAL OR ENTITY NAMED
ABOVE IF THE REA.DER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY
NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS
STRICn Y PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, PLEASE
NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY COLLECT TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE
0 US
AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS VIA U.S. MAIL. WE WILL REIMBURSE YOU

U8Ss8

'in

j
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Stock Redemption Agreement
This Stook Redemption Agreement (this "Agreement") is made and entered into as of
, 1995~ by and among AIA Services Corporation, an Idaho cD:rporation
-:::-:::-!'l:l.'P-Illl::::::::;Y;;:::,,)=,an::::::.......~· d J. Taylot' ("Shareholder"),
11
.J.... ~
IL

f-bnYlc; -{

(J

wrrtl~
~

{i4'2 u

tu-rt.

CU

Recitals

~fI- j;n~uJ't:Yrll.e.r

Z:n t- •

COIPpany is
parent holding company and owner of all of the capital stock of
ance Co any. an Idaho domestic insurance company (<<Universe), AlA
lrururanco, Inc., IdMo c rporation ("AlAl")1 and Fanne:rs HoolthAlliance Administrators,.
Inc.• an Idaho corpor~tiQ "Fanners"). Great :Fidelity Life Insurance Company, a stock life .
insurance company d~midled· in Indiana ("Great Fidelity"), is ~ wholly-owned subsidiary of
A.

Tht.- Universe Life

I

Universe,
B.

.
Shnreholder owns 6]3,494 shares of COmnlon siock (}f Company (the "Shares':').

C.
Company desires to redeem the Shares and Shareholder desires that the Shares be
redeemed, on the tenns and subject to the conditions hereinafter set fortb.

Agreement

Fol' good and valua.ble consideration: ,the receipt and sufficiency of which ate hereby
. acknowledged. the parties agree as follows:

Article I -Definitions
In addition to the temJ.S defUled elsewhere in thi$ Agreement, including the preamble and
recitals above, thl! following termg !Shall take the following ascribed meanings:

"Agreement, " "this Agreement "hereto," "hereof," "herein; " "h~nnmdfJr~ tl uherehy'~
and similar expressions refer to this Agreeroent, including the schedules and exm'bits attached
hen~to, and not any specific article. section, subsection 9t other ,subdIvision hereof or thereof.
.. oOJ\(~,>" hct~ ~ fllea.nl~ ~<J.thhf~ q.", l'r Iry ~~ to t>f 1+/lJ,J Sioc..k
"CAP Pragrtdn" has the meaning ascribed to it on. Schedule 1 attached hereto.
lc:Jve...
H

r

.

"

"CAP Program Tcingihle Property" has the meanmg asCIibcd to it on Schedule 1
attached hereto.

~~~

eDt T.3)

"CAP Sel'Vicfs Center Balanc~ JI has the meaning asctibed to it on Schedule 1 attached

hereto.

"Collateral" refers collectively to the collateml to be given to secure all of the obligations
of Company to Shafcholdtil' under this Agreement, including but not limited to (l) all of the

- 1-
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1

outstanding oap
stock ofUni'V01'si AlAl and FannersJ and any capital stock acquired by
Company after the, Closing, includirig any stock acquired as a result of a dividend made to
om~ by Universe (including a dividend of the stoQk of Great Fidelity)"JiIU,Ii1:&f8 811 ht\f;an
dividends 0 proceeds with respect to any such stock (collectively, the ~'Pledged
Shares"); (2) alilllsurallce ~~ommissions paid 01' payable to' or fO'r tilt:: benefit of Company or its
direct or ifi~ Subsidiariewd any interest accrued in oonnection therewith (the
•
"Connnissions"); and (3) the~nds drr:,d_itn\.t1iI"S;l~ and any interest aocrued in .
connection therevvith{tHe "Beads'?+.
bl!-

'7_
.

_---.-- '

pi 'I- A."I

I

'Ii ~'

~ ~11 'J-(

~ the meaning ascribed '" it On Schedule 1 attached hereto. ~~

cl..~~. I~ ~~1t1
/J.~ ttv

"First Interstate" means First Intcmtate Bank ofIdaho, N.A.
.

CIGMP" means generally l1c~ted accounting principles, as defmed by "the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

"Governmental Authartly" means any nation or government, foreign or domestic. any
state O'A~ other political subdivIsion thereof. and any agency or other entity exercisillg executive,
legislative, judicial, regulatory Or fldmin.istrative fun.cnons of government., including, vvithout
limitation, all state in!>lmIDce regulatory authorities and all taxing a.uthorities.
"Person" meana an individual. corporation, partnership, unincorporated Msociation,
trust,joint venture or othm- organization or entity, 1ncluding a Governmental Authority,
.

"SubsidiaryH of a Person means (i) any corporation 50% or mote of the outstanding .,
voting securities having ordinary voting power of which shall at the time be owned or contr~llhd,
directly or indirectly, by such Person or by one or more ofits Subsidiaries or by $1;lchPersonand
one or more of its Subsidiaries J or (H) any partnership, association, joint venture or similar:
business organization 50% or more of tile ownership interests having ordinary voting power iff
which shalil1t the time be so owned or controlled.
Article II ~ Redemption ofShares; Closing.of )l,edemption Tral1sacti011.
2.1

Agreement~

~II;lption

QfShares

2.1.1 Redemption. On and subject to the terms and conditions set forth in
at Closing. CO:oJ:pany shall redeem the Shares.

this :.

2.1.2 Redemption Price. The aggregate consideration to be paid by compai&~ffi·
full consideration for the redemption of the Shares shall consist <?fthe following: (a) One','!:"
Million Five Hundred ThOU$alld Dollars ($1,500.000) payable by casbler's cheek at Closing (the
"Down Payment"); (b) Six Million Dollars ($6,000,000) payable pursuant to the te:r:ms of a
promissory note to be del~.vere by Company at Closing in substantially the form attached heieto
.

as Exhibit A (ful!l"'Note',); (c those certain Cessna 441. Ce:!lsna 206 and Piper Cub airplanes "
more particularly descdbcd n Schedule 2.1.2 attached hereto (the'; "AJrplane1'7, (d) eliminat10n

.

t\e./tv
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lllclo4

of any Debit :Balance outstanding at Closing and the releaso of any obligation of Shareholder to
the Company with respect thereto; (e) elimination of any CAP Services Center Balance
outstanding at Closing and the relQase of any obligation of Shareholder to Company with :respect

thereto and with respect to any expenses. of the CAP Program; and (f) the CAP Program Tang.ible
Property.

. .

2.1 ..3 Alllication ofRedem on Priel!. The redemption prica !1Ihall he allocated
for tax purposes as set forth on SchedUle L3 attached hereto.
.
..
Vh r n n (.~.J.
0 . : > .d...w.. (fr<

-t&t..

under the sha]
Not execute dvtJ'l.i.)
"SM:h_~~~~2~2~~S~C~g~Jl~ri~ty~.~T~o~s~e~cure~fo~am~oun~t~p~a~§~o~S~har~eh~Ol~d~erCompany
deliver at Closing a Stock Pledge Agreero.en su stanu y m e form attached hereto as
siq-.
Exhibit a (the '<Pledge Agreement';), and shall execute and deliver, and cause its Subsidiaries to

execute and deliver, a Security Agreement substantially in the form attaohed hereto as Exhihit.C
(the "Security Agreement"), In the event that Company is able to obtain, for the benefit of
Shareholder, Bonds meeting the tonditions specified in tho Plc;dge Agreement, and 11 Company
otherwise me.t;rt$ the terms and conditions for the substitution of such collateral contained in the .
Pledge Agreement, Shareholder will release the Pledged Shares in exchange for a pledge of the

Bonds.
2.3
CQrumlting Agreement;. fol' and in consideration of the mutual covenants oftbis
Agreement~ Shareholder and Company shall also, at Closing, enter into a Consulting AgreemMt
SUbstantially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit D (the "Consulting Agreement"). In
connection with the Consulting Agreement, Shareholder shall, at Closing, enter into a
Noncompetition Agreement substantially in the fonD. attached hereto as E:dribit E (the
''Noncompetition Agreement").
.
2.4
Closing. The closing uf lll1; transactions contemplated hereby (the "Closing,
shall take place at the. offives of
in
at _ _.m. local t:i.me on
_ _ _ _~, 1995 or such other time or place as the prutie.':l shull mutually agree (the "Closing
Date").

2.5
Ileliyeries by._Company at Closing. At Closing,.. Company shall duly execute and
deliver to Shareholder the Down Payment, together with the following documents:
I

The Note;

(a)

?'1 q I .q '1) ~htl.:f"~'!. 0(.2

(b)

AM /tAl

p-D;;;. /WTnf}\fY\-

Pl~:;~~:fotherthan

(0)
Stock ce' aws repreSenting e
those
certificates representing
. stock ofU 'Yl;llie urrently in. the possession of First
oblitations to First Interstate (the "First
Interstato and held as security for Company's
1nterntat~
togetherr with duly executed assignments sepnrute from certificate -with
respect to all sto certificate!! .representing the Pledged Shares;
.

Sharer".

ayJt

{)JII,

~aL{

"11eM0rt

1fJr"

moL~M ~4
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, I

(d)
Instructions. in fonn and substance satisfactory to Shareholder~ signed by
Company and by First Interstate, requiring that the certificates representing the First Interstate
Shares be delivered promptly and directly to Shareholder upon the satisfaction of those
obligations which are outstanding as of Closing and wInch arc secured by the Fit'st Interstate
Shates~
prohibiting any notion ~ubsequcnt to Closing which would increase t h e '
of
!)1--tr
'i-he.- Company1hat 'lr.e ~cwOO by ~erstate Shares;
. .. ~ _I ~ '. r
pan ~'~;7 JIje;~
rrl'i~lF"""
(e)
The Security Agreement;
A~

rurd

AI

dQcumentatio~

lf

/fJ,*/1/
fNVYV

(l)
Tran.sfer
in form and substance satisfactory to /1/I7
v
Shareholder, transferring nIl of Company's right, titk and interest in and to the Airplanes, subject
only to those liens Which were outstanding as of December 31, 1994 and which are described on
Schedule 2.1.2;

1

(g)
A Bill of Sale in substantially the funn attached hereto as Exhibit F.
transferring title to the CAP Progtftbl TtIDgible Property to Shareholder;
(11)

The Consulti1lg Agreement;

(i)

The Noncompetition Agreement;

G)

An opinion of Company' sIegal oounsel substantially in the fann of

Ex.hibit G hereto;
(k)
A certificate signed by an officer of Company. satisfactory in form and
mbstance to Shareholder, certifYing the accuracy on the Closing D~te of Company's

representations and warranties contained in Article ill below;
(1)
A certificato signed by an officer of Company, sawnactoryinform and
substance to Shareholder, certifying thui Shar.eholder has no obligation to Company, and
..
releasing Shareholder from any obligation to COmpmy, with respect to the Debit Balance,
CAP Services Ce1if.er Balance. any CAP Program expEmSes, and any an.d all other matteJ.'S (except
for those obligations of Shareholder that arise out of this Agreoment); and

the

(m)
Such other documents and instruIn.ents as Shareholder or his counsel may
reasonably r~quire to effectuate or evidence the transactions contemplated hereby.

2.6
Deliveries hi' Bbat'((bclrkr at Closing. At Closing, Sh.a!eholder s1uill duly execute
and deliver to Company the following documents:
(a)
A certificate or certificates representing the Share5~ endorsed for transfer
or accompanied by an assignment separate from certificate;
(b)

The Pledge Agreement;
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(c)
(d)
(e)

Tho Noncompetition Agreement;

(f)
An assumption agreement? sati9fuctory in form and substance to Company,
relating to the obligatIon5 secured by the liens on the Airplanes described in Schedule 2.1.2;
(g)
A certificate signed by Shareholder, satisfactory in form and substtltlce to
Company, certitying the accuracy on the Closing Date of Shareholder's representations and
warranties contained in Artiele V below; and

(h)
Such other doc;umcrits and instruments as Company or its counsel may'
reasonably require to effectuate or evidence the trat).':IactioDS contemplated hereby.
.
Ar(4~lc

III - Representations tllld Warranties Regardillt: Company

To induce Shareholder to enter int() and perfonn tbjs Agreement, CO~PflJl~~e~
. .....
and warrants to Shareholder as follows:
~/J1,t}'{/

'.i

O~jzmjQD

-7 , )~~1
; ?~f!

::.{.·.,!,.';~.'l

,.', '; Y~~
' .:~pi

.. :'.hW
"ii ;~Y' W?f
...,

conducted. CompIUlY rmd each of its SUb3i arles me duly qualified to do business and are in good
standing as foreign corporations in alljuris 'ctions where the failtUe to be so qualified would
materially adversely affect Company or it Subsidiaries. Company owns all of the outstanding .
capital stock ofTJpiverse(AlAl and Fanners, and Universe owns all of the outstanding capital st.OCk

ofGreatFideli~ l ~

. (\01-

~4-

~~ D/I

'tV'

Q-

...r.~ 0

~~ \~. AitX'~~, {t

r ~r d.II'LL~r;,11uP--.)d)li~ s'ha.~2

.'

3.2
~un.d Authorit)'. Company has full corporate power a~~
execute, deliver and perform. this A e
and to consummate the transactions contemplated
hereby. This Agreement has be
ul authorize executed and delivered by Compapy and is a.
legal, valid and binding obligation 0 ompany, eniorceable against it in accordance 'With its,• .
tenn.s, except as enforceability may be limited by bankruptcy, insolvency, reorganization or other
similar laws affecting the enforcement of creditors' ngbt..'l generally or the availability of
equita.blc ~m¢di(l$ subject to the discretion of1he court.

~\~ ~

~l~~01
AFF
v8 / 9 #: 8080 LgS 90('
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JI'V .JI«IU af/~ E,
pany, AlAI and F.a:rmors is a ~/;l~~i

3.1
and Good Standing, Each of C
corporation duly o:r:gaI~l~ed~ validly existing ~d in good
ding under.the laws ~ftbe state' 0~.1
Idaho and has all reqmslte power and authonty to own eaS6 or operate Its propertIes and to Can)"
on its busines~ as it ~ n~w beln? conducted. Ynivers s a domestic insurance company du1y
orga:u::ed, valIdly exIsting .and ill good standing un r the laws ~f the state ofId2lh~ md has all
requlSrte power and autbonty to own, lease or op to its ptoperties and to cany on It, business as it
:is now being con-dueted. Great Fidelity is a stoc life insurdllce company duly organi:ze~ validly
existing and in good standing under thelaws 0 the state OflndiHIlB. and h.EL~ all requisite power and
Ltu.tl.lodty to own, lease or operate its prQperti and to cany on its business as it is now being
,
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Consents; NoncontraventjOD. The execution and delivery ofthls Agreement and
the perfonnance of the trenBaotions contemplated hereby "ill not result in ~. violation of any of
the terms or provisions of the articles of incorporation or bylaws of Company or any of its
3.3

SUbsldiaries or any amendments thereto, or constitute Ii violation or default under any
mdebtednes3. indenture. mortgage. deed of trust, note; boml, liccllSe, lease agreement or other
material agreement or irurt.tument to which Company or any of its Sub.!iidi~es is a party or by
which it or any of its assets may otherwise be bound, or of any lQ.w, rule, license, regulation.
judgment, order, ruling or decree gOi/erning or affecting the operation of Company or any of its
S ubsidianes in any material respect; hOT will the same constitute an event permitting tt'lnnmation
of any material agreement or the acceleration of any .indebtednes~ or other .liability of Company
or any of its Subsidiaries, with or without notice or lapse of time, or result in the creation or
imposition of any lien upon the Collateral No consent, authorization; approval or exemption by,
or filing with, any Person or any Governmental Authority is required in connection with the
execution. delivery and pe.rfonnance by Company of this Agt'eeillent or the taking of enyaction .
cont.emplated hereby. except such as have been or shall have been obtained prior to Closing. The
redemption of the Shares and the other transactions contemplated under this Agreement arc not
prohibited by and do not. violate any instu'aoce laws or regulations of any jurisdiction to which'
Company or any of its Subsidiaries are subject.
3.4
Title to Properties; ;encumbrances. Company owns beneficially and of record, 01'
will at the time of Closing own beneficially ann of record, all of the Pledged Shares, free and
clear of all pleds~:a. liens. ~n(lUlnbrances, security interests, equities. claims, options, or
limitations on Company's ability to vote such shares or to transfer such shares to Shareholder.
except for the liens in.favor of Shareholder created in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement and the lieu in favor of First Interstate 1.Ipon the First Interstate
Shares. Comp£U).y has full right, title and inter~st In and to the Pledged Shares, and full authoritY
to pledge the Pledged Shares to Shareholder at Closing as security for the perfonnance of
. \
Company's obligations to Shareholder arising under the Note and this Agreement. All of the.' j
Pledged Shares have been du1y authorized ahd validly issued. and are fillly paid and
':,'
nonas~es~ablo. At Closmj. Shareholder will hltYc eo firBt priority, J1crfected security interest in:,:l::"
the Pledged Shares, other- 1h.an the First Interstate Shares. There are no options, warrant.'!, calls, '
subscriptions, rights, agreements. commitments or undcI'Standings of any nature that call for the'; '.
jg~l1ance. s::,.le, pledge or other disposition of any Pledged Shatl!!s or which entille any person t;:l:::~ ! l
acquire such shares, other than those rights :lrising under this Agreement. The Company has ~~:, ~ ..
good and marketable ti
free and clear of any lien Or encmnbrnnce.,,, other than tho!'le
. ,
disclosed on Schedul 1.2.
Schedule 3.4 attached hereto. and full power and authority to' , . ; .

' "

\

transfer, (1) the Aitplanes. (2) the CAP Program Tangible Pt'opertyjllnd (3)the· Corittnission!:I~~1~\f;
'1" "

3.5
Finar.l!~iaJ Condjtion. ~ consolidatld financial statements of CompmlY and its
Subsidiaries for the years ended December 31. 1994, 1993 and 1991 attached hereto as

Schedule 3..5 (the "Financial Statements") present fairly the financial condition and results of
operations and changes in financial pOSition of Company and its SubSidiaries as of such
.

jJ1i!:,

respective dates and for th~ r~8pective years then ended in conformity with GAAP applied on a
consistent basis# ang Iljnce.Dec.emb~,.199·~ 00 materiaJ. ad"'B1'81il eH(t'Hgefl hat/@ QCCll;n:ed
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Fl=!ng. Company has sufficient funds .VlIilabl. or has received
from third parties to provid~ sufficient funds to pay the Down Payment. ')~

r-:t

\~~~

3, 7
Liti~ There are no claims. actio , suitst pI'OCeedings or investigations
pending or, to the best of Company's knowled ,
ate.t'led a~amst or :t:e1ating to Company or
eny of its Subsidiaries, at law or in equity ore or by any OovennnentID Authority. nor has .any .
such actiot1; suj~ proceeding or invest" 'on been, to the best of Company's knowledge, pending

"

.

since tht: commencement of the
c-.year period covered by the Fimtncial Statements, except as
set forth on Schedule 3.7 her . Neither Company nor any ofits Subsidiarios is in defauItv.rith
respect to any ru:ljudicato order, writ) itUunction or decree of any Governmental Authority..
Neither Company nor y ofits Subsidiaries is a party to any cease and desist: order. superVisory
agreement or arr
ement, corueIlsual or otherwise. with any Governmental Authority. except as
set forth on Sc dule3.7.
3.8
~. Company and its Subsi' . es have filed all state, cotlD.ty.local and federal
tax and otho1' return!" ~nd reports .that they
required to file in respect of .all taxes, as~1;;ti~men~
levies, llcense and registration fees, ch es or withholdings of any nature whatsoever shown by
such returns to be. or that are othe .se; due and paya1;lle, including, 'without limitation,. income,
business and occupation. unem yment, social secUrity. withholding, excise and workers'
compensation taxes and ass
ents ('Taxes'), and to the extent its liabilities for Taxes as of
Closing have not been
dischargftd; fu.ll and complete reserves have been established on the
December 31,. 1994 b ance sheet included itl the Financial Statements. Neither Company nor'
.any of its Subsidi es is in default in the payment of any Taxes due or payable or of any

assessments re Ived in respect thereof.
3.9
CQmpli5lOCe with Lav,m, Each of Co any and its Subsidiaties is in compliance
in all material Iespects with all fcd~.ral; state
oeal laws, statutes, rules, regu:lations and orders
of all Governmental Authorities matcrial . business; and all required registrations and other
f11mss by or on behalf of Company
nch of its Subsidiaries with all Governmental
Authorities are materially true an omplete and are cUttent nnd v!1lidJ)' in force; all permits and
licenses requlred in connectio
"th the operation of the Company's business or the business of·
its Subl'iidiarics have been mined and are current and validly in force; and neither the Company
nor any of its Subsidi
s have received any notice that it is in violation of any lavvs J regulations
or orders.
' .'.
~

3.10 Brokers. Finders.. El&. All negotiations relating to this Agreement and the
transactions contemplated hereby have been catrled on without the intervention of any person
acting on behalf of the Company in such manner as to givo rise to any valid claim against the
Company or Shareholder fur sny brokerage or finder'S fee, commission~ or similar
componsation.
.
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3.11 Def<lWiS. Neither Company nor any of its Subsidiaries is in violation of any of
the tenns or provisions of its articles ofincotflotation or bylaws or any amendments tbereto,or in
vio.lation or default under any indebtedness, indenture, mortgage, deed of trust. note, bond,
license. lease agreement of other materla.l agreement or .instrument to which Company or any of
its Subsid.iaries is a party or by which it or any of its assets may o"therwise be bound, or of any
law. rule. license, reguIation,judgment. order. ruling or decree governing or affecting the
opemtio-u of Company or any olits Subsidiaries in any material respect; no ci.rcutnstance exists
which constitutes an e-ventpemrltrlng term.ination of any ma.terial agreement or the acceleratirm
of any indebtedness or othel' Hahility of Company or ~ny of its Subsidiaries, with or without
notice 01.' lapse of time, or which could result in the creatiou or imposition of any lie'll lJpOD the
Collateral. Neither Company nor any of it! Subsidiaries is in violation of any insurance laws or
regulations of any jurisdiction to which Company or any ofits Subsidiaries are subject. . !.
Article IV - Representations and Warranties ofSharell(Jlder

;'~~~.:,

\

To induce Company to enter into W'id perfonn this Agreement, Shaniliolder represen.~'
and warrants to Company as follows: Sh2il,'(:holder owns the Shares free and clear of all pledges,
liens, encumbrances. security interests, equities, claims. options (other than the option orlainally
granted to Centermial Life Insurance Company, la.ter assigned to Company and ox~cised
ptInmant to this Agreement), or !imitations on Shareholder's ability to vote the Shares or to
fraIlsfe.r the Shares to Company. Shareholder has full ~ght, title and interest in and to the Share~..:J~
tJf""'

~,~ o(l'13onJ.j m~.e..'k;, rx1['('/I'al1~.;
p/. ~ku-n. '10 (') f/ 'J~c.k P1u:p- f1j~
.:t!

(ii)t1J/

Article V- Cuvenauts

,

\

!

~Ier

~

5.1
. Company hereby covenants to Shareholder that until Ute
/)~W Note has been paid .in ful it will perform and ohserv~ the following covenants:
. ,.... ,.

!

••

(a)
Company will provide Shareholder with quarterly financial statements•.
prp.pared.in accordance with GAAP, within 45 days of the end of each ..fiscOO. qUlUier; ,
'

31'

I

~;~

~ .:? ~:f.~
.

(b)
Compttny will provide annual audited financial statements, prepared
acl~6jdance with GAAP, within 120 days of the end of each fiscal year;

i\::.

/1~~;r/.;

,;

wd I be.- (:)

./It;;/ ~

tJVJ at e-J.(J"'.7/Aj '--t

!..

(e)
As of the last day of each calendar month. Company shall maintain a ratio
of cmrer1t a"lsets to current liabilities, calc:ul::ded 1n accordance with GAAP consistently applied,
equal to I\t least _-to-_;

WdlS:S

SG-9Z,-S

l~

\

,

,

~-l:y ~

(d)
As of the last day of each calendar month,
ma:lntain.
working capital (current assets less currerit liabilities), calculated in sccordance with GAM
consistently applie~ equallo at tea!'.;t $_ _ _ _~

\~,

;\

m: ....

(c)
As of the last day of each calendar month, Company shan maintain "i:: 'l ,
shareholders' equity, calculated in accordance \"Vith GAAP consistently applied, eql1a1 to at least .

$

f,

~t

~;

11: 10
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IJe.J,... ~& ~Uft-

!k* Iv~ ~ aP/Im.~

~

' ~
d,tu.,(/(L
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, 'f'

~~ Ko'I1M11~' $~lrlf)~~e)· ~t~ " 7

y.. ~¢ t[£(j) a..vJLt)~cr ~~~ Ulr-~Uy
V7 r:-~ /.11 'VI t!,) tl- u> ~lh 1(/ Ul? fV'ki/G
(f)
All of the lest day of each calendar nlonth. Company shall maintain a ratio
of Consolidared Long Term Debt-to-ConsQlidated Net Worth (as such terms are defined in
Section 4.2.1C> of the comp aI1Y'.s Articles ofIncorporation~ l'IS a~endedY'{th~~·~
. ',clr~"}) equal to
atleast3.6-to-l;
~jt.

/'

JAIl

'

. ,JiJL. M tI

\
'

L1aitt/

kl

(g) /\ Company
not loan funds to any affililrte other than wholly-ovm.ed
/l
Subsiruaries (other than any loans tha.t ate ()urrently required to be made to or for the benefit.. Of
'
, Company" e:JCisting employee stock ownership plan);
?
tt~ ~.:it,
...
~ fjr- ..,td-uJZ-/J;r
• .') {V
(h)
Company W1~'1lt mortgage edge, subject to lien or other ncumbrance.
1lf'J,JP"sell. assign or transfer any, Collater or, except' the ordjnary courso ofbusin.es any other '
~ ~() ( _~ material asset of Company or any 0 Its Sub . iarieJ or fail to take all reasonab e steps necessary
(>(.tW'"4' to maintain its customer aud (;licnl buse and all otn:r intangible assets;

f

fi\~/
/.
I~Jn~-j

tr/f/IfJU/

~

lhItJf;1

/111-"

l{

~~

~

j

0
,' fv

.

(i)

Company will use it!: best

~ffotts to Cause Shareholder, or a desi~~ 'ot :'

Sh~'I'eholder rea~OnablY a~eptablo.to com~any, to be elected t~ comp~~'S. Board Of~irecto:rs;

G)
Company will perrrut. and cause each oflts Submd~WlCS to perrmt"
'
Shareholder, or a designee of Shareholder reaso~bly acceptable to Company, to have full ~ce&:
to its premises md to all properties. books, contracts. commitments and records with X'eapect to
each such company's business, property and personnel as SharehoIder or its representatives
from time to time request;

may

.
(k)
Company shell ensure that no adrlitional shares of capital stock are issued
by Universe, Farmers, AlAI or Great Fidelity; a.n:;l.
J .
...1!..
' ,", :
,
.~Mor> ;
(1)
Cumpany shall
its best
obtain and deliver, as soon after tJ;w
Closing as possible, but in no event later th/jI1 Lh~ cons mroation of a public offering by the ". .
Company, :Bonds meeting the requirements set forth in le Pledge Agreement" and, to the extent
penrtissible under applicable insurance laws and regulationS t \vill use allY net proceeds from the
sale of Great Fidelity or its assets, and any net proceeds from, any public offering of Com.pao:Yi,L~
1\-' ,

use

stock. toward

ofBondsJ~

eff0;E

'fi'~)J

,

,:

Y"nJlTU :'; ..

:?

"

:;
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"';'

such press release, statement or disclosme and the time of the release thereof has been approved
in advance by the othet: party hereto.

5.2.2 Cooperation. Each party will fully cooperate with the other party and
51.1Cb. other party's advisors in COTInection wlth any steps required to be taken as part of ltg
obligntiQl1S hereunder, and will use its best ~ffOlts to cause all conditions to Closing to be
satisfied as promptly as possiblo and to obtain all consents and approvals necessary for such

parly's due and punctual performance of the Agreement and for the satisfaction of the conditionS
,
hereof on its part to be satisfied,. and will execute and deliver. or cause to be executed and
delivered, such additional reasonable documents and instruments and do. or cause to be done, all
xf::(Ulonable things nece5smy, proper or advisable under applicable law to consummate and make
effective the transactions eoti:t~mplated hereby.
Artlde VI -lndemniflcutlo1J
Party'~)

6.1
lndemnificatiQn of SbarehQlder anclQotnpany. Each party heret.o ("1n.demnifying , ...
hereby agrees to defend. indemnify and hold harmless the other party hereto and eac1:i.'bf

such other party' $ affiliate!!> successors, assigns. officers, directors, sbm:eholders and mnployd~s ;
("Indemnified Partie.s~') from and against and in respect of any and all costs, losses; cla.hns t .,,:.
liabilities, fines, penalties, dam~gt;ls lind expenses (mc1uding, without limitation, court ~osts ani,
reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel and accountants) invurn:d by an Indemnified Patty
in ccmnectlol1 with or arising out of any !?reach or alleged breach of any representation,. wamilitY': '.
_or covenan~.made by the Indemnifying Party in ~~~~
.
,,'

r'A~

0

r
~. ron~p{(y after recei$t by ·ii Indemnified Party of
notice o~
com.meucement of any actio over~d by ibis Article VI, such lndem.ni:fied P!lrty,'
~ \f. shall notify the n emm
ill
ofthe comrn.encer.nent "thereof; provided,. however,'
~ that any delay by the Indemnified :rarty in so notifying the Indemnifying Party sb.allnm r~1ieve
iJ.-00; \P~ 11m Indemnifying party of any liability to the Indemnified Party hereunder. c'Xccpt to the ~ent ...
~ &.-\ "'1 the IndemnifYing Party is materially and adversely prejudiced by such delay. The Indcmnifyin.g

6.2

~ 1t~JY.- A~

--

.

\ K
. i .
(\td\t

(T

0<

t/v

Party, by ddiv~ ofwritiennouce to the IndemnifledParty l.Vitbin 30
S ofreceipt ofnotiee of'
claim to indemnity from tlte Indemnified Party. may elect to comes such claim, actIOn r

:11

proceeding at the Indemnifying Party>s apcnse and by COl.lD.5c:l of its own choosmg. f the
Indemnifying Party does not elect to contest such cJaim, action or proceeding. the IndemnUied.
.
Party shaH have the right to prosecute, defend, comprom~se, settle or pay any claim at the
Indem.n.ifying Party's expense. If the Indemnified Party requests in writing that suchcl.ai:m, •....
action or proceedmg not be contested, then it shall not be contested. but shall not be covered '
•

.

';

.

~

.

It,,,

the in.dern.qities provided herein. The Jndennrlfying party may settle an indemnifiable matter'that
it has duly elected to contest with the consent of the Indemnified Party, after delivering a written
deScription oftbe proposed settlement W~ ~lIId receiving consent ftom. the Indemnified Party .. hi
the event tha.t the Indemnified Party declines to consent to a bona. fide settlement acceptable ti>:; .

of

the claiIll2Ult, the Indemnified Party shall have no right to indemnification beyond the amount
the proposed settlement. 1b.e lndemnified Party shall cooperate with the Indemnifying Party in ..
connection with any matter or claim for indenmification..

.,,".,

8~g
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Article JIll ... Conditions
7.1

~

>k.
f\/f)

r ' '5"

raJ 012

Conditjons to SharehQlder's ObligatioDs.

C

uxP'
~1Jr«f1.

~f
'

obligutions of Shareholder unde. .•.~.

this Agreement are subject to the fulfilhnent, ~ prior to losing1. of each of the following i';
con.d.itioll.-t:. any or ~l of which m.ay be waived in~' Shareholder in his sole diSOretiO~..·.:. '

.;r.

i;l.M'l\ u>

~

1.1 . estrZlciurir ()fOwnership of

.,.

and Farmers. All of the outstanding ;;'
apital stock of
shall have boon distributed to Company by Universe as a ' ,
dividendjan
all be ovvne~ directly by Company. J l-:.• _.
.'

tLl! 0 u:htAj ~,;,t. Itl ru:~,-cv-rnt:r.5
7.1.2 Consents. Authorizations or consents of any Per~on or Governmental
Authority requirod in connection with the consummation of the transactions oontemplated

hereby, including without limitation consents of the Id11ho Department ofInsll.l'aD.ce and First ,
Interstate, shall have been CJbtttined, and copies of such authorizations or consents shall have ,1
been delivered 10 Shareholder.
7.1.3 A ccuracy ofRepre.sentatlotlS atld Warranties. All of the representatio;i
and warranties ofCompHhy ~ontained herein shall be true on and as of the Closing Date with tile
same force and ffeet as thotlgh made on and as of the ClosinQ Date.
/'

7.2
Conditions to Company's QWigations. The obJiga1ions of Company hereunder
are Bubj ect to the fuJfillment. at or prior to Cloamg. of each of the following conditions, any or all
of which may be waived in writing by Company, in its sole disGrcti01'l;

7.2.1 Accuracy ofRepr~~TJtatiolls and Warranties. The representations a:nd
wan'antiM of Shareholder contained herein shAll be true Qn and as of tbeClosing:Qate with the . '
same force and effect as thoughr:ade on and as of the Closing Date, " :
"
,', .,

Clas£;!focuments. Shareholder shall have complie-.Q With the
requirements ofSection2,~ above.
7 ~,t( S~~, tt.d -s"-ot::l (}(lterf1
7.2.2

7,?. ~ tM~&(\.,*,.'
Arttcle VIII .. Taltillil1tiC11t and Default

-

.

'1,')ftVYI

- «td.l~ e~1M·R--r J

7.;t.S" m~

8.1

'..

C;~ ~tJ~~Ar4:
(.

7,1'{,.. Q-6.\lnA.4-Wt!- ~~~)
.~
.I

~\~

.

~ ;i

! .
~. .

.

', ~~!,:

(a)

by muWal consent of the parties here(o;

(b)

at the election of either party to this Agreement upon written notice to~ ;

fl(pcm#~::~DL~:::"OF ROD:~~~J~ '~J!~ND

~1

)

. j ..

~I I

Wd8S S

SG-9G-S
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(c)
by Shareholder if there ha..s been e materiw violation or br~ach by
Company of any agreement, representation or warranty contained in tbis Agreement that has
rendered the satisfaction of any condition to the obligation of Shareholder impossible and sllch
violation or brea.ch has not been waived by Shareholder; or
(d)
by COll)pany ifthere has been a m.aterial violation or breach by
Shareholder of any agreement, representation or warranty contained in this Agreement that has
rendered the satisfaction of any conditioll to the obligations of Company impossible and such
violation at breach has not been waived by Company.
8.2

Defaults Hud.,! the Agreem~nt. "Event of befault; ." wherever used herein, means

any Orie of the following events:
(a.)
Company shall fail to pay any interest or any other aIllOWlt payable to .
Shareholder or his succes!<or(s) or assign(s) pursu.ant to the Note, when and U3 the ~.lame becomes
due and in accordance with its tenns, and such fai)ur~ continues for three (3) days following the
~- ,

'

(b)
Company shaH fail to observe or perfonn any te~ covenant or agreement
of Company in this Agreement~ and such failure shall not have been cured with.h1 thirty (30) day~
following written notice thereof from Shareholder;

(c)

Any representation or warranty made by Company herein or in connection

with this Agreement shall prove to hav~ been irteorrect when made or deemerl. made, and cure
shall not have been made within thirty (30) days ofwrittcn notice thereof from Shareholder; ,
"

(d)
Company shall d~fault under the Note, the Pledge Agreement. the Security
Agreement, the Consulting Agreement, or the Noncompetition Agrcc:mcnt after the expiration uf "" ,',,'
any applicable cure period;
'
' '
i
" "
(e)
Company or any of its material Subsidiaries shall trulke <1 general
assignment for the benefit of creditors or shall become insolvent;
(f)
Company or any of its material Subsidiaries shall be the subject of, or th~
debtol' i~ any bankruptcy, reorganization, :receivership. compromise, Bll'angement, insolvency.

readjustment of de~ dissolution or liquidation case or proceeding under any law, whether now
or bert:laflcJ; io t:ffect, of any jurisdiction; or .

,'.

.

(g)
First Interstate, the holders of the Company's preferred stock, or any other ,
material obligoe of Company shall have taken any rem¢dial f\Ction against Company following,'a : .
default in the fulfi11ment of Company's obligationS toward nny su.c::h obligee. ,
~~: ';!i
,

'

"

- 12-
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Remedies for Default. Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default or at any ,
time thereafter, if any Event of Default is then continuing, Shareholder roay, v.1thout notice (or
without fmther notice) if initial notice was required pursuant to ~etiOD 8.2 ahovo)~ in his
8.3

discretion:
~ ,:

(a)
declare the entire unpaid balance of ptincipal and interest under the Note
hrunediately due and payable by Company, without presentment, demand., prDtI!!9t or any notice
of any .kind, all of:wmch are hereby expressly waived by Compan~;

.

.

subj (let to the requirements of applicable law then ill effect, proceed 10
enforce this Agreement Dr any document contemplated hereby by exercising such remedies as are
availa.ble thereunder or in respect thereof under applicable law, whether for damag~s, S))ecific
performance of any covenant or other ngreement, or the excrciBe of any power granted herein
or in the documents contemplated hereby;
(b)

m

(c)
In addition to ilie exercise of any rights now or hereafit:'T existing under
applicable law, exerciso all rights of a seemed creditor under the Uniform Commercial Code in
all relevant jurisdictions; and prOt<eed to protect and enforce.: its rights hereunder or realize ,(many
or all security ,granted pursuant hereto or under the Pledge Agreement. the Security Agreement oxthe Note in any manner or order he deems expedient without regard to any equitable principles of
marshaling or otherwise; and/or
. (d)
give written notice to Company of his desire to.becol1le "agent of record" .' .
for all farm association trusts andIor policies for which Company or any of its Subsidiaries, at'the, ";
time of giving of such notice, serves as agent of record. Upon receipt of such notice. Company
.,.
shall promptly deliver written notice, in form and submance satisfactory to Sbareholder; to:all .,
such trusts, policy holder,') and other appropriate prutic5 of the appointment of Sharehold~ .as ' .
agent of record
" ,::

Article IX - General
9.1

~unrjya1

of Representations and Wrur~. The representations, wacranties,

covenants and agreements of tho parties serforth in this Agreemen:t, including the exhibits .and
schedules hereto, and in any written fepresentation and any ancillaty document con1e:mplated

hereby, and the prOvisions of Article VI regarding indemnification and release of claims. shall
survive Closing until the later of (i) three years followina Closing or (ii) final paym~t by
Company in full satisfaction. of the Note.

9.2

Amendments and WaJ.y~. The provisions oftbis A~cemcnt ma:y.be mnlmcIt~(1

only by the written agreement of the parties hereto. E~t as othexwise pl'ovil.led " -~" .-~J
waiver, permit, consent or approval of any kind or cbaract~ on the: part of either party of
provision or condition ofthl!'l Agreement must be made in writing and shall be effeetive
the extent s,pecifically set forth in BUch writing. No action taken purstIaIrt to this
including any investigation by or on behalf af ofther party. shan be deemed to constitute
by the party taking suth action of compliance with any representation, war.nmty. 96verumt

{;~h:': : ' ,,i.:' ;r~"
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agreement contained herein. The waiver by any party hereto of 11 breach of any provision of this
Agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breath.
9.3
filrtjctJ in Interest. This Agreement shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto
and sball be biDding upon the p~rties hereto and their respective heirs, personal representatives• .
successors and assigns. Except to the extent expressly stated in this Agreement" nothing in this
Agreement is intended to confer
rights or remedies on any Person other t.h.an the parties

uy

hereto. Dor is anything in thi~ Agreement intended to relieve or disch~e the obligation or
liability of any thitd party, nor shall .my provision give any third party any right of subrogation
or <'IC1ion against any party to this Agreement.
.
Not~Y8. All notices. requost5, demands and other commmrications that are:
9.4
required-to-be or may be given under this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed Jo
have been duly given when delivered in person or tra:nsmitted by telex, facsimile, cable or .
tdegram, or by certified or registered first class mail, postage prepaicL return receipt requested, to
the respective parties as follows:

Ifto Company, to: -

AJA Services Corporation
One tE-..mg Clark Plaza

Lewiston, Idaho 83.501
Attention: John Taylor
With a copy to:

Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumbow &. McKlveen, Chartered
300 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 1368
Boise, Idaho 83701-1368
Attention: Richard Riley
If to Shareholder, to:

'.

,,.
) ~,."' j

Reed J. Taylor

•

., '

,;1\
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With a copy to:
1.,!

Caimcross & Hempelmann
:.

70th Floor; Columbia Center
701 FLfth.Avenue

: .•..

. ~~ :.

Seattle, WA 98104~7015
Attention: Scott Bell
or to such other address as any party may have furnished to the others in writing in ~ordance
herewith, ~copt that notices of vhaDge of address shall be effective only upon receipt.

Ii

9.5
Remydles CllJl!ulatiye. A.ll Tights and remedies of Shareholder shall be
cumtdative and may be t:xcroised at such times aud in such order as Sha:reholder de~es. ' The
failure Qf Shareholder to inBi:st upon or enforce strict porformance of any provision of thls or any
related agreement, or to exercise the rights or privileges hereunder or thereunder or any of its .
rights as provided by statute Or law or in equity or otherwise, shall not impair. prejudice or '
constitute a waiver of any such right, power. remedy or privilege or be constructed as a waiver of
any default hereunder or thereunder or as .an acquiescence therein or preclude the exercise or?>
enforcement thereof at a later time. Nor shall any single or partial exercis~ of any such righ~ :
power. remedy or privileges preclude any other or further exercise of any other right. powei;·~ '
remedy or privilege.

9.6
Severabili~. The invalidity of all or any part of any section of this Aireem~t .,
shaU not render jnvalid the remainder of this Agreement or the remainder of such section. If any
provision of this Agreement is so broad as to be W1enforceable~ such provision ~ball be
interpret~d to be only so broad as i5 onforceable.
9.7
Construction. Singular and plural forms, as the case lhay be. oftbe terms defined
in Article I above, Or of the capitalized tertn$ defmed elsewhere inthis Ag:reC1Ilen~ have ';:
correlative meaning$. Arry defined tarm thm t¢;lates to .a, document inolude~ within its definition:
any amendments. modifications. renewals. restatements, extensions, supplements or substitutions
that may heretofore have been or that may hereafter be executed in accordance with the terms
thereof and as may be pennitted by this Agreement.
"

,

9.8
Headioi:S. The section and other headings contained in this Agreement are for . I:
reference pmpOSCB only and shall not be decmed to be a part of this Agreement or to affect the ;;,:: '
meaning or interpretation of this Agreement.
:utr

9.9

'!';f~:ii .
Govemin~ Law; SkIYice QfPmcess. The -validity, meaning and effect ofthis:1~Jl;:+'i t

Agreement shall be determined in accordance with the laws oftbe State ofIdaho. The parti~l!'A:
hereby agree that delivery or mailing of any process or other papers in the manner provided iii!U! i.
Section 9.4 above, or in such other manner 3!l may be permitted by law, shall be v(lUd
and ..,t'" :~; ,. ,.'
,
.
... ,, '
sufficient service thereof.
::,' t :i .:..
.,
,i.:~",p;:' .. .
,,~

;-' ,';I~~iJi~li '; ,
.. "
i:SS7:;·,
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9.10 Entire Agreement. '11:ri:t Agreement, including the exhibits and schedules and
ancillary docwnents expressly referred to herein that fonn a part ht~Qf, constitute the ontire
agreement of the parties concerning the matters referred to herein and supersede all prlor
agreements and understandings, oral or written, all ofwruch are hereby superseded and canceled.
9.1 I

Exhihits and Schedules. .
Exhibit A
ExhibitB
Exhibit C

ExhibitD
Exhibit E

ExhibitF

Exhibit G
Schedule 2.1.1
Schedule 2.1.3
Schedule 3.5

Note
Pledge Agreernent
Security Agreement
Consulting Agreement

Noncompetition Agreement
Bill of Sale
Form of Company's COUILSel's Opinion
Airplanes
Allocation of Redemption Price
Financial Statements

Schedule 3.7

Litigation

Schedule 5.1

Financial- Compliance Levels and RatiO!;

9.12 Execution in Cmmterpmis. This Agreement may be executed in any number of
counterparts, each of which when so executed and delivered shall be deemed an original) and
such counterpart together shall constitute ono instru.m.ent.
,:'"

DATED the first day entered above.

COMPANY:

AlA SERVICES CORPORATION

By: _____________________
ItS: _ _ _ _ ___

-SHAREHOLDER:

~_

. REED J. TAYLOR

207Bl OC.M44
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ExhibitB

STOCK. PLEDGE AGREEMENT
This STOCK PLEDGE AGREEMENT is entered into as of
• 1995, by and .
between AIA Services Corporation. an ldaho Cozporation ("Pledgor"), and Reed J. Taylor
("Secured Party"). .Capitalized terms Used in this Agreement ,and not otherwise defined shall
have the meanings given to them in the Redemption Agreement (as defined below).

RECITALS
A.
Pledgor and Secured.Party we parties to thai: certain Stoo
ede.til.ption
. . 9Agreement, da.ted as of
, 1995 (the ·'RedemptionAgmom t'J, pursuant to whio}if .'
Pledgor will redeem 613,494 shares ofits Common Stock held by Se:e eel Party in exohange for
in part, a Promissory Note of even date herewith in the principal amoUn: of $6.000~OOO (the '.:
'~ote"), Pledgor and Secured Party are also parties to that certaln •
Agreement (the ".
Awcement")~ that certain Consulting Agreement (the "Consulting Agreement,)
and that oertain Noncompetition Agreement (the "Noncompeut1()n Agreement'), all of even date '.
herewith.
.,
J

Company~

w~11 ~ .

B. 1!t;niversa Life lnsurance
an Idaho domestic insurance company
C"Univergel')~ Farmers Health Alliance Administrators, Inc., an .):::'J~ corporation ~.if?
("Farmers"), and AlA Insurance, Inc., an Idaho corporation ("AIAl"), al.'o whully owned (Je... lrdt
subsidiaries of Pledgor.
, J.tl~/rt;

eJ"')

C.
As a condition of Secured PartY's entry into the Redemption Agreement, Secured
Party bas required that Pledgor pledge all of the shares of capital. stock of each ofUmverse,
Farmers and A1Al) and any other shares of capital stock dIstributed to ple~or b~ Universe, .~ . ".
~~tl1""!!".lY' the "Shares') as Security for ~~Liolliiii:>., : :

Pl[~ll¥:lIg @#r t};e 'RBdMijjtioR Agte~

f rr n~ d4.tt-

&I};.:Y-he.

D.
Secured Party desires, and Pledgor agre<!s to grant to Secured Party. as security ,'.,
.
"
f
for the Secured ObHgfltions (as defined bduw) and on the terms and conditions heteinafter set "
forth, a security interest in all right, title andlntQ'C'St of Pledgor in the Pledged Collateral (as ,:' ,.:.
further defined he1Clw), including, but not limited to, the Shares.

'i't';: ~

AGREEMENTS

" ,~i !r <;! ..

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and fur Qth~r;!':
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby aoknowledgedd.
the ....
.,...Hes agree as follow!I!
~u

i'>,~<''i;;>::! .
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Seeured Obligations

1.

(collectively. the "Secured Obligations").

2.

Pledge
As c~llateral security for the payment and performance in full ofllie Secured Obligati6ns~

Pledgor hereby. pled!ies. assigns; 1rtnwfet~; delivers and grants to Secured Patty a security interest
in all right! title and interest of Pledgor that pte~ently exists 01' tha.t hereafter may arise in, to arid
lmder Ci) the Shares and aU rights and privileges ofP1edgor with re~ct thereto, (ii) all c~h! \ . :
dividends, noncash dividends. stock dividends, interest, cas~ instruments and oilier property :;; .
from time to time received, receivable or otherwise wstributed in respect of or in exchange fOf:
any or all of the Shares, (iii) all !Jubscr:1ptions, warrants, options and any other riahts issued uPhn:
or in connection with 1he Shares, (iv) any additional shares of capital stock ofllie issuers ofllie . :
ShfiI'C:l5 hereafter issued, (v) any and aU certificaoos or other instrument or docUlllents representirlg
any oftbe foregoing. and (vi) all cash and non-cash proceeds of the foregoing (all such property.
collectively, tbe <'Pledged Collateral'?

3.

I

.

.

Representations and Warranties

. 01*-,b~\ Pledgor represents and WlIITants to, and agroos with, Secured Party as follows:
UqvV- \ .\

Title. The Shares include all of the issued and ollf;Stttnding {'.apital stock of each of; ,
UniVefS Fanners, and AlAI. The Shares are legally and beneficially oWned by Pledgor on tm; ::,,' '
date her of: :free and clear of a111iens, encumbrances, drums or demands arising through Pledgor/.i
whatsoever (other than the security interest created hereby and the lien of First Interstate Bank

3.1

ot ...

Idaho, NA ("First Interstate") upon the capital stock ofUnivel'5e (the "First Interstate Lienj).':(;ll
of the Shares were duly aufuorizcd and validly issued, and 1.11:e fully paid and nOIla.')sessabJe. .'Ii.' • .
; ' .' ~ .

3.2

Power and Authority. Pledgor llas all requisite power and authority and.fulll~,..

right to execute. deliver and p~lform all QfPlcdgor's obligations under this A2J:"eelIlent and to}~n: i ;
pledge and grant a &ecurity interest in the Pledged Collat~;ral in the manner and for the purposW!J ;
contem.plated by this Agreement, and has the right to grant Secured party a security interestill~fi~:;

!

such P1edged CollateraL ~bject to the rights of First Interstate in the stock ofUnlversc. · )i~L:.;

and::~~;;IT! .

3.3
Execution; Binding Contract. This Agreement bas been duly executed
delivered by Pledgor and constitutes the legal, -valid and binding obligation of 'Pledgor,
enforceable against Pledgor in acc.ordance with its te01~

·!~fd,:

:t::Jl:',:

( hU£ftC~IUf'h ~t~r*~J,~:
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No Violation. Tho pledg of and the grant ofa security interest in the Pledget, 01·;fO.k. ../1};:;
for the purpos¢ contemp.laied by this AgreClIlcut does
"7 ~':'::'':,'''D,
not. and will not (i) violate any law, e, regullrtloIl, order. judgment, settlement agreement or
.. ;',;;
1"1 ·'~!'H~~~
decree (including, without limitation any ofthe'ioregoing arising out of any regulatory ~tivity
of':any ,tnsurance tegu1e.mry aiency gov~enta1 authCJrity of any state) applicable to Pledgor ,
or (ii) result in or require the crtmtio or imposition of (except as granted to Secmed party by this
Agreement) any lien, security intere ,encumbrance or right of athers of any nature upon" or with .
respect to, any of the Pledged Coll
aL
3.4

3.5
Protection ofSeCW*i Interest. To Pledgor's knowledge. tho Pledged CollatemI is
not su.bject to any option, agreement assessment, charge or other contractual restriction of
nature that mi t
•..
. d la or otherwise affect the pledge of the Pl~died Collateral
heIeund~.[ 0 the sale or disposition 0 the Pled~ed CoUmer
unlu~nt hereto by Secured Party.
Pledgor will.no s
or emu my len or encum ranoe of any narute, other than thoso granted
to Secured Party and the First Intef!:rt.:rte Lien. to attaeh to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor will
fully and punctwilly ~rfonn any duty required of it in conn~ction with the Pledged Collateral
d win 1lotta1.re any aetion that will impair. damage or destroy Secured Party1g rights with
respect to the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor will remain the sole shareholder of all of the
outstanding capital stock ofUruvefse, Fanners and AW. and Pledgor will not pennit Universe,
Farmers or AIAI to issue any additional capital stoc)(and any attempt to issue additio.nal shares., .' . . . . " .',
of such capital stock shall be in-valid.,
CVk.J-t\tllJ .~c.ki {); r ~
",r ,It\'.i-~11lWr~!pt;

any

fr{

L.

4.

(ik"tJ--

\". I .. n

.

D

e)."

t '..

~~

In

v~ '1D F-e.rA.:,
..,"
I? Il.l>t- le..!>~(U'ld... .

Delivery of Pledged Collateral

11 e,tU,t.h
\,/1 ',

Pledgor agrees to deliver to Secured Part)' on the date oftllis Agreement all instruments.
and stook certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collatt:ral now owned. except for those Shares of
Universe in the pos3cssion of First lntcrntnte and subject to the First Interstate L1c:Jl (the ~'F.irst
Interstate SharesH), and to deliver to SlICufed Party promptly upon :receipt all i.n.st.Tmnents and ,
stoc:k certificates pertaining to the Pledged Collat~ra1 acquired in the :fhture. Without)imitingthe
foregoing. jfPledgor shall purchase or otherwise b¢come entitled to receive or shall receive, ill.'"
connection with any of the Pltdged Collateral, any: (i) stock certificate. including without '. j,;,l{;",
limitation any certificate representing a stock dividend or in connection with any increase or
reduction of capital, reclassifica.tion, merger, consolidation. sale of assets, combination of shili:e~~
stock split, spin-off', split-off. split-up or liquidation; (li) option, warrant, or right, whether as all! ,

IL:; ,

~

Y, i \\,.,\-- uti'-

fJ)!ltI'(; IV
(fy ,

addition to or in substitution or in exchange for any of its securities, or otherwise; (iii) dWiQoJ.id '
rLE:.iImlU"s
~stributiO'l'i pa:yable ~
l~sueQ."13y o~
H'nivm;~'
ALAJ, or ~ any certificate
the First Interstate Shares, then Pledgor shan
in

QF prefJ8ftj'. iB:eIueliBs t>¢(;ufitie;

,

thfID.

representing

Q£

acc:ept it in trust for Secured Party and shall immediately deliver it to Secured pany in the exact: ,
form received, with Pledgor>s endorsement When necessary. or appropriate stock powers duly';:'
eKecuted in blank to be held by Secured Party aa part of the Pledged Collateral. Pledgor lihall·

deliver to Secured Party on the d~e Qfthis Agreexnellt jnstructions, in f'01:m and "',,!-"L~.~ll,",,,,
acceptab1~ tn Secured Party. signed by Pledgor and First Interstate, requiring'

-,',.-:",,,,

, representing the First Interstate Shares be delivered promptly nnd directly to Shlll'eh.older
the satisfaction of any obligations secured by the Fitst Interstate Shares, and prohlbitihg any! '.,
action which would inerease thoJrunount of Pledgor', indebtedness to First Intcrsta1e,
. 'iI.A'

\ rt1n~

3
-

',;;;',;;

~
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Contemporaneously with the signing of this Agreement, Pledgor shall deliver to Secured
party Assignments Separate from Certificate ("Assisnments"), in the form attacl1ed M
Exhibits A-l~ A-2 and A-3 to this Agreement. covering aU the Shares. Such AsSignment<;, shw.l
be endorsed in blank by Pl¢d&or before delivery to Secured Party. Secured Party may not use
$'I.l,ch Assignments to transfer the Pledged Collateral except in realization on i~ security interests
in ilil;.': Plooged. Collateral after the occurrence, and during th~ continuance, of a DeiauIt
d.e:fmed in Section S hereof). .
'

(as

6.,

'

Pledgor's Voting Right$
;

i

So long as no Default under this Agreement has OCCUlTed and is conrlnutn~~ Pledgor shaH
be rntitled to exorc:i.!'Je any voting rights incident to the Pledged Col1aternl, subject to any
restrletion on such voting rights containl!d herein or in the Redemption A~eement. Upon the
occurrence and continuation of it Default, Pledaor's right to exercise suoh voting rights shall
immediately cease and terminate and all voting rights withrespect to the Pledged Collateral shaIJ
rest solely and oxclusively in Secured party. The furegoing sentence shall constitute and grant to
Secured party an irrevocable proxy coupled with an interest to vote the Pledged Collateral U1X!h
the occurrence and continuation of such a Default. and any officer ofUnive.1'$('l, Farmers~ f]f ,J.
A1Al, as the case may be, may rflly on written not1ca from Secured Party RS to the existence of tt, ' .,,'
Default and Secured Party's right to vote such Pledged Collateral.
'
,.:,it·,
i

7.

Appointment (If Secured party

Pled~or hereby designates and appoints SecuriUl Party its true and lawful attorney
power irrevocable. for it and in iOi nmne, place and stead,
nat a Default on tbis
AJ[eement shall have oeourred, to ask., demand. receive, , . ',' '.',
'
an amounts that may be or become due or payable to;Pledgorwithrespect
Collatera11 and in Secured Party's sole discrclion to file any claim or take any action or
proceeding in its owp. name or in the runneofPledgor, that Secured Party deems necessary or .
desirable in order to carry out the provisions oftbis Agreement and to accompJish the purposes, ~
IlereoL Nothing in this Agreement shall obligate: Secured Party to perform any duty, covenant or
obligation required tv bt; pt:rformed by Pledgor,in connection with the Pledged Collateral.
,;

8.

~{

Default

Anyone of the following events shaH constitute a default by Pledgor under this
Agreement (a "Default")!

,
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(b)

~

D

Agreemen which brea

.;,Uq

:;

,.,j--\~{W'~t ~(v:;~ # ' .I.

rv-w ~ D~\W' Cot\lJ";~of>-~~~,t

achofanyreprcscntatio~'wmranly, t~nno!conditioncontainedin this .~. If: :~jIE'·
continues after notice and a thirty (30) day OP~ortwlity to cur::~:c..{ ':flt, c~r~~~~;

.

(c)
Failure of Pledgor fully Md timely to perform and observe any)
terms, ' : <ii:t:. . i\'f~if{' .
conditions and provisions contained i!l the Note, ~ C.AItMlt!lue .....
the Security
.
~! ;' ., " ;i;';;F,~~
A€7~ement. or the Stock Redemption Agreement, or is ElBY otbar ~moat Qr agIlNmewt
, , :JJ.t:.':j'::';J;j~:, '
between P1e~ger and Seemod Pan;y relating to the iale, rcdtmljluml. tz:amfe.r Q;{ other dispositi.pD. ' ; ',~r'(;/ ';" ,:~>\; ,

,-imt,

:=;: apPlicab:~:~'::7~ll::::~::=:'=~:~gedr
o

,

. .

'

",:'

;"

M~

(e)
issoJUtJOn.l<nnlnatJOIl of existenco, imIoIvency or bankruplCy ofPledgor
or any of.i~~SubGidiarie, r appointment of' a receiver to take p¢s$ossion of any of the Plc:dgcd ~ j

~

w~J....,~~klM.kn.J4, ~C{tW~ 1~IN

Collateral.

iJUt..

:aluLo(J-.~. P/edJut dllCt~ ~~"~.t)~kr l

~"Lb, 11 t.it rf {.tit. Poi;!... ~ f.l~ ~U,A.L<..,.
1.'4/n~(lUL9 a..'fltlr
.
9.1
General. In the event of a Default by Pledgol' under this Agreement. Seemed
Party may, at its election and in its sole discretion, without further notice of such electiOllaIId i "

9.

Remedies

without demand upon Pledgor, do anyone or mote of the following~

.

;

.;

'
.. .

.

:~

r· ···

(a)

Declare the SecUl'td Obligations immediately due and payable.

(b)
Sell all or any part ofthe Pledged Colla~l at public auction or private i ' : . ..
~ sale in accordance with the laws oftbe United States or other applicable law, tor cash or credit
~:v..\o.f:
the election of Secured Party, Pledgor to be credited wIth thf' amounts of any such
,
tM1-.~ when the cash proceeds are actually received by Secured I:arty. Under ,
'
tL' .p...l Secured Party be required to expedite or delay sale of all or any pm of the
(J.,l ~ J.~ due to prevailing or expected conditions in the market for guch Pledged Collateral. Bach
. .,
~w ~ purchaser at My such sale shaH hold the property sold absolutely free trolll any claim or right on ~
~j'{J'J
the part of Pledgor, and Pledgor hereby waives (to the extent pemritted by applicable law) all ,.1 ":. . .
~\ ~ rights of redemption, stay and/or appraisal which it now has or may at any time in the future have
o
\yo ~ under any rule of law Of statute now existing or hereafter enacted. Secmed Party shall not be
p ' 6 obligated to make any sale of Pledged Collateral.regardless of notice of sale havini been given.
(i.- v;J
Secured Party may adjourn any public or private sale from time to time by announcement at th~,.
o (p I time and place fixed therefor, and such sale may, without:further notice. be made at the time arid
(""
place to which it was so adj oumed.

::t

rk

t.

f-

tf

fir

;#

~

~

(c)
Exeroise rut of the rights and remedies available under the Uniform
f'..llmmercial Code as enactad in the applicablejurisdieti(}n or under other applicable law.
. ;

.

~

:.

9.2
Agent, For the purposes set forth below, Pledgor doe$ hereby iIT~vo~blJ IJ.l~"''''~~.
constitute, designate and appoint Secured Party (and any agent which may he designalfd by .·
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Secured Party) as Pledgor's true and lawful attorney-in-fact and agent. In the t..'1Ient of any
Defuult by Pledgor umieI" this Agreemen; such agent shall have full power and authority ;for and
in the name of Pledgor to arrange for the transfer of the Pledged Collateral on the books of
Universe. Fanners, ~ or any other issuer of the Shares, to the name of Secured Parly, or
.(1 J).
purchaser fr().tn or nomme~ of Se¢tlt'w,pmy.
~ (.{.~ ~ ~f ~ 4.I't,,-

any

.

, ' ;:
:

.

,
_ C-J WJw~!~....JJ
9.3
Sale ofPledged Collateral. Pledgor recognizes ~ Secured Party'may sell all or , ~ j
any part of the Pledged Collateral pursuant to Section 9.1 above, as and whenapplieai')le by '"
,.

means of ono or more private sale~ to 8. remicted group of purchasers who will be obligated to
agree, among other things, to acquire such sectlrities for their own account. for investment arid
not with a view to distribution or resale~ Pledgor acknowledges that any such priva1e sale or, ', :
sales may be at places and on terms less favorable t~ the sellc:rthan if sold at public sales,and,r ' .,
agrees that such private sales shall be deemed to have been made ill a commerCially , " . ' ,
manner, and that S~ured party has no obligation to deJay 1h~ sale ofany such securit)-'for
period of time necessary to permit Universe, Farmers, AIAI. or any o:ther igsu~ ofthe ,
.' " ,
V~giBter such ~ec~tic:!'I ~orpubliCl s~e under arty llppl,icab16 securities IaW:i Q[ , '. • ' • • :, ;; , '
(J ~% event any notice 15 reqUlred to be glven to Pledgor With .r:spect to any sueh. sale 6r dlSPOSltio~of
Ct ' (
any of the J?ledged Collateral, ten (10) calendar days notice of any 3UCh action shall be deemed to
.r/..
be a sufficient and oommercially reasonable nfltice.

W-

k \

lILW'/
~tJ.

{\Q

9.4
Liability ojSeC1Jred Party. Neither Secured Party nor any employee, attorney.,
accountant, l.mderwriter or other agent of Secured party shall be liabJe for any action taken or '
omitted to be taken in connection with this Agrgement, except for its or their own recklessness or
wiIlftd misconduct. Secur"d party shall not be liable for any claims, demands, losses or damages
made, claimed or suffered by Ple<t,gor, except any that may be caused by Secured Party's
recklessness or willful misconduct. Pledgor shall reimburse Secured Party; on demand, for all , :
costs and expenses illcurred by Secured PartY In connection with the administration and ,
enforcement of this Agreement iWd for all costs and ~xpmses of the enforcement,oftbis
Agr~en:umt, and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Seemed Party and the othetpe'rsons "
Ilatned l;tbove from and against any and allliability incurred in cOIlllection with this ' "
unless such liability is due to their gross negligence or wi11fu1 mkcondu.ct.
., (~ .) ':Yi:!m~'.fJ"·
~~erU

10.

Substitution and Release of Security

In the event
~n-n"'Tofwhicb.~

Six Million Dollars

average interest rate reasonAbly approximate to the projected

same period under the Note, thon SeCUred Party will allow
the Pledged Collateral, provided that the following

"n.,n.,~"~,rl
."

(a)

The bonds are issued by the U.S,

JOVprnmeJ[ll

Secured Party;
(b)

-f
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or an obligor approved by ';

